Phifer v. Hyundai Power Transformers USA

522 F.Supp.3d 1102

Robert PHIFER, Jr., Plaintiff,

v.HYUNDAI POWER TRANSFORMERS USA and Luther Scull, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:19cv166-MHT

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.

Signed March 2, 2021

Alicia Kay Haynes, Charles Edward Guerrier, Haynes & Haynes, PC, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiff.

Elizabeth Bosquet Shirley, John James Coleman, III, Meghan Nowicki Cox, Burr & Forman LLP, Birmingham, AL, Ingu Hwang, Burr & Forman LLP, Montgomery, AL, for Defendants.

OPINION

Myron H. Thompson, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Plaintiff Robert Phifer, Jr., who is black, has sued defendants Hyundai Power Transformers USA and Hyundai employee Luther Scull under three federal statutes: (1) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a and 2000e through 2000e-17 ; (2) § 1981, originally part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ; and (3) the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 - 54. Relying on Title VII and § 1981, Phifer claims that Hyundai intentionally created a hostile-work environment for him; discriminated against him because of his race, by failing to promote him, giving him adverse job assignments and disciplinary citations, and firing him; and retaliated against him by suspending and then firing him when he complained of race discrimination. Relying on the FMLA, he also claims that both Hyundai and Scull interfered with the exercise of his rights under that statute and retaliated against him for exercising those rights. The court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and § 1343 (civil rights); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (Title VII); and 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2) (FMLA).

This case is now before the court on Hyundai and Scull's motions to dismiss. Relying on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Hyundai moves to dismiss, for failure to state a claim, Phifer's Title VII and § 1981 claims of racially hostile-work environment, discriminatory failure to promote, and retaliation as well as his FMLA interference claim. The company also moves to dismiss his Title VII failure-to-promote and hostile-work-environment claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Finally, relying on Rule 12(b)(6), Scull moves to dismiss Phifer's two FMLA claims on the basis that, under the facts alleged, the statute does not apply to him and thus Phifer has failed to state an FMLA claim for relief against him.

For the reasons discussed below, Hyundai's motion will be granted in part and denied in part, and Scull's motion will be granted in full.

I. STANDARD ON MOTION TO DISMISS

In a defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) failure-to-state-claim motion to dismiss, the court accepts the plaintiff's allegations as true, see Hishon v. King & Spalding , 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984), and construes the complaint in the plaintiff's favor, see Duke v. Cleland , 5 F.3d 1399, 1402 (11th Cir. 1993). The court may draw "reasonable inferences" from the facts alleged in the complaint. Chesser v. Sparks , 248 F.3d 1117, 1121 (11th Cir. 2001).

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929, (2007) ). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.

Hyundai's argument that some of Phifer's Title VII claims should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, however, does not fall under Rule 12(b)(6) : "[M]otions to dismiss for failure to exhaust are not expressly mentioned in Rule 12(b)." Bryant v. Rich , 530 F.3d 1368, 1375 (11th Cir. 2008). Failure to exhaust instead is considered "a matter of judicial administration." Id. Although this issue is appropriately decided at the same time as a Rule 12(b) motion, the court's consideration of the arguments regarding exhaustion is not subject to the same limitations about what factual material may be considered as apply to Rule 12(b)(6) motions. See id. at 1375-76. In other words, the court is not restricted to the four corners of the complaint.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

According to the factual allegations in the complaint, Phifer was hired by Hyundai in 2011 to work in the company's winding department. See Second Amended Complaint (doc. 43) at ¶ 13. As he describes it, the environment at the company was suffused with discrimination against black employees. Black workers were called "boy" by white employees and supervisors. Id. at ¶ 28. White workers were allowed to take Saturdays off freely, while black workers were disciplined for asking. See id. at ¶¶ 34-36. Disciplinary points were removed from white workers’ personnel files, while black workers were fired for accumulating such points. See id. at ¶ 40. Black workers were denied promotions and favorable shift assignments, no matter their qualifications. See id. at 42-44. One supervisor in particular was openly hostile to black workers. See id. at ¶ 30. According to the complaint, there was even a break room that black workers were barred from using, while white and Korean workers napped there during their shifts. See id. at ¶ 46.

Phifer began complaining about this discrimination in March 2018, first to Hyundai's chief operating officer and later to the company president. See id. at ¶¶ 47-48. Two months after he started complaining, he was suspended for accessing a breaker panel box, which he says was a routine act among his co-workers that never resulted in discipline, although it was a violation of the company's safety rules. See id. at ¶¶ 60, 64-69. Indeed, Phifer says that Scull, the white supervisor named as a defendant in this suit, had accessed the same panel without repercussions twice on the same day Phifer accessed it. See id. at ¶ 65. After five days of suspension, Phifer was fired. See id. at ¶ 70.

Separately, Phifer had a son born in January 2018 with serious medical needs. See id. at ¶ 18. Phifer applied and was ultimately approved for leave under the FMLA to care for his son. See id. at ¶ 18-20. But he says that Scull, acting at the behest of a senior supervisor named Clayton Payne, attempted to discipline him for taking intermittent FMLA leave. See id. at ¶¶ 22-25. Phifer refused to sign the disciplinary citations that Scull wrote, and, while it is not clear from the allegations in the complaint whether he ever was in fact disciplined by Hyundai for taking FMLA leave, that inference can be drawn. See id. at ¶¶ 22-25, 182, and 194. The allegations in the complaint also suggest that he was eventually suspended and terminated for exercising his FMLA rights. See id. at ¶¶ 185, 198, & 201.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Exhaustion of Title VII claims

Hyundai argues that Phifer's Title VII hostile-work-environment and failure-to-promote claims should be dismissed for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies at the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). As stated above, in resolving this issue before trial, the court is not restricted to the four corners of the complaint.

Plaintiffs who seek to bring suit under Title VII must first present their claims, in the form of an administrative charge, to the EEOC so that the commission may "have the first opportunity to investigate the alleged discriminatory practices to permit it to perform its role in obtaining voluntary compliance and promoting conciliation efforts." Gregory v. Ga. Dep't of Hum. Res. , 355 F.3d 1277, 1279 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Evans v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co. , 696 F.2d 925, 929 (11th Cir. 1983) ). This requirement does not, however, mandate that the claim in plaintiffs’ complaints must be identical to their EEOC charge. Instead, to determine whether a claim's allegations are sufficiently related to the plaintiffs’ charge, the central question is whether the claim "was like or related to, or grew out of, the allegations contained in [the] EEOC charge." Id. at 1280. The allegations of the claim must fall within "the scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge," but this scope "should not be strictly interpreted." Id.

There is little question that Phifer's claim of a hostile-work environment is sufficiently connected to his EEOC charge to meet this standard. In his charge to the EEOC, Phifer complained of inequitable discipline; white workers being allowed to take days off that black workers were not; unprofessional conduct toward him by a superior after Phifer complained; co-workers hiding his equipment; Scull suggesting that all black workers look alike; and public discipline of workers who took part in discrimination complaints. See EEOC Charge Narrative (doc. 43-1) at 4-7. Whether or not these allegations by themselves indicate that "discriminatory conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created a work environment abusive to employees," Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc. , 510 U.S. 17, 22, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993), an investigation by the EEOC into the allegations "would have reasonably uncovered" any further evidence that the environment at Hyundai was hostile or abusive, Gregory , 355 F.3d at 1280. As such, Phifer's Title VII hostile-work-environment claim was exhausted in his EEOC charge and will not be dismissed on that basis.

Whether Phifer exhausted his claim that Hyundai discriminated against him by failing to promote him presents a much closer question. The nearest Phifer's EEOC charge comes to alleging a failure to promote him is his allegation that, after Scull accessed the same breaker panel as Phifer had, he was promptly promoted instead of being fired. As will be discussed below, however, the court...