Pettus-Brown v. Cooper

LASHAWN R. PETTUS-BROWN, Plaintiff, v. ETHNA M. COOPER, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 1:15-cv-539

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION

September 1, 2015

Black, J.

Bowman, M.J.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, an inmate in state custody at the Pickaway Correctional Institution (PCI) in Orient, Ohio, brings this civil action against eleven state and federal officials and entities. (See Doc. 1). The complaint was filed with this Court on August 18, 2015 upon plaintiff's payment of the filing fee.¹ It appears from the record that summons has been issued by the Clerk of Court to the defendants by way of certified mail. (See Doc. 3-6).²

This matter is before the Court for a sua sponte review of the complaint to determine whether the complaint, or any portion of it, should be dismissed because it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 804, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); § 805, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The screening procedures established by § 1915 apply to complaints filed by prisoners against governmental entities, officials or employees regardless of whether the plaintiff has paid the filing fee, as in this case,or is proceeding in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a); Hyland v. Clinton, 3 F. App'x 478, 479 (6th Cir. 2001); Bell v. Rowe, No. 97-4417, 1999 WL 196531, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 22, 1999) (citing McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608-09 (6th Cir. 1997)); see also Fleming v. United States, 538 F. App'x 423, 426 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (citing Ruiz v. United States, 160 F.3d 273, 274 (5th Cir. 1998)); Miller v. Edminsten, 161 F. App'x 787, 788 (10th Cir. 2006); Lewis v. Estes, No. 00-1304, 2000 WL 1673382, at *1 (8th Cir. Nov. 8, 2000) (per curiam) (citing McGore and Seventh and Second Circuit cases).

A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous when the plaintiff cannot make any claim with a rational or arguable basis in fact or law. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328-29 (1989); see also Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). An action has no arguable legal basis when the defendant is immune from suit or when plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An action has no arguable factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or "wholly incredible." Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992); Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199. The Court need not accept as true factual allegations that are "fantastic or delusional" in reviewing a complaint for frivolousness. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328).

Congress also has authorized the sua sponte dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). A complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff must be "liberally construed" and "held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). By the same token,however, the complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Hill, 630 F.3d at 470-71 ("dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and Twombly governs dismissals for failure to state a claim" under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).

"A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, but need not "accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Although a complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations," it must provide "more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A pleading that offers "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders "naked assertion[s]" devoid of "further factual enhancement." Id. at 557. The complaint must "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (citations omitted).

Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this action against the following defendants: Hamilton County, Ohio, Court of Common Pleas Judge Ethna M. Cooper; Hamilton County Prosecutor Joseph T. Deters; Hamilton County Sheriff Jim Neil; Hamilton County; the Hamilton County Justice Center (HCJC); the State of Ohio; Ohio Attorney General Mike DeWine; the Warden of PCI; United States Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz; United States District JudgeMichael R. Barrett; and the President of the United States, Barak Obama. (Doc. 1, at PAGEID#: 2-4).

In the complaint, plaintiff alleges in the "Statement of Facts" that he was "unlawfully placed at HCJC" after he was arrested in Los Angeles and extradited to Cincinnati on December 20, 2013 "for an alleged violation from Hamilton County Case# B0500613." (Id., at PAGEID#: 4). Plaintiff lodges the following complaints about his confinement at HCJC: (1) although he filed numerous grievances between December 28, 2013 and January 31, 2014 complaining that he had not been allowed access to the jail's law library, he was not granted access to the library until February 13, 2014, for only a 45-minute period; (2) the jail law library lacked adequate "resources to properly defend himself before the court as there were no current law books, no adequate digital legal resources (i.e. Westlaw, LexisNexis, etc.), and no means of preparing and printing a legal document for presentation to the court"; and (3) the jail was "grossly overcrowded," failed to "provide adequate medical care for detainees," and "was illegally taking money from the accounts of detainees, a violation which the HCJC was previously exposed of committing and reprimanded for said violations." (Id., at PAGEID#: 4-5) (emphasis in original). Plaintiff states that with the help of his executive assistant he filed a motion, "supported with verifiable evidence," challenging the Hamilton County court's jurisdiction and requesting the dismissal of the action against him based on his "multiple immunities" and "the commercial discharge of the case by the State of Ohio." (Id., at PAGEID#: 5). However, defendant Cooper "deliberately ignored" the law by sentencing plaintiff to a three-year term of imprisonment on March 5, 2014. (Id., at PAGEID#: 6). Plaintiff was then transferred from HCJC to PCI. (Id.).

Thereafter, on April 8, 2014, plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with theUnited States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio in a case docketed as Case No. 1:14-cv-292. (Id.). The case was brought against PCI's Warden, with defendant DeWine representing the warden on behalf of the State of Ohio. The case was assigned to defendants Barrett and Merz. In his habeas petition, which is still pending before the Court for final disposition, plaintiff has presented four grounds for relief based on his "sovereign immunity, jurisdictional immunity, corporate (personal) immunity, and the commercial discharge of Case# B0500613 by the State of Ohio." (Id.).

Plaintiff claims that "[o]n or about May 25, 2014, through the discovery process in the federal habeas action, a contractual agreement was reached between the State of Ohio and himself "in which the State of Ohio acknowledged and agreed that [he] is in fact sovereign and has sovereign immunity; that [he] held corporate (personal) immunity; that the Hamilton County court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the alleged offenses in suit in Case# B0500613; and that the alleged charges in Case# B0500613 were in fact discharged in full" in accordance with Ohio law and the Uniform Commercial Code. (Id.) (emphasis in original). Plaintiff states that defendant DeWine bound the State of Ohio to that agreement and that DeWine has "acknowledged and agreed" that plaintiff "is in fact sovereign" and "is not, nor could be, a resident of a corporate fiction such as the State of Ohio." (Id., at PAGEID#: 6-7) (emphasis in original).

Plaintiff further asserts that defendants Cooper and Deters "fraudulently created securities to bond Case# B0500613," and that the "bonds are in fact the equitable property of Mr. Pettus-Brown" held in "constructive trust" by defendant Cooper as the "trustee" for plaintiff as "the beneficiary." (Id., at PAGEID#: 8-9). Plaintiff claims that the bonds were improperly used "togenerate revenue for Hamilton County and the State of Ohio without [his] knowledge." (Id., at PAGEID#: 9). He also alleges that defendant Cooper has "acknowledged, admitted, and contractually agreed that the bonds do in fact exist and that they are in fact the property of Mr. Pettus-Brown." (Id.). Plaintiff states that Cooper entered a contractual agreement with him "[o]n or about September 5, 2014" in which she waived "any and all defenses pertaining to [plaintiff's] claims" and agreed "to be held liable for returning the bonds to Mr. Pettus-Brown and/or providing the location and party in possession of the bonds," as well to plaintiff's "placing a lien in the sum certain of ten million dollars ($10,000,000USD) on her property (assets) until ... her default is cured and the default penalty is paid." (Id., at PAGEID#: 9-10).

In addition, plaintiff...