Pierce v. Rodriguez

1

JEFFREY M. PIERCE, Plaintiff, v. RODRIGUEZ and THIBEAULT, Defendants.

No. 3:20-CV-1755 (SVN)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

March 27, 2023

RULING AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

SARALA V. NAGALA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This action concerns allegations that officials from the Connecticut Department of Correction (“DOC”) were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff Jeffrey M. Pierce's health during Defendants' efforts to combat the spread of the novel coronavirus, COVID-19, throughout Osborn Correctional Institution (“Osborn”) in the spring of 2020. Plaintiff, who was incarcerated at Osborn at that time, claims that the precautions purportedly implemented at Osborn were not actually followed and that, as a result, he contracted COVID-19 and suffered permanent hearing loss.

Defendants Thibeault and Rodriguez, the Deputy Warden and Warden of Osborn, respectively, seek summary judgment in their favor on Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim. Specifically Defendants argue that there is no genuine dispute of material fact regarding the adequacy of Osborn's precautionary measures and that, even if such measures were inadequate Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. For the following reasons, the Court disagrees. Accordingly Defendants' motion is DENIED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The record contains the following facts, which are undisputed except when noted. At all relevant times, Plaintiff was incarcerated at Osborn, Thibeault was the Deputy Warden of Osborn, and Rodriguez was the Warden of Osborn. Pl.'s Local Rule (“L. R.”) 56(a)2 Statement (“St.”), ECF No. 43-1, ¶ 1. Prior to the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, Plaintiff was housed in B-Block, and he was employed as a second-shift kitchen worker. Id. ¶¶ 23-24.

On March 13, 2020, Osborn went into an emergency lockdown in an effort to limit the spread of the COVID-19 virus among the staff and inmate population. Id. ¶ 2. Osborn imposed other precautionary measures to limit the spread of the virus, such as: reducing the prison population density through community release options; suspending visits and group recreation; suspending the use of telephones in cell blocks under quarantine; staff going through COVID-19 screening prior to entering the facility; regular cleaning of inmates' sleeping areas; and providing inmates with instructions on how to keep from contracting COVID-19. Id. ¶¶ 6-7, 10-12. In early April of 2020, inmates were also provided with cloth masks, and inmates and staff were required to wear masks at all times. Id. ¶¶ 8-9.

Sometime in March or April of 2020, Plaintiff was transferred from B-Block to E-Block.^[1]Id. ¶ 24. Defendants maintain that this transfer was because Plaintiff was a kitchen worker and, at that time, essential inmate workers were moved to E-Block to form a segregated “cohort,” which would ensure the continuous operation of essential facility functions. Defs.' L. R. 56(a)1 St., ECF No. 37-2, ¶¶ 25-26. Plaintiff takes issue with this explanation, however, because he was only a second-shift kitchen worker; first-shift kitchen workers remained housed in B-Block. Pl.'s L. R. 56(a)2 St. ¶ 24; Pl.'s Decl., ECF No. 43-2, ¶ 5. Plaintiff contends that first- and second-shift kitchen workers were housed separately to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 between them. Id.

In mid-April, Plaintiff was terminated from his kitchen job. Defs.' L. R. 56(a)1 St. ¶ 27; Pl.'s St. of Supplemental (“Suppl.”) Facts, ECF No. 43-1 at 6, ¶ 6. Defendants assert that Plaintiff was terminated from the job because he refused to wear a mask while working and the medical staff did not approve any medical reason why he could not work while wearing the cloth mask he had been supplied. Defs.' L. R. 56(a)1 St. ¶ 27. Plaintiff responds that he never refused to wear a mask. Pl.'s St. of Suppl. Facts ¶ 4. Rather, he states, he requested an alternative to the cloth mask because he found it difficult to breathe through the cloth mask, which was made of “the same thick, heavy fabric that is used to make the pants worn by inmates at Osborn.” Id. ¶¶ 2-4; Pl.'s Decl. ¶¶ 7-8.

Following Plaintiff's termination from his kitchen job, he was moved from E-Block back to B-Block. Defs.' L. R. 56(a)1 St. ¶ 28; Pl.'s St. of Suppl. Facts ¶ 6. Defendants contend that, because E-Block had become a segregated “cohort” for essential inmate workers, Defendants moved Plaintiff out of E-Block and back to B-Block because he had been terminated from his kitchen job. Defs.' L. R. 56(a)1 St. ¶ 28. Plaintiff claims he was moved from E-Block to B-Block “without explanation.” Pl.'s Decl. ¶ 10. He also takes issue with Defendants' explanation that he was moved back to B-Block because he was no longer an essential worker, because, as noted above, first-shift kitchen workers had remained housed in B-Block during this time. Pl.'s L. R. 56(a)2 St. ¶ 24.

Defendants maintain that they were not aware that any inmates in B-Block were infected with COVID-19 at the time Plaintiff was transferred back to B-Block because, throughout April of 2020, Osborn implemented the following precautions regarding the isolation of inmates with COVID-19. Defs.' L. R. 56(a)1 St. ¶¶ 33. If an inmate displayed or complained of COVID-19 symptoms, he was immediately sent to the medical unit, given a swab test, and isolated in the F-Block housing unit pending the results of the test. Id. ¶ 14. If the inmate had a cellmate, the cellmate was also isolated in F-Block on the opposite side of the tier. Id. ¶ 15. If the inmate's test results were positive, he would be isolated in the Hospital 2 unit while awaiting transfer to Northern Correctional Institution, which was designated by the DOC as the facility for medical isolation of COVID-19 symptomatic inmates. Id. These precautionary measures were based on recommendations and instructions provided to Osborn by health service professionals, including the DOC's Chief Medical Officer and the Center for Disease Control (“CDC”). Id. ¶ 16; see also Thibeault Decl., ECF No. 37-3, ¶ 4.

Citing these measures, Defendants represent that no inmates who had tested positive for COVID-19 were housed in B-Block before mass testing occurred on May 15, 2020. Defs.' L. R. 56(a)1 St. ¶ 17. Defendants admit that several inmates in B-Block tested positive for COVID-19 in April of 2020, but maintain that those inmates were immediately transferred out of B-Block, per Osborn's precautionary measures. Id. ¶ 18. Defendants also assert that the entire B-Block was placed on quarantine when these inmates tested positive. Id.

Plaintiff disputes, however, that Osborn in fact followed those measures with respect to B-Block. Pl.'s L. R. 56(a)2 St. ¶¶ 14-17. Plaintiff represents that he “voiced concerns” to prison staff prior to being transferred back to B-Block because he was aware that at least two inmates in B-Block had tested positive for COVID-19. Pl.'s St. of Suppl. Facts ¶ 7; Pl.'s Decl. ¶ 11. In addition, after he was transferred back to B-Block, Plaintiff orally informed Defendants that he was aware that other inmates in B-Block had tested positive for COVID-19 and that he did not wish to be housed in B-Block. Pl.'s St. of Suppl. Facts ¶ 8; Pl.'s Decl. ¶ 13. Plaintiff represents that Defendants responded that Plaintiff “was housed appropriately.” Pl.'s St. of Suppl. Facts ¶ 8; Pl.'s Decl. ¶ 13. Plaintiff attests he later learned that more than ten inmates in B-Block tested positive; he learned this directly from the infected inmates. Id. ¶ 14. Plaintiff represents that, around this time, approximately April 28, 2020, B-Block was placed on quarantine. Id.; Pl.'s St. of Suppl. Facts ¶ 9. Also on that date, he submitted a written complaint to Thibeault requesting to be moved to a different unit due to COVID-19, but he received no response. Id. ¶¶ 10-11.

Osborn conducted mass testing on May 15, 2020,^[2] Pl.'s L. R. 56(a)2 St. ¶ 20, and Plaintiff represents that he tested positive for COVID-19 the next day, Pl.'s St. of Suppl. Facts ¶ 13. Plaintiff further represents that, as a result of contracting COVID-19, he suffered severe injuries, including permanent hearing loss in his left ear. Id. ¶ 14.

Plaintiff initiated this action pro se in November of 2020, and the Court (Bryant, J.) permitted his Eighth Amendment claim to proceed past initial review. ECF Nos. 1, 8 at 7. Thereafter, the Court (Bryant, J.) granted Plaintiff's motion to appoint pro bono counsel. ECF No. 16. After the case was transferred to the undersigned, the Court modified the operative scheduling order to permit discovery regarding liability and damages to proceed in phases, in light of the parties' representation that Plaintiff required further medical testing to ascertain the extent of his hearing loss. ECF No. 32. Defendants then filed the present motion for summary judgment regarding liability. ECF No. 37.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides, in relevant part, that a court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” A disputed fact is material only where the determination of the fact might affect the outcome of the lawsuit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). With respect to genuineness, “summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.

In moving for summary judgment against a party who will bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial, the movant's burden of establishing there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute will be satisfied if the movant can point to an...