Phillips v. Cricket Lighters

841 A.2d 1000

576 Pa. 644

Gwendolyn PHILLIPS, Administratrix of the Estate of Robyn Jorjean Williams, Deceased; Gwendolyn Phillips, Administratrix of the Estate of Jerome I. Campbell, Deceased; Gwendolyn Phillips, Administratrix of the Estate of Alphonso Crawford, Deceased; Neil Curtis Williams, A Minor By His Guardian and Next Friend, Gwendolyn Phillips, v. CRICKET LIGHTERS; Swedish Match, S.A.; Pinkerton Tobacco Company; Pinkerton Group, Inc.; Pinkerton Group, Inc., t/a/d/b/a Cricket USA; Cricket, S.A.; Poppell, B.V.; Wilkinson Sword/Cricket, Inc.; Wilkinson Sword, Inc.; NDC Corporation and National Development Corporation t/a Shenango Park Associates; NDC Asset Management, Inc.; Regional Sales, Inc.; Universal Match Company a/k/a Universal Match Corporation; Swedish Match, A.B.; Cricket, B.V.; Inter-Match, S.A.; Feudor, S.A.; Schick Netherland, B.V.; Warner-Lambert Holland, B.V.

Appeal of Swedish Match, S.A.; Pinkerton Tobacco Company; Pinkerton Group, Inc.; Pinkerton Group, Inc. t/a/d/b/a Cricket, USA; Cricket, S.A.; Poppell, B.V.; Wilkinson Sword/Cricket, Inc.; Wilkinson Sword, Inc.; Universal Match Company a/k/a Universal Match Corporation; Swedish Match, A.B.; Cricket, B.V.; Inter-Match, S.A.; and Feudor, S.A.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued September 9, 2002.

Decided December 3, 2003.

Paul R. Robinson, Carl A. Eck, Louis C. Long, Pittsburgh, for Swedish Match, et al.

Brian Thornton Must, for amicus curiae Zippo Manufacturing Company.

James Michael Beck, for amicus curiae Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc.

Edward Michael Koch, Jerrold Paul Anders, Philadelphia, for amicus curiae Pennsylvania Defense Institute.

James William Gicking, Richard A. Kraemer, Philadelphia, for amicus curiae BIC Corporation.

D. Bruce Kehoe, Pro Hac Vice, Indianapolis, IN, John M. Humphrey, Clifford Alan Rieders, Hittle, Kehoe, Humphrey and Rieders, for amicus curiae Shirley and John Hittle.

Henry E. Sewinsky, Rodgers, Perfilio, Heiman & Sewinsky, P.C., Sharon, for Gwendolyn Phillips, et al.

Paul A. Lauricella, Philadelphia, for amicus curiae Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association.

BEFORE: ZAPPALA, C.J., and CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN, SAYLOR and EAKIN, JJ.

OPINION

Chief Justice CAPPY.

This is an appeal by allowance. We are asked to resolve whether the Superior Court properly reversed, in part, the trial court's order dismissing all of the claims against the manufacturers and distributors of a cigarette lighter which was allegedly the cause of a fatal fire. For the reasons that follow, we now reverse in part, affirm in part, and vacate in part.

I.

On the night of November 30, 1993, two year old Jerome Campbell ("Jerome") pulled down the purse belonging to his mother, Robyn Williams ("Robyn"), from the top of the family's refrigerator. Jerome retrieved a Cricket disposable butane cigarette lighter from his mother's purse. It is uncontested that this butane lighter lacked any child-resistant feature. Jerome's five year old brother, Neil Williams ("Neil"), observed Jerome use the lighter to ignite some linens. The fire spread to the rest of the family's apartment. After Neil was unsuccessful in his attempts to rouse his mother, he was able to get to a window and began screaming; a neighbor rescued him. Tragically, Robyn, Jerome, and another minor child of Robyn's, Alphonso Crawford, died in the fire.

Gwendolyn Phillips ("Appellee"), as administratrix of the estates of the three decedents and as guardian of Neil, instituted this action against the manufacturers and distributors of the Cricket lighter (collectively, "Appellants").¹ In her complaint, Appellee raised, inter alia, claims of design defect sounding in both strict liability and negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, and punitive damages. These claims were all predicated on Appellee's allegations that Appellants should have manufactured and distributed a lighter that had childproof features.

Appellants filed for summary judgment. The trial court found in favor of Appellants, and dismissed all claims against them. As to the design defect claim sounding in strict liability, the trial court noted that Appellee was required to establish that the Cricket lighter was unsafe for its intended use. Tr. ct. slip op. at 16-17 (citing Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., Inc., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978)). The trial court reasoned that "[t]he term `intended use' necessarily entails the participation of the `intended user'." Id. at 17 (citation omitted). Since a two year old child was not the intended user of a cigarette lighter, the trial court found that Appellants could not be liable in strict liability. In addition, the court reasoned that where a product is found to be not defective for strict liability purposes, then a design defect claim sounding in negligence also must fail; it thus dismissed the negligent design claim. Id. at 30. The trial court also dismissed the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, reasoning that such a claim must be dismissed because Appellee had failed to state a cause of action for negligence. Id. at 36. As to the breach of warranty claim, the trial court found that Appellee had failed to show that the Cricket lighter was not fit for its ordinary purposes of producing a flame. Id. at 31-32. Finally, the court stated that since there was no evidence of wanton or willful misconduct on Appellants' part, then the punitive damages claim must also be dismissed. Id. at 38.²

On appeal, Appellee presented five issues to the Superior Court, claiming that summary judgment should not have been entered on her breach of warranty, negligent infliction of emotional distress, or design defect claims sounding in strict liability or negligence. The Superior Court reversed the trial court's entry of summary judgment on all five of these claims.³

As to the strict liability claim, the Superior Court emphatically rejected the trial court's holding that for strict liability purposes, a product must be designed to be safe only for the "intended user". Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 773 A.2d 802, 810-13 (Pa.Super.Ct.2001). Rather, the court posited that the product must be safe for its intended use, which it found was to create a flame, when used by any user, either intended or unintended. Id. at 813. The court concluded that the Cricket lighter was unsafe because its failure to incorporate a child safety feature allowed it to be operated by an unintended user, namely a small child, thus exposing the child and others to a grave risk of harm. It therefore reversed the trial court's entry of summary judgment on the design defect claim sounding in strict liability.

As to the negligent design claim, the Superior Court noted that the trial court had entered summary judgment because the strict liability claim had been dismissed; the Superior Court reasoned that since it had found that the trial court's determination on the strict liability claim to be erroneous, it must perforce reverse the entry of summary judgment on the negligent design claim. Concomitantly, the Superior Court reversed the entry of summary judgment on the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim as the trial court had dismissed this claim on the basis that the negligence claim had failed.

The Superior Court also reasoned that it must reverse dismissal of the punitive damages claim. In reviewing this issue, the Superior Court expressed the belief that the trial court had dismissed this claim solely because Appellee had no other viable causes of action, and that a punitive damages claim may survive only where there are other viable tort actions. The Superior Court concluded that since it had reinstated four other tort claims raised by Appellee, then the trial court's entry of summary judgment on the punitive damages claim must be reversed.

Finally, the Superior Court did expressly state that it was reversing the trial court's entry of summary judgment on the breach of warranty claim. Yet, the Superior Court provided no analysis as to how it arrived at this conclusion.

Appellants filed a petition for allowance of appeal, which we granted. This appeal then followed.

Appellants contend that the Superior Court erred in reversing the trial court's entry of summary judgment on the strict liability, negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, breach of warranty, and punitive damages claims. In reviewing these claims, we examine whether the Superior Court erred in its application of the appellate standard of review of a trial court's entry of summary judgment. That standard declares that an appellate court may reverse the entry of summary judgment only where it finds that the trial court erred in concluding that the matter presented no genuine issue as to any material fact and that it is clear that the moving party was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Pappas v. Asbel, 564 Pa. 407, 768 A.2d 1089 (2001). In making this assessment, "we view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party." Ertel v. Patriot-News Co., 544 Pa. 93, 674 A.2d 1038, 1041 (1996). As such an inquiry involves solely questions of law, our review is de novo.

II

Appellants' first claim is that the Cricket lighter was not defective pursuant to § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. They argue that this court has long held that a product is not defective where it is safe for its "intended use". Echoing the reasoning of the trial court, Appellants argue that a necessary corollary to the "intended use" doctrine is that the product must have been utilized by an "intended user".

Appellants are correct in stating that under Pennsylvania law, a product will be deemed defective only if it "left the supplier's control lacking any element necessary to make it safe for its ...