Phillips v. Reinhart

MELCHESTER PHILLIPS, JR., Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL REINHART, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 1:20-cv-01034-DAD-SAB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

September 2, 2020

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RECOMMNEDING DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND

(ECF No. 7)

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

Melchester Phillips, Jr. ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On July 31, 2020, Plaintiff's complaint was screened and found not to state a cognizable claim. (ECF No. 5.) Plaintiff was provided with the legal standards that applied to his claims and was granted leave to file an amended complaint within thirty days. (Id.) Currently before the Court for screening is Plaintiff's first amended complaint, filed August 24, 2020. (ECF No. 7.)

I.SCREENING REQUIREMENT

Notwithstanding any filing fee, the court shall dismiss a case if at any time the Court determines that the complaint "(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (section 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis complaints, not just those filed by prisoners); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (dismissal required of in forma pauperis proceedings which seek monetary relief from immune defendants); Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (district court has discretion to dismiss in forma pauperis complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim). The Court exercises its discretion to screen the plaintiff's complaint in this action to determine if it "(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, the Court uses the same pleading standard used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

In reviewing the pro se complaint, the Court is to liberally construe the pleadings and accept as true all factual allegations contained in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Although a court must accept as true all factual allegations contained in a complaint, a court need not accept a plaintiff's legal conclusions as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "[A] complaint [that] pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability . . . 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.' " Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Therefore, the complaint must contain sufficient factual content for the court to draw the reasonable conclusion that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

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II.FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff is currently a pretrial detainee being held in the Kings County Jail on the charges upon which this action is based. The Court accepts Plaintiff's allegations in the complaint as true only for the purpose of the sua sponte screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

Plaintiff brings this action against California Superior Court Judge Michael Reinhart and the Kings County Superior Court alleging violations of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments. (First Am. Compl. ("FAC"), 2, 4, ECF No. 7.)

As of August 16, 2020, Plaintiff has spent 311 days in custody and contends that he is falsely imprisoned. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff was involved in a car accident on November 18, 2018. (Id. at 6.) The police report of the incident charges Plaintiff with reckless driving causing bodily injury, in violation of California Vehicle Code, section 23104(a); and failing to stop for a red signal, in violation of California Vehicle Code, section 21453(a). (Id.) The police report states that neither Plaintiff nor any other occupant of the vehicle had been drinking and none of them showed any signs of impairment. (Id.)

On March 25, 2019, Judge Reinhart issued an arrest warrant for Plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff was arrested on October 11, 2019, in the State of Washington. (Id.) He was arraigned in Washington on October 14, 2019, and charged with a wet and reckless. (Id.) On October 15, 2019, the case involving the arrest warrant was dismissed. (Id.) Attached to Plaintiff's complaint are several declarations for determination of probable cause. The declaration dated October 14, 2019, states that an arrest warrant issued on March 25, 2019, and Plaintiff is charged with five counts of violating California law. (Id. at 13.) The declaration filed November 14, 2019 states that after he was arrested for being a fugitive from justice and while in custody, Plaintiff broke the window in the court holding cell and was charged with malicious mischief 2 due to the cost of the repair. (Id. at 14.) The State of Washington dismissed the California fugitive charges assuming that California did not wish to extradite Plaintiff, but that California reinstituted the warrant. (Id.)

On November 14, 2019, extradition proceedings were reinstated on the wet and recklesswarrant, and Plaintiff was extradited to Kings County on December 19, 2019. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff was rearraigned on December 20, 2019. (Id.) He was held to answer in case no. 19cm-0573 on charges of assault with a deadly weapon or causing great bodily injury which are not the charges identified in the police report. (Id.) Plaintiff also includes a copy of the police report in which the officer checked boxes that no driver or occupant of the vehicle had been drinking. (Id. at 19, 20.) The police report shows that Plaintiff broadsided a vehicle that was traveling straight and was investigated for violations of 23104(a), reckless driving of a vehicle that causes bodily injury to a person other than the person driving the vehicle; and 21453(a), failing to stop at a red light, in violation of the California Vehicle Code. (Id. at 15-20.)

Plaintiff contends that the warrant for the wet and reckless was not based on probable cause and Plaintiff has been illegally detained by the false warrant and is currently awaiting trial set for August 24, 2020 in Kings County Jail. (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, monetary damages in the amount of ten million dollars, punitive damages in the amount of three million dollars and damages for pain and suffering in the amount of ten million dollars. (Id. at 10.)

III.DISCUSSION

A. Section 1983

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of Plaintiff's constitutional or other federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). The statute provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution ... shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. "Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred." Crowley v. Nevada ex rel. NevadaSec'y of State, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). Thus, to state a claim, Plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating the existence of a link, or causal connection, between each Defendant's actions or omissions and a violation of his federal rights. Lemire v. California Dep't of Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011). The Ninth Circuit has held that "[a] person 'subjects' another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made." Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

B. Fourth Amendment

Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested and is being falsely imprisoned on an illegal warrant. The Fourth Amendment provides that 'the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. U.S. Const. amend. IV. "[T]he Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment." Camara v. Mun. Court of City & Cty. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). "To establish a viable Fourth Amendment claim, a plaintiff must show not only that there was a search and seizure as contemplated by the Fourth Amendment, but also that said search and seizure was unreasonable and conducted without consent." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978); United States v. Rubio, 727 F.2d 786, 796-97 (9th Cir. 1983).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that he...