Philadelphian Owners Association v. City of Philadelphia, Civil Action No. 00-3181, Class Action (E.D. Pa. 7/23/2002)

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PHILADELPHIAN OWNERS ASSOCIATION, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 00-3181, Class Action.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

July 23, 2002.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SCHILLER, District Judge.

Plaintiffs commenced this action against the City of Philadelphia (the "City"), challenging: (1) the legality of a City ordinance that excludes buildings with more than six units from the City's trash collection services; and (2) the City's imposition of a license fee for buildings with more than two residential units. Subsequently, I certified two classes in this matter, and the members of those classes have been properly notified of the pendency of this action. On behalf of both classes, Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, I find that the City's ordinance is unconstitutional as applied to condominiums and cooperatives.

BACKGROUND

Parties and the Classes

Plaintiff Philadelphian Owners Association is a condominium association representing the unit owners of a large, multi-unit condominium building. The other named plaintiff in this matter, Welsh Walnut Associates, L.P. is the owner of a large, multi-unit apartment building. Certified pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), the first class (the "Waste Removal Class") was defined as follows: "All condominium associations and entities and all owners of buildings that each contain more than six (6) dwelling units (as that term is used in the City of Philadelphia Code), for which the City does not provide waste removal services."

The second certified class (the "Dwelling Tax Class") was defined as follows: "All condominium associations and entities and all owners of buildings that each contain more than two (2) dwelling units and are subject to the Multiple-family Dwelling License ordinance of the City, Philadelphia Code § A-906.2."

The City does not dispute that the named Plaintiffs and the Waste Removal Class have expended substantial amounts of money on private waste removal services, nor does the City dispute that the named Plaintiffs and the members of the Dwelling Tax Class are subject to the license fee.

The City's Waste Removal Regulations

Pursuant to Title 351 of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter, the City's Department of Streets has adopted regulations governing the municipal collection of garbage. See 351 Pa. Code § 8.8-407 (2002). These regulations specify, inter alia, who is eligible for city refuse and recycling collection. "[B]uilding[s] with more than 6 dwelling units, regardless of the form of ownership" are not eligible for the City's trash collection services. Sanitation Div. of Phila. Dep't of Sts. Regulations Governing Mun. Collection of Refuse § 8.5.E (1999). As a result of this ordinance, Plaintiffs and the Waste Removal Class must pay for the collection of their garbage.

In bringing their challenge to this ordinance, Plaintiffs sought appropriate discovery. Their requests, however, yielded next to nothing. Regarding the issue of trash collection, the City produced only one witness for deposition, Mr. Frank Leo, Program Administrator of the Sanitation Division of the City's Streets Department. Upon questioning, Mr. Leo's sole explanation for the waste removal ordinance was that collecting trash from the larger buildings "would put a huge strain on our already strained resources." (Leo. Dep. at 78; Pls.' Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 3.) Mr. Leo conceded that he was not aware of any analysis or calculations showing that individuals living in buildings with more than six units produce more trash than individuals residing in buildings with fewer units. (Leo Dep. at 80-81.) Like the deposition testimony of the City's witness, the documents the City produced during discovery fail to even suggest that there is a basis for the waste removal ordinance's validity.

Multiple-Family Dwelling License Fee

Plaintiffs also challenge a license fee the City charges annually to each unit in a multiple-family dwelling. The Philadelphia Administrative Code, as amended in June 1999, provides: "The annual license fee to operate a multiple-family dwelling shall be $25.00 for each dwelling unit with a maximum annual fee of $10,000 per dwelling." Phila. Code § A-906.2. As defined in the Philadelphia Property Maintenance Code, a "multiple-family dwelling" is "[a] building containing more than two dwelling units." Phila. Code § PM-202.0.

It is undisputed that the City's imposition of the license fee is consistent with the City's zoning and fire code classifications. Under the City's zoning regulations, buildings with three or more dwelling units are classified as "R-2," and single family homes and duplexes are zoned as "R-3." See Phila. Code §§ 14-203, 204. The City's Fire Prevention Code¹ — which is technical and complex — includes more stringent requirements for those buildings classified as R-2 as compared to those zoned as R-3. Compare Phila. Code § F-503.3.2-503.3.2.2.2 (detailing specific requirements for automatic fire detection units required in R-2 buildings) with Phila. Code § F-503.3 (requiring smoke detectors in R-3 buildings); see also Phila. Code § F-503.4 (setting forth requirements for sprinkler systems in R-2, but not R-3, buildings). The City performs inspections to ensure that the buildings comply with the City's Fire Prevention Code. (Lacey Dep. at 9-10; Def.'s Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. F.)²

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment must be granted if the record, when viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). When weighing the evidence offered by the parties on a motion for summary judgment, this Court must review the evidence and all inferences drawn from that evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Defendants, as the non-movant, may not rest on "mere allegations" but must demonstrate the existence of specific facts that create a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).

DISCUSSION

Waste Removal Services

1. Properly Defining the Waste Removal Class

The Waste Removal Class previously certified in this matter includes owners of apartment buildings, condominiums, and cooperatives. However, I find that the Waste Removal Class, as previously defined, is overly broad.³ Specifically, building owners who lease or rent apartments should not be included in the Waste Removal Class. Under the City's refuse collection regulations, commercial enterprises generally do not receive the City's waste removal services. See Sanitation Div. of Phila. Dep't of Sts. Regulations Governing Mun. Collection of Refuse § 8.3-8.5.D. In this regard, the owners of apartment buildings are no different than the owners of other commercial buildings who must negotiate contracts for waste removal services. See E & T Realty v. Strickland, 830 F.2d 1107, 1109 (11th Cir. 1987) ("different treatment of dissimilarly situated persons does not violate the equal protection clause"). As such, the owners of apartment buildings are not entitled to relief and are excluded from the Waste Removal Class. Accordingly, the Waste Removal Class is properly defined as follows: "All condominium associations and similar entities (excluding owners of apartment buildings) and cooperatives for which the City of Philadelphia does not provide waste removal services pursuant to § 8.5.E of the Regulations Governing Municipal Collection of Refuse."

Rational Basis Review⁴

Plaintiffs contend that the City's waste removal ordinance violates their right to equal protection of the laws, entitling them to relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. As the Supreme Court has stated, the Equal Protection Clause "is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).

"Unless a classification warrants some form of heightened review because it jeopardizes exercise of a fundamental right or categorizes on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic, the Equal Protection Clause requires only that the classification rationally further a legitimate state interest." Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992). Thus, because Plaintiffs do not contend that the City's waste removal ordinance implicates a fundamental right or involves a suspect class, I apply the less rigorous rational basis standard of review. See Leheny v. City of Pittsburgh, 183 F.3d 220, 226 (3d Cir. 1999).⁵ "When faced with a challenge to a governmental classification under the rational basis test, a court should ask, first, whether at least one of the purposes of the classification involves a legitimate public interest and, second, whether the classification is rationally related to achievement of that purpose." Hancock Indus. v. Schaeffer, 811 F.2d 225, 237 (3d Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). Under the rational basis test, even when similarly situated persons are treated differently, state action is presumed constitutional. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961). Rational basis review in equal protection analysis "is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices." FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).

"That being said, rational basis review is not a rubber stamp of all legislative action, as discrimination that can only be viewed as arbitrary and irrational will violate the Equal Protection Clause." Hadix v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 840, 843 (6th Cir. 2000). Likewise, "[a] classification must be reasonable,...