Phillips v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon

VINCENT PHILLIPS, Plaintiff, v. THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, AS TRUSTEE FOR THE BEAR STEARNS ASSET BACKED SECURITIES TRUST 2002-2, ASSET BACKED CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2002-2, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 1:20-CV-968 (ABJ)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

September 15, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION

AMY BERMAN JACKSON, United States District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint (ECF No. 6). For the reasons discussed below, the motion will be GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Vincent Phillips (“plaintiff”) is the owner of real property in the District of Columbia at 427 Mellon Street S.E., Washington, DC 20032 (“the Property”). Verified Complaint (ECF No. 1, “Compl.”) ¶ 7. The complaint does not identify the lender or mortgagee that was involved when he purchased the Property.

Plaintiff describes defendant, The Bank of New York Mellon as Trustee for the Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2002-2 Asset Backed Certificates, Series 2002-2 (“defendant”) as “a diversified financial marketing and/or services corporation[] engaged primarily in residential mortgage banking and/or related businesses.” Compl. ¶ 7. He alleges that defendant pooled mortgages including the mortgage on the Property, securitized these pools of mortgages, and sold these mortgage-backed securities to investors. See id. ¶ 9. He further alleges that defendant engaged in these activities without having “follow[ed] the basic requirements for the transfer of . . . negotiable instrument[s] and . . . interest[s] in real property.” Id. ¶ 10.

According to plaintiff, “no interest in the Mortgage Note, Deed of Trust or Property was ever legally transferred to . . . [d]efendant.” Id. ¶ 11. Nevertheless, on November 19, 2015, defendant filed suit in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (“Foreclosure Action”) to foreclose on the Property. See Id. ¶ 12; see generally Def.'s Mem., Ex. 2 (Docket, The Bank of New York Mellon v. Phillips, No. 2015 CA 009003 R(RP) (D.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2015)).^[1] In its motion to dismiss, defendant represents that it holds the first priority mortgage on the Property. Mem. of P. & A. in Support of Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss Compl. (ECF No. 6-1, “Def.'s Mem.”) at 1.

On August 31, 2018, the Superior Court issued an Order granting defendant's motion for default judgment, and the Property was sold to a third party at auction on July 18, 2019. See Def.'s Mem., Ex. 2 at 5; see id., Ex. 3 (Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment and Decree for Sale of Real Property, The Bank of New York Mellon v. Phillips, No. 2015 CA 009003 R(RP) (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 31, 2018)). On April 9, 2020, the Superior Court ratified the foreclosure sale. See id., Ex. 4 (Order Granting Motion to Ratify Foreclosure Sale and Granting in Part Consent Motion to Intervene As Of Right for the Limited Purpose of Making a Claim to Surplus Proceeds, The Bank of New York Mellon v. Phillips, No. 2015 CA 009003 R(RP) (D.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 9, 2020)). Plaintiff timely filed an appeal. See generally id., Ex. 5 (Notice of Appeal, The Bank of New York Mellon v. Phillips, No. 2015 CA 009003 R(RP) (D.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2020)).

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on October 7, 2020, see id., Ex. 6 (Order, Phillips v. Bank of New York Mellon, No. 20-CV-432 (D.C. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2020)), because plaintiff had not filed a statement regarding transcripts. See Pl.'s Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss Compl. (ECF No. 8, “Pl.'s Opp'n”) ¶ 2. The appeal since has been reinstated. See id.^[2]

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on April 9, 2020, and he brings three causes of action: wrongful foreclosure, violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), see 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., and negligence. See generally Compl. ¶¶ 14-15, 19-20, 24-25. He demands monetary damages, see generally Id. ¶¶ 16-17, 21-22, 25-26, and among other relief, plaintiff seeks an injunction “preventing [d]efendant . . . from collecting on the subject loan and from causing the Property to be sold, assigned or transferred to a third party.” Id. at 7 (page number designated by CM/ECF) ¶ 3.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

A plaintiff need only provide a “short and plain statement of [his] claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), that “give[s] the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The Court “must construe the complaint in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see Kowal v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). While the Court must accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint, it “need not accept inferences drawn by plaintiff[ ] if such inferences are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.” Kowal, 16 F.3d at 1276. The Court need not accept “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation, ” or “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, ” are not sufficient to state a claim either. Id.

Although a pro se complaint “must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, ” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), it still “must plead ‘factual matter' that permits the court to infer ‘more than the mere possibility of [defendant's] misconduct, '” Atherton v. District of Columbia Office of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79); see, e.g., Budik v. Dartmouth-Hitchcock Med. Ctr., 937 F.Supp.2d 5, 11 (D.D.C. 2013) (“However, even though a pro se complaint must be construed liberally, the complaint must still ‘present a claim on which the Court can grant relief.'”), aff'd, No. 13-5121, 2013 WL 6222951 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 19, 2013).

The Court may take judicial notice of matters of public record, such as the Superior Court and Court of Appeals documents the parties have submitted or to which they refer, see Covad Commc'ns Co. v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 407 F.3d 1220, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2005), without converting defendant's motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See Asnake v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., 313 F.Supp.3d 84, 86 (D.D.C. 2018).

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, ” and the law presumes “that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. EPA, 363 F.3d 442, 448 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“As a court of limited jurisdiction, we begin, and end, with an examination of our jurisdiction.”). Under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992); Shekoyan v. Sibley Int'l Corp., 217 F.Supp.2d 59, 63 (D.D.C. 2002), aff'd, 409 F.3d 414 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1173 (2006). “[B]ecause subject-matter jurisdiction is ‘an Art[icle] III as well as a statutory requirement . . . no action of the parties can confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon a federal court.'” Akinseye v. District of Columbia, 339 F.3d 970, 971 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982)). Subject matter jurisdiction may not be waived, and “courts may raise the issue sua sponte.” NetworkIP, LLC v. FCC, 548 F.3d 116, 120 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Athens Cmty. Hosp., Inc. v. Schweiker, 686 F.2d 989, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). Indeed, a federal court must raise the issue because it is “forbidden . . . from acting beyond [its] authority, and ‘no action of the parties can confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon a federal court.'” Id. (quoting Akinseye, 339 F.3d at 971).

When reviewing a challenge pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the Court may consider documents outside the pleadings to assure itself that it has jurisdiction. See Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 735 n.4 (1947); Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding same). By considering documents outside the pleadings when reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the Court does not convert the motion into one for summary judgment. See Haase, 835 F.2d at 905 (noting that “the plain language of Rule 12(b) permits only a 12(b)(6) motion to be converted into a motion for summary judgment” when the Court considers documents extraneous to the pleadings).

III. ANALYSIS^[3]

A. Res Judicata

Defendant argues that the claims plaintiff raises here are barred under the doctrine of res judicata. See Def.'s Mem. at 10-12.

“The preclusive effect of a judgment is defined by claim preclusion and issue preclusion, which are collectively referred to as ‘res judicata.'” Taylor v Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008) (footnote omitted). “[C]laim preclusion (sometimes itself called res judicata) . . . prevents parties from raising issues that could have been raised and decided in a prior action - even if they were not actually...