Phipps v. Camp Pendleton & Quantico Hous.

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VICTORIA PHIPPS, an individual, Plaintiff, v. CAMP PENDLETON & QUANTICO HOUSING, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company; LPC PENDLETON QUANTICO PM LP, a Delaware Limited Partnership; and DOES 1 to 50, inclusive, Defendants.

CAMP PENDLETON & QUANTICO HOUSING, LLC; LPC PENDLETON QUANTICO PM LP, Counterclaimants, v. VICTORIA PHIPPS, Counterdefendant.

No. 21cv1514 DMS(AHG)

United States District Court, S.D. California

August 4, 2023

ORDER (1) DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ITS COUNTERCLAIM FOR BREACH OF LEASE AND (2) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Hon Dana M. Sabraw, Chief Judge.

This case comes before the Court on the motion for partial summary judgment filed by Defendants/Counterclaimants Camp Pendleton & Quantico Housing, LLC (“CPQH”) and LPC Pendleton Quantico PM LC (“Lincoln”) on (1) their counterclaim for breach of CPQH's Lease Agreement with Plaintiff/Counterdefendant Victoria Phipps and (2) their motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff filed an opposition to each motion, and Defendants filed reply briefs. After a thorough review of the issues, Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment is denied, and their motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Victoria Phipps is a medical retiree of the United States Army. (Decl. Of Lenden Webb in Supp. of Pl.'s Opp'n to Mot. for Partial Summ. J. (“Webb Decl.”), Ex. 6 at 48:6-9, ECF No. 48-1 at 207.) On February 14, 2020, she entered into a Lease Agreement (“the Lease”) with CPQH for a 1 bed/1.5 bath townhouse at 261-01 Palma Court in the Serra Mesa neighborhood on Camp Pendleton. (Decl. of Elvira Martinez in Supp. of Mot. for Partial Summ. J. (“Martinez Decl.”), Ex. A, ECF No. 42-3.)^[1]

Phipps moved into the home in March 2020, and shortly thereafter notified Lincoln, the property management company, about the possibility of mice in her unit. (Webb Decl., Ex. 6 at 103:10-25.) In response, Lincoln sent pest control personnel to Phipps's home, and they set rodent traps in the house. (Id. at 104:11-20.) During a follow up inspection in November of 2020, an inspector moved Phipps's stove and found mold on a kitchen cabinet. (Id. at 109:23-110:12.) Later that day, a Lincoln inspector sealed off the mold, and told Phipps “that there was a water leak that happened before [Phipps] even moved in and that they should have replaced that cabinet[.]” (Id. at 118:21-119:16.) The following day, another inspector came to Phipps's home and apparently took a sample of the mold. (Id. at 140:3-16.) That inspector returned the following day with a letter from Lincoln telling Phipps she was being displaced from her home so the mold could be remediated. (Id. at 142:10-20.) The following day, Phipps was relocated to another home in the neighborhood. (Id. at 151:24-153:2.)

A few hours after leaving her original home, Phipps realized she left her medication in the fridge, and she reentered the home to retrieve it. (Id. at 153:3-155:13.) Several days later, Phipps was walking through the neighborhood at night and noticed the lights were on inside her home, so she again reentered the property. (Id. at 162:5-163:13.)

Sometime thereafter, and after the remediation of Phipps's home had begun, Phipps requested a pause in the remediation work so she could have an expert inspect the property. Lincoln granted Phipps's request, and the remediation work was paused for approximately two weeks until Phipps's expert was able to conduct an inspection. Shortly thereafter, Phipps was moved to Ward Lodging Camp Pendleton due to mice inside her temporary housing. (Id. at 172:2-21.) Phipps remained in the Ward Lodging until December 18, 2020, when the remediation work was completed. (Id. at 23-25.)

During her relocation, Phipps requested that she be allowed to terminate the Lease early, and Lincoln agreed to that request. (Id. at 176:15-21.) Thus, Phipps did not reestablish residence in the Palma Court house. Instead, Plaintiff found lodging in a nearby hotel and then moved around between several local campgrounds. As of the date of her deposition in this case (June 15, 2022), Plaintiff had reached the stay limit for the campgrounds and was living in her car. (Id. at 15:14-15.)

Phipps contends that as a result of her exposure to the mold in the Palma Court house, she suffered physical and mental injuries and damages. To redress those issues, Phipps filed the present case against CPQH and Lincoln in San Diego Superior Court alleging claims for negligence, nuisance, negligent infliction of emotional distress, breach of the implied warranty of habitability, breach of the implied covenant of quiet use and enjoyment, rent abatement, gross negligence, premises liability, constructive (wrongful) eviction, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.^[2] In response, CPQH and Lincoln removed the case to this Court on the basis of federal enclave jurisdiction, federal agency jurisdiction, and federal officer jurisdiction. CPQH and Lincoln also filed a Counterclaim against Phipps alleging claims for breach of the Lease, equitable indemnity and contribution, and declaratory relief.^[3]

II. DISCUSSION

CPQH and Lincoln move for partial summary judgment on their counterclaim for breach of the Lease on the ground there are no genuine issues of material fact on the elements of that claim, and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. On Phipps's claims, CPQH and Lincoln assert they are entitled to summary judgment based on the federal enclave doctrine, the choice of law provision in the Lease, the Supremacy Clause, derivative sovereign immunity, and Phipps's failure to name an expert on the standard of care for property management. CPQH and Lincoln also contend they are entitled to summary judgment on Phipps's request for punitive damages due to Phipps's failure to come forward with evidence to support that request.

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is proper. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). The moving party must identify the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, or other evidence that it “believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “A material issue of fact is one that affects the outcome of the litigation and requires a trial to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth.” S.E.C. v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1982).

The burden then shifts to the opposing party to show that summary judgment is not appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The opposing party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, to avoid summary judgment, the opposing party cannot rest solely on conclusory allegations. Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). Instead, it must designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. See also Butler v. San Diego District Attorney's Office, 370 F.3d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating if defendant produces enough evidence to require plaintiff to go beyond pleadings, plaintiff must counter by producing evidence of his own). More than a “metaphysical doubt” is required to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

B. Breach of Lease

Turning first to the motion for partial summary judgment, CPQH and Lincoln argue they are entitled to summary judgment on their first counterclaim for breach of the Lease. To prevail on this counterclaim, CPQH and Lincoln must show the existence “of a contract, [their] performance or excuse for failure to perform, [Phipps]'s breach and damage to [CPQH and Lincoln] resulting therefrom.” Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments, 171 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1031 (2009) (quoting McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc., 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1489 (2006)). Neither side disputes the existence of a contract here, but each side disputes the three other elements.

On the second element, CPQH and Lincoln argue they have performed all of their obligations under the Lease. Specifically, they argue they responded to all of Phipps's service requests on the property. Unfortunately, however, CPQH and Lincoln fail to cite the provisions of the Lease that set out their obligations. Instead, they leave the Court to sift through the evidence and determine, for itself, what the Lease required. That does not satisfy CPQH and Lincoln's burden on a motion for summary judgment. As stated in Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Nadkarni, 477 F.Supp.3d 1091, 1095 (N.D. Cal. 2020), “[t]he party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion, and identifying portions of the pleading, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a triable issue of material fact.” (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). Because CPQH and Lincoln have not met that burden, their motion for summary judgment on their counterclaim for breach of the Lease is denied.

C. Federal Enclave Doctrine

Turning to CPQH and Lincoln's motion for summary judgment, the first argument raised there is that many of Phipps's claims are barred by the federal enclave doctrine. CPQH and Lincoln specifically attack Phipps's claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of...