Pfannenstiel v. Mars Wrigley Confectionary US, LLC

APRIL PFANNENSTIEL, Plaintiff, v. MARS WRIGLEY CONFECTIONARY US, LLC, Defendant.

Case No. 19-02096-JAR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

January 29, 2021

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff April Pfannenstiel brings this action against her former employer, Defendant Mars Wrigley Confectionary US, LLC ("Mars"), alleging retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), and retaliatory discharge under Kansas law. Before the Court is Mars's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 53). The motion is fully briefed, and the Court is prepared to rule. For the reasons stated in more detail below, the Court denies in part and grants in part Mars's motion. Summary judgment is denied on Pfannenstiel's Title VII retaliation claim. Summary judgment is granted on Pfannenstiel's FMLA retaliation and retaliatory discharge claims.

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party demonstrates "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact" and that it is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law."¹ In applying this standard, the Court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefromin the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.² "There is no genuine [dispute] of material fact unless the evidence, construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party."³ A fact is "material" if, under the applicable substantive law, it is "essential to the proper disposition of the claim."⁴ A dispute of fact is "genuine" if "there is sufficient evidence on each side so that a rational trier of fact could resolve the issue either way."⁵

The moving party initially must show the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.⁶ In attempting to meet this standard, a movant who does not bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial need not negate the nonmovant's claim; rather, the movant need simply point out to the court a lack of evidence for the nonmovant on an essential element of the nonmovant's claim.⁷

Once the movant has met the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."⁸ The nonmoving party may not simply rest upon its pleadings to satisfy its burden.⁹ Rather, the nonmoving party must "set forth specific facts that would beadmissible in evidence in the event of trial from which a rational trier of fact could find for the nonmovant."¹⁰ The nonmovant must identify these specific facts "by reference to affidavits, deposition transcripts, or specific exhibits incorporated therein."¹¹ A nonmovant "cannot create a genuine issue of material fact with unsupported, conclusory allegations."¹² A genuine issue of material fact must be supported by "more than a mere scintilla of evidence."¹³ Finally, summary judgment is not a "disfavored procedural shortcut"; on the contrary, it is an important procedure "designed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action."¹⁴

II. Factual Background

A. Evidentiary Objections

Before reciting the uncontroverted facts in this matter, the Court briefly addresses Pfannenstiel's objections to four of Mars's statements of fact. Summary judgment evidence need not be "submitted 'in a form that would be admissible at trial.'"¹⁵ But "the content or substance of the evidence must be admissible."¹⁶ Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2), a party may object on this basis—that the material "cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence." As the Advisory Committee's notes to the 2010 Federal Rule amendments explain: "The burdenis on the proponent to show that the material is admissible as presented or to explain the admissible form that is anticipated."¹⁷

Pfannenstiel objects to Mars's Statements of Fact 77 through 80 on the basis that they contain inadmissible hearsay, meaning a statement that the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing and that a party offers to prove the truth of the matter asserted.¹⁸ Hearsay is inadmissible except as provided by law,¹⁹ and hearsay within hearsay is excluded unless each part of the combined statement conforms with an exclusion from or exception to the rule against hearsay.²⁰

Mars's Statements of Fact 77 through 80 rely on the deposition testimony of Associate Relations Manager Nichole Phillips discussing statements made to her by Topeka, Kansas Police Detective Davies. While Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) permits Mars to support its factual assertions at the summary judgment stage by citing to deposition testimony, the content or substance of the deposition testimony must be otherwise admissible.²¹

Here, Mars offers Detective Davies's statements not for the truth of the matter asserted but solely for their effect on Phillips, a proper nonhearsay use. "If the significance of an offered statement lies solely in the fact that it was made, no issue is raised as to the truth of anything asserted, and the statement is not hearsay."²² A statement offered to show its effect on thelistener is therefore not hearsay.²³ Thus, the statements by Detective Davies contained in Phillips's deposition testimony are admissible for nonhearsay purposes.

B. Uncontroverted Facts

With the above rules of law and evidence in mind, the following material facts are either uncontroverted, stipulated to, or viewed in the light most favorable to Pfannenstiel.

Mars manufactures and distributes confectionary and snack food products, including M&Ms Peanut, M&Ms Caramel, Snickers, and Twix. In May 2016, Mars hired Pfannenstiel as a Wrapper Operator for Snickers in the Filled Bar Department at its Topeka, Kansas facility. The Filled Bar Department was divided into three teams that each worked different shifts. Each team had a packaging side and a processing side. Pfannenstiel worked on the packaging side.

March 2017 Sexual Harassment Complaint

In March 2017, Pfannenstiel reported that two of her supervisors, Team Leads James Gustin and Travis Bussen, sexually harassed her. Mars investigated her claims, found them credible, and terminated the employment of Gustin and Bussen.

Between March 14 and April 2, 2017, Pfannenstiel took paid medical leave offered by Mars. While Pfannenstiel was on leave, Mars hired a new Team Lead, Benjamin Arteaga, Sr. Pfannenstiel joined his team when she returned to work.

September 2017 Coworker Complaints

In September 2017, Pfannenstiel and two of her coworkers, Jacob Edwards and Jordan Stilley, made complaints against each other to Arteaga. Pfannenstiel complained that she did not feel comfortable working with Stilley or Edwards and that Edwards made comments about howPfannenstiel was not safe to work with, while Edwards and Stilley complained that Pfannenstiel took extra breaks.

Arteaga held a meeting with Pfannenstiel, Edwards, and Stilley to discuss the complaints about Pfannenstiel's alleged extra breaks. During the meeting, Stilley shouted and cursed at Pfannenstiel, accusing her of getting Gustin and Bussen fired. Stilley said he was upset because he thought Pfannenstiel received special treatment because of "a lawsuit" she "holds over Mars."²⁴ Because of his conduct at the meeting, Stilley was fired.

Shortly after the meeting, Edwards approached Value Stream Manager Shirley Ha to complain about Pfannenstiel. Edwards told Ha that "Jordan [Stilley] was his friend and that he agree[d] with [Stilley], that [Pfannenstiel] ha[d] abused some form of policy, and that this ha[d] been going on for a while."²⁵ Ha told Edwards she would look into it and speak with Arteaga to understand the situation. When Ha spoke with Arteaga, he said that he was aware of Edwards's concerns and that Edwards was "really close" to Stilley.²⁶ Arteaga also said that he had explained to Edwards and Stilley that Pfannenstiel's absences were "not something he [could] discuss with them."²⁷

FMLA Leave

In September 2017, Mars offered Pfannenstiel intermittent FMLA leave. Shortly thereafter, Pfannenstiel began taking FMLA leave for anxiety, and between September 27 and October 3, 2017, Pfannenstiel took FMLA leave for her carpal tunnel syndrome.

Between October 4 and November 22, 2017, Pfannenstiel worked a total of nine shifts. Pfannenstiel was on FMLA medical leave from November 2 to November 10, 2017 for her generalized anxiety disorder, and again from November 27, 2017 to February 12, 2018 for carpal tunnel surgery on both hands.

On November 8, 2017, while Pfannenstiel was on FMLA leave, Arteaga drafted a "Final Written Warning" regarding her attendance for Associate Relations Manager Idol Rashid to review. The warning was prompted by an automatic report generated by Mars's time-keeping system, under which employees are only allowed a certain number of points for absences before the system sends an automatic warning to the manager. When Pfannenstiel received the Final Written Warning, she informed Arteaga that "it was incorrect" because it included points based on her FMLA leave.²⁸ Pfannenstiel and Arteaga reviewed her attendance record together, and after confirming the error, Arteaga asked Regional Nurse Case Manager Jonette Penton, who is involved in administering FMLA leave for associates and coding time entries into the time-keeping system, to correct Pfannenstiel's records.

On February 2, 2018, while Pfannenstiel was on FMLA leave, Ha sent an email to Rashid stating: "[Pfannenstiel] has consistently failed to provide her [FMLA] paperwork in time. Is it really acceptable to continue in this manner?"²⁹ Rashid responded that "[Penton] followed the correct response of escalating [Pfannenstiel's] failures with the letter that was sent out and we will need to continue to monitor it with Legal's help."³⁰ He also wrote, "It's unfortunate that sheis not...