Pheap v. City of Knoxville

687 F.Supp.3d 807

Sophia PHEAP, as Administratrix andPersonal Representative of the Estate of Channara Pheap, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF KNOXVILLE, et al., Defendants.

3:20-CV-00387-DCLC-DCP

United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee, Knoxville Division

Filed August 15, 2023

Joshua D. Hedrick, Whitt, Cooper, Hedrick & Wojcik, Knoxville, TN, Lance Kristopher Baker, The Baker Law Firm, Knoxville, TN, for Plaintiff.

Gary M. Prince, Nathaniel Craig Strand, O'Neil, Parker & Williamson, Knoxville, TN, John M. Kizer, Gentry, Tipton & McLemore, PC, Knoxville, TN, for Defendant Dylan M. Williams.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Clifton L. Corker, United States District Judge

In 2019, Knoxville Police Department ("KPD") Officer Dylan M. Williams ("Officer Williams") fatally shot Channara Tom "Philly" Pheap ("Pheap") at an apartment complex in Knoxville, Tennessee, where he was investigating a hit and run. Sophia Pheap ("Plaintiff"), the administratrix and personal representative of Pheap's estate, brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer Williams, the City of Knoxville ("the City"), former KPD Chief of Police Eve M. Thomas ("Chief Thomas"), and Jane Does 1-5 [Doc. 1]. Officer Williams, the City, and Chief Thomas now move for summary judgment on various claims asserted by Plaintiff in her Amended Complaint [Docs. 98, 101]. For the reasons stated herein, Chief Thomas and the City's motion [Doc. 98] is GRANTED and Officer Williams's motion [Doc. 101] is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

I. BACKGROUND

On the afternoon of August 26, 2019, Officer Williams received information from dispatch regarding a hit-and-run collision that had just occurred within his district [Doc. 119, ¶ 1]. Dispatch described the suspect vehicle as a gold sedan and, after running the license plate number, Officer Williams determined that the make of the vehicle was Dodge and the registered owner, Chelsea Beverwyck, lived at Clear Springs Apartments (formerly known as "Tillery Ridge Apartments") [Id. at ¶¶ 2-5; Doc. 120, ¶ 10]. Officer Williams proceeded to Clear Springs Apartments and, as he pulled into the parking lot at approximately 5:30 p.m., he observed a gold Dodge sedan parked in the lot with a license plate number matching that of the suspect vehicle [Doc. 119, ¶¶ 6-8].

Officer Williams parked his patrol cruiser at an angle directly behind the gold sedan [Id. at ¶ 9]. Noticing that no one was in the vehicle, Officer Williams approached a ground level apartment unit and asked the individuals inside if they knew who drove the gold sedan [Id. at ¶¶ 12, 14]. A woman, later identified as April Barnard, came out onto the porch to speak with Officer Williams [Id. at ¶ 14]. Ms. Barnard indicated that the driver lived on the third floor and directed Officer Williams around the corner to the back of the building to access the stairs [Id. at ¶ 15]. Officer Williams proceeded around the corner of the building and out of view of his dash camera [Id. at ¶ 16; Doc. 34-6, 17:35:38].

As Officer Williams approached the stairs, he observed Pheap coming down the stairway and greeted him [Doc. 119, ¶ 17]. When Pheap reached the bottom of the steps, Officer Williams asked him if he drove a car in the parking lot, to which Pheap responded, "no" [Id. at ¶¶ 18, 19; Doc. 120, ¶¶ 21, 24]. Officer Williams testified that Pheap was fidgeting, acting nervous, and repeatedly attempting to reach his hands into his pockets [Doc. 119, ¶¶ 22, 23]. He also testified that he saw an item in Pheap's pocket and he ignored multiple verbal commands to keep his hands out of his pockets [Id. at ¶¶ 26, 27]. When Officer Williams asked what he had in his pocket, Pheap stated that it was his wallet [Doc. 120, ¶ 26]. Officer Williams further testified that Pheap could not maintain eye contact as he scanned his surroundings, which he interpreted as an effort to look for an imminent path of escape [Doc. 119, ¶¶ 24, 25]. Shortly after encountering Pheap, Officer Williams requested a description of the driver over his radio [Id. at ¶ 28]. In response, he received a physical description of the driver as "light to medium skin, black or Hispanic male," which he observed to be consistent with Pheap's appearance [Id. at ¶¶ 29, 30].

Due to the consistency of Pheap's physical appearance with the description of the driver and his demeanor, Officer Williams asked Pheap if he could check his pockets to determine what he had in them [Id. at ¶ 32]. Officer Williams asked Pheap to turn around and keep his hands up [Id. at ¶¶ 33, 34]. Although Pheap initially complied, he suddenly lunged away [Id. at ¶¶ 34, 35]. Officer Williams attempted to stop him by wrapping his arms around his waist and using a "leg sweep" to take him to the ground [Id. at ¶ 35; Doc. 120, ¶ 60]. A struggle ensued and, seconds later, Officer Williams fatally shot Pheap in the parking lot [Doc. 119, ¶ 36; Doc. 120, ¶ 61].

Following the fatal shooting, Plaintiff initiated this action in her representative capacity asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer Williams for excessive force and municipal liability against the City and Chief Thomas for failure to train their officers [Doc. 1]. Plaintiff also alleged state law claims for wrongful death, battery, and negligence [Id.]. Officer Williams moved for summary judgment, arguing he was entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claim and that, as a result, the state law claims against him also failed as a matter of law [Docs. 34, 40]. The Court denied the motion due to the existence of genuine disputes of material fact [Doc. 77] and the Sixth Circuit dismissed the successive interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction [Doc. 82]. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint [Doc. 85], adding another claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer Williams for unlawful seizure [Id. at ¶¶ 143-56]. The City and Chief Thomas now seek summary judgment [Doc. 98] and Officer Williams moves for partial summary judgment [Doc. 101].

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper where " 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' " Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citation omitted). A mere "scintilla of evidence" is not enough; the Court must determine whether, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, a fair-minded jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party. Id. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

III. DISCUSSION

The City and Chief Thomas assert they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on each of Plaintiff's claims [Doc. 98]. In response, Plaintiff expressly abandons all claims against Chief Thomas and her negligence claim against the City [Doc. 115, pg. 3, n.1], leaving only the § 1983 municipal liability and wrongful death claims remaining against the City. As for Officer Williams, he asserts he is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff's unlawful seizure claim and judgment as a matter of law on the state law claims for wrongful death and negligence [Doc. 101]. Each claim is examined in turn, beginning with those brought under § 1983.

A. Section 1983

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides "a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred." Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n.3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979). To succeed under § 1983, a plaintiff must show "(1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States (2) caused by a person acting under the color of state law." Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff alleges Officer Williams and the City¹ deprived Pheap of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In particular, Plaintiff asserts that Officer Williams used excessive force and unlawfully seized Pheap [Doc. 85, ¶¶ 122-56]. Plaintiff also alleges the City is liable for the use of excessive force due to its failure to train and supervise KPD officers [Id. at ¶¶ 157-78]. For the reasons that follow, Officer Williams is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's unlawful seizure claim and the City is entitled to summary judgment on the claim of municipal liability.

1. Unlawful Seizure

Officer Williams asserts the defense of qualified immunity on Plaintiff's unlawful seizure claim [Doc. 102, pg. 7]. "Qualified immunity shields government officials in the performance of discretionary functions from standing trial for civil liability unless their actions violate clearly established rights." DiLuzio v. Vill. of Yorkville, 796 F.3d 604, 608 (6th Cir. 2015). Once raised, a plaintiff may overcome the defense of qualified immunity only by showing that (1) viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the defendant's actions violated a constitutional right and (2) such right "was 'clearly established' at the time of the defendant's alleged misconduct." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). The Court, in its discretion, may decide which of the two prongs to address first, taking into account "the circumstances of the particular case at hand." Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236, 129 S.Ct. 808.

Considering the...