Pezzolanti v. Extensis Grp.

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SAMANTHA PEZZOLANTI, Plaintiff, v. EXTENSIS GROUP LLC, Defendant.

No. 23-CV-7276 (RER)(PK)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

October 23, 2024

DECISION & ORDER

PEGGY KUO, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE:

Samantha Pezzolanti (“Plaintiff”') brought this action in the Eastern District of New York against Exensis Group LLC (“Defendant”) for discrimination on the basis of gender. Plaintiff brings claims under the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”) and the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), or, in the alternative, the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. (“Compl.,” Dkt. 1.)

On June 7, 2024, Defendant moved to transfer this matter to the District of New Jersey pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (“Motion,” Dkt. 24; see also “Def Mem.,” Dkt. 25; “Pl. Mem.,” Dkt. 26 “Reply,” Dkt. 27.)

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are taken from the Complaint and assumed to be true for the purposes of this Motion.

Plaintiff resides in Richmond County, Staten Island, New York (Compl ¶ 2), and at all relevant times was employed by Defendant. (Id. ¶ 5.) Defendant is a limited liability company whose principal place of business is in New Jersey, but it also maintains an office and transacts business in New York. (Id. ¶¶ 2-3.) Defendant has clients in both New York and New Jersey. (Pl. Mem. at 6.)

Plaintiff began working for Defendant on May 16, 2022. (Id. ¶ 5.) She alleges that she was forced out of her position due to discrimination on December 22, 2022. (Id.)

Plaintiff worked for Defendant as a “Key Account Manager” and reported to Joseph Lambert (“Lambert”), the VP of Client Success. (Id. ¶ 7.) She worked remotely from her home in Staten Island at least two days a week and worked with several clients based in New York City. (Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff visited clients in New York with Lambert and took part in virtual calls with Lambert from her home in New York. (Pl. Mem. at 14-15.)

Plaintiff was hired as a hybrid employee who worked three days a week in Defendant's New Jersey office and two days a week from her home in Staten Island, New York. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff generally started work at 8:00 a.m. or earlier and had to leave the office at approximately 5:00 p.m. each day for purposes of caring for her 13-year-old daughter, after which she often continued to work from home. (Compl. ¶ 11.) In May 2022, Lambert approached Plaintiff and told her that she had to stay until 5:30-6:00 p.m. each day because the whole team “needed to ‘huddle' or ‘recap' the day.” (Id. ¶ 12.) When Plaintiff explained that it would be difficult for her to do that every day because of her childcare responsibilities, Lambert “was visibly annoyed.” (Id. ¶¶ 13-14.) Plaintiff felt “extreme hostility” from Lambert every time she had to leave the office at 5:00 p.m. (Id. ¶ 16.)

On December 15, 2022, Lambert called Plaintiff into his office and told her that her performance for a new client was “lacking,” even though the only feedback he provided to her was related to her schedule, not her job performance. (Id. ¶¶ 17-18.) During this meeting, Lambert also made comments about whether Plaintiff actually needed to leave early to take care of a thirteen-year-old. (Id. ¶¶ 19-21.) After telling Plaintiff that she needed to be willing to “make sacrifices” and “give up time in [her] personal life,” he noted that she needed to decide if she wanted this role or wanted a lesser role instead. (Id. ¶¶ 22-24.) Plaintiff left the conversation upset and broke down in tears. (Id. ¶ 25.)

On December 21, 2022, Lambert assigned Plaintiff and her teammate Alexandra Ruta (“Ruta”) a task at around 4:45 p.m., knowing that Plaintiff had to leave at 5:00 p.m.; Plaintiff worked on the task until 5:15 p.m. and then left to pick up her daughter, telling Lambert and Ruta that she would resume the work first thing the next morning. (Id. ¶¶ 26-29.) The next morning, Plaintiff finished the task and sent it to Lambert, who informed her that Ruta had already stayed late to finish the task and that her “lapse” or “service break” in not finishing until the morning was not acceptable. (Id. ¶¶ 30-33.)

Plaintiff contends that Lambert's refusal to accept or accommodate her parental obligations, along with his hostility toward her 5:00 p.m. departures, made it impossible for her to continue in her position. (Id. ¶¶ 36.) When Plaintiff told Defendant's Human Resources staff that Lambert was making it impossible for her to continue in her role, they responded that “this is [just] another Joe Lambert issue” and took no action to address Plaintiff5s concerns. (Id. ¶¶ 37-40.) Because of Defendant's refusal to take any action in response to her complaint that Lambert had refused to accommodate her caregiver responsibilities, Plaintiff contends that she was constructively discharged on December 22, 2022. (Id. ¶ 41.)

Plaintiff does not dispute that each of the specific interactions with Lambert she described in the Complaint, as well as Plaintiff s meetings with Defendant's HR staff regarding Lambert's conduct, occurred in Defendant's New Jersey office. (Def. Mem. at 6, 10.)

DISCUSSION

“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). “In any motion to change venue, the movant bears the burden of establishing the propriety of transfer by clear and convincing evidence.” Payless Shoesource, Inc. v Avalon Funding Corp., 666 F.Supp.2d 356, 362 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). While courts have the discretion to grant a motion to transfer venue, courts in this Circuit “have consistently applied the clear and convincing evidence standard in determining whether to exercise discretion to grant a transfer motion.” New York Marine & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Lafarge N. Am., Inc., 599 F.3d 102, 114 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Christina Canada, Inc. v. Wior Corp., 702 F.Supp. 461, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (“[A]bsent a clear and convincing showing that the balance of convenience favorts the ultimate forum, discretionary transfers are not favored.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

“The inquiry on a motion to transfer is two-fold. The court must first determine whether the action sought to be transferred is one that ‘might have been brought' in the transferee court. Second, the court must determine whether, considering ‘the convenience of parties and witnesses' and ‘the interest of justice,' a transfer is appropriate.” Berman v. Informix Corp., 30 F.Supp.2d 653, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).

I. Whether Action Might Have Been Brought in District of New Jersey

“A case might have been brought in another forum if ‘at the time the suit was brought, the defendants were subject to jurisdiction and venue was proper' in that district.” Smart Skins LLC v. Microsoft Corp., No. 14-CV-10149 (CM), 2015 WL 1499843, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2015) (quoting Giuliani, S.p.A. v. Vickers, Inc., 997 F.Supp. 501, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)).

Here, the parties do not dispute that that this action could have been brought in the District of New Jersey. Defendant is a limited liability company registered to do business in New Jersey with its principal place of business in New Jersey. (Def. Mem. at 3.) Accordingly, this action could have been brought in the proposed transferee district.

II. “Convenience” and “Interest of Justice” Considerations

Factors which courts commonly consider in a motion to transfer venue include “(1) the plaintiff5 s choice of forum, (2) the convenience of witnesses, (3) the location of relevant documents and relative ease of access to sources of proof, (4) the convenience of parties, (5) the locus of operative facts, (6) the availability of process to compel the attendance of unwilling witnesses, [and] (7) the relative means of the parties.” D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 106-07 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Albert Fadem Tr. v. Duke Energy Corp., 214 F.Supp.2d 341, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), which references the following additional factors: “(8) the forum's familiarity with the governing law, and (9) trial efficiency and the interests of justice, based on the totality of the circumstances”). “There is no strict formula for the application of these factors, and no single factor is determinative.” Sarracco v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 220 F.Supp.3d 346, 356 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). “Instead, these factors should be applied and weighed in the context of the individualized circumstances of the particular case.” Id.

“In seeking to meet [its] burden that clear and convincing evidence calls for transfer, [defendant] must establish that at least one of the factors weighs in favor of transfer, and that any factors weighing in favor of transfer outweigh any factors weighing against it. If all the factors are neutral, the transfer motion should be denied.” In re Peloton Interactive, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 21-CV-2369 (CBA)(PK), 2022 WL 1211516, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2022).

Here, I find that the locus of operative facts weighs strongly in favor of transfer.

“To determine where the locus of operative facts lies, courts look to ‘the site of events from which the claim arises.'” Id. (quoting 800-Flowers, Inc. v. Intercontinental Florist, Inc., 860 F.Supp. 128, 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)).

Plaintiff argues that she lived in New York; worked from home two days a week (and nights); visited clients exclusively in New York where most of her clients were also located, including with Lambert; participated in Zoom calls with Lambert from home; and due to Defendant's and Lambert's actions, had to find a new job, downsize, and move while within New York. (Pl. Mem. at 2, 10-11.) Plaintiff also argues that the discrimination she faced was not “location-specific,” but...