Petway v. Santander Consumer U.S.

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JACQULINE PETWAY, Plaintiff, v. SANTANDER CONSUMER USA INC., Sued herein as, and doing business as Chrysler Capital, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 22-3100 (RBW)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

July 17, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION

REGGIE B. WALTON, United States District Judge

In her initial Complaint, the plaintiff, Jacquline Petway proceeding pro se, brings this civil action against the defendant, Santander Consumer USA Inc. d/b/a Chrysler Capital (“Chrysler Capital”), asserting what the Court construes as eight causes of action: (1) negligence (2) trust fraud; (3) harassing phone calls; (4) conversion of a 2021 Jeep Renegade; (5) a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692j of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”); (6) a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1605 of the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”); (7) breach of contract; and (8) a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1611 of the TILA. See generally Notice of Removal Exhibit (“Ex.”) A (Complaint (Sept. 13, 2022) (“Compl.”)), ECF No. 1-2. Currently pending before the Court are: (1) the defendant's motion to dismiss, see Santander Consumer USA Inc. d/b/a Chrysler Capital's Motion to Dismiss (“Def.'s Mot.”), ECF No. 4; (2) the plaintiff's first motion to amend her Complaint, see Motion to Amend (“Pl.'s 1st Mot. to Amend”), ECF No. 12; and (3) the plaintiff's second motion to amend her Complaint see Motion [f]or Leave [t]o Amend (“Pl.'s 2d Mot. to Amend”), ECF No. 14. Upon careful consideration of the parties' submissions,^[1] the Court concludes for the following reasons that it must deny both of the plaintiff's motions to amend and grant the defendant's motion to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The following allegations are derived from the plaintiff's Complaint, unless otherwise specified.^[2] “On September 24, 2021[,] [the plaintiff] [engaged in] a credit transaction with [the defendant,] Chrysler Capital[,] for [acquisition of a] 2021 Jeep Renegade.” Notice of Removal, Ex. A (Affidavit (Sept. 13, 2022) (“Aff.”)) ¶ 1, ECF No. 1-2. In June 2022, the plaintiff “made a payment [to the defendant] . . . with a remittance coupon . . . to pay [the defendant] w[hat] they said [she] owe[d] th[e]m[.]” Id., Ex. A (Compl.) ¶ 3. The defendant then “sent [her] a green card [in the] mail” from the defendant's CEO leading her to believe that “[b]y law [her] payment was received and [ac]cepted” Id., Ex. A (Compl.) ¶ 3. However, the plaintiff subsequently “received phone calls from [the defendant] har[a]ssing [her] saying a payment needed to be made or [her] truck would be repo[ssess]ed.” Id., Ex. A (Compl.) ¶ 3. Finally, on August 12, 2020, “[the defendant] took [the plaintiff's] truck . . . after [she] atte[m]pt[ed] to settle [her] debt.” Id., Ex. A (Compl.) ¶ 3.

The plaintiff also asserts a variety of claims against Darcars of Waldorf, see id., Ex. A (Aff.) ¶¶ 2-7, which the defendant identifies as “a car dealership with its principal place of business at One Business Park Drive, Waldorf, Maryland[,]” Def.'s Mem. at 3; see Def's Mot., Ex. A (Maryland State Business Entity Search (Oct. 18, 2022) (“Business Entity Search”)) at 2, ECF No. 4-2.^[3] Specifically, the plaintiff alleges (1) that “D[arcars] [of] W[aldorf] has been furnishing deceptive form[s] every month misleading [the plaintiff] to believe [she] owe[s] a debt that is already paid” in violation of 15 U.S.C. [§] 1692j, Notice of Removal, Ex. A (Aff.) ¶ 2; (2) that “the [f]inance [c]harge [was] suppose[d] to be explained conspicuously . . . [and was] suppose[d] to be the sum of all charges[,] . . . [which] . . . was [not] explained to [the plaintiff] by Darcars[,]” id., Ex. A (Aff.) ¶ 3 (emphasis omitted); (3) that “Darcars never explained the insurance section in the contract which is labeled optional [according to] 15 U.S.C. [§] 1605[,]” id., Ex. A (Aff.) ¶ 4; (4) that “Darcars has breached the contract [it had with the plaintiff] and therefore by law the contract no longer exist[s,]” id., Ex. A (Aff.) ¶ 5; and (5) that “Darcars owe[d] [the plaintiff] a duty in [r]emedy of a refund for each payment [she] made to [their] company[,]” id., Ex. A (Aff.) ¶ 7. However, Darcars is not named as a defendant in this lawsuit, nor has the plaintiff provided any proof of service of the Complaint upon Darcars. See generally id., Ex. A (Compl.).

The plaintiff seeks the return of the 2021 [J]eep Renegade and the title to the vehicle. See id., Ex. A (Compl.) ¶ 2. Additionally, the plaintiff is “also requesting [$]1,000 for every law that was broken and . . . compensation for damages and hardships due to the negligence of [the defendant].” Id., Ex. A (Compl.) ¶ 2.

B. Procedural History

On September 13, 2022, the plaintiff initiated this civil action in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. See id., Ex. A (Compl.) at 1. Subsequently, on October 12, 2022, the defendant timely removed the case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446. See id. at 1. The defendant filed its motion to dismiss on October 19, 2022, see Def's Mot. at 1, to which the plaintiff has failed to file a response, see Def's Notice of Failure to Oppose at 1. Based on the plaintiff's failure to respond to the motion to dismiss, the defendant filed a notice arguing that the Court should treat the defendant's motion as conceded. See id. On March 24, 2023, the Court issued an Order informing the plaintiff of her obligation to oppose the defendant's motion and the potential consequence of dismissal if she failed to oppose the motion within the time provided by the Court.^[4] See Order at 2 (Mar. 24, 2023), ECF No. 10. Specifically, the Court ordered that, “on or before April 20, 202[3], the plaintiff shall file her memorandum in opposition to the defendant's motion to dismiss, if she intends to oppose the motion[,]” and advised her that, if she failed to do so, “the Court may dismiss the plaintiff's Complaint upon a finding that the arguments raised by the defendant in its motion are meritorious.” Id. (citing Cohen v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of D.C., 819 F.3d 476, 482-83 (D.C. Cir. 2016)). As of the date of the issuance of this Memorandum Opinion, the plaintiff has not filed an opposition to the defendant's motion as she was ordered to do.

On November 16, 2023, during the pendency of the resolution of the defendant's motion to dismiss, the plaintiff filed a document which she titled a “[m]otion [t]o [a]mend[.]” Pl.'s 1st Mot. to Amend at 1. Shortly thereafter, on December 1, 2023, the defendant filed an opposition to the plaintiff's motion to amend. See Def.'s Opp'n at 1. Finally, on February 20, 2024, the plaintiff filed a second motion to amend her Complaint, see Pl.'s 2d Mot. to Amend at 1, and, on March 6, 2024, the defendant filed another opposition in response to the plaintiff's second motion to amend, see Def,'s 2d Opp'n at 1.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Motion to Amend Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, “[a] party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course no later than [twenty-one] days after serving it, or if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, [twenty-one] days after service of a responsive pleading or [twenty-one] days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1). Moreover, “the Court [should] ‘freely give leave [to amend a complaint] when justice so requires,'” Henok v. Kessler, 78 F.Supp.3d 452, 457 (D.D.C. 2015) (second alteration in original) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2)), and therefore, “[i]t is common ground that Rule 15 embodies a generally favorable policy toward amendments[,]” Howard v. Gutierrez, 237 F.R.D. 310, 312 (D.D.C. 2006) (quoting Davis v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 871 F.2d 1134, 1136-37 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). This is because “[i]f the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, [the plaintiff] ought to be afforded an opportunity to test [her] claim on the merits.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). However, the Court may deny leave to amend due to “undue delay, bad faith, undue prejudice to the opposing party, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, or futility.” Richardson v. United States, 193 F.3d 545, 548-49 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Indeed, “[a] motion to amend [a c]omplaint should be denied as futile if the complaint as amended could not survive a motion to dismiss.” Black v. Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n, 87 F.Supp.2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2000) (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must dismiss a complaint that “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In evaluating a motion to dismiss based on this Rule, the Court must “treat the complaint's factual allegations as true and must grant [the] plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court need not accept as true, however “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” nor an “inference[] unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.” Trudeau v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Although “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, [if] accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks...