Pierre v., 17-CV-973 (MKB)

NIXON C. JEAN PIERRE, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK CITY TAXI AND LIMOUSINE COMMISSION, Defendant.

17-CV-973 (MKB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

April 19, 2017

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

MARGO K. BRODIE, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Nixon C. Jean Pierre, proceeding pro se, filed the above-captioned action on February 17, 2017, alleging that Defendant the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission (the "TLC") violated his due process rights when it revoked his taxi license. (Compl., Docket Entry No. 1.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court grants Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis for the limited purpose of this Memorandum and Order. For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the Complaint.

I. Background

Plaintiff is a taxi driver with the TLC, which requires him to maintain a "hack license,"¹ a TLC-issued driver's license specific to yellow taxis. (See generally Compl.) By letter dated July 28, 2016, Defendant informed Plaintiff that a passenger in his vehicle on July 7, 2016 had lodged a complaint against him for arguing about the passenger's desired route, yelling at the passengerand refusing to give the passenger a receipt upon request. (Id. at 8.)² Defendant notified Plaintiff that he may be charged with violating TLC Rules 54-15(l) ("courtesy"), 54-12(f) ("threats, harassment, abuse") and 54-16(d) ("receipt for payment"), all of which would result in a fine of at least $600 and may also lead to the suspension or revocation of Plaintiff's hack license. (Id.) Defendant offered Plaintiff the opportunity to plead guilty to a violation of TLC Rule 54-15(f) and pay a $250 fine instead, with no points assessed against his hack license. (Id.) According to the Notice of Decision that Plaintiff attaches to the Complaint, Plaintiff did not pay the fine and did not appear for his hearing on October 31, 2016, before a hearing officer of the New York City Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings ("OATH"). (See id. at 6 (Notice of Decision).) On November 1, 2016, the hearing officer entered a default judgment against Plaintiff for his failure to appear at the hearing to adjudicate the complaints. (Id.) Defendant imposed a fine of $1375 and revoked Plaintiff's hack license. (See id.)

Plaintiff alleges that the TLC engages in "a pattern of abuse" in which it fails to properly investigate passenger complaints against drivers and instead assumes the truth of those complaints and demands settlement from the drivers. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff states, "[Defendant] will ask you to send an amount of money and you don't have to worry about it. If you don't send any money you will receive a summon[s] by mail to appear at a hearing." (Id. at 5.)

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant uses a "prejudicial and double standard" because drivers must appear in person at a hearing, but complaining witnesses may appear by telephone. (Id. at 4.) Because Plaintiff did not comply with this "double standard" by appearing at his hearing, Defendant revoked his hack license. (See id.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant "failed to notify [him] by mail about the hearing," and that he previously had his license revokedand "[i]t took [him] 8 years to get it back." (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that he was "maliciously prosecuted as an act of retaliation and retribution" because he is an "activist" who has sued Defendant before. (Id. at 4, 10.)

Plaintiff states that the revocation of his license has caused him to be "traumatized whenever [he] receives a mail from [Defendant]." (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff asserts federal jurisdiction on the basis of "abuse of power and authority, [and] malicious prosecution," (id. at 3), seeks five million dollars in damages and requests an injunction requiring Defendant to change the way it investigates passenger complaints, (id. at 5, 10-11). Plaintiff attaches a copy of a letter from the City of New York Office of the Comptroller, which informs Plaintiff that "the basis of [his] claim is outside the scope of authority of this office as it requests review of an administrative decision" and directs him to "proceed under Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules." (Id. at 12.) Plaintiff does not indicate whether he filed an Article 78 petition.

II. Discussion

a. Standard of review

A complaint must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Matson v. Bd. of Educ., 631 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Although all allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is "inapplicable to legal conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In reviewing a pro se complaint, the court must be mindful that a plaintiff's pleadings should be held "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-105 (1976)); see Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that even afterTwombly, the court "remain[s] obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally").

Nevertheless, the Court is required to dismiss sua sponte an in forma pauperis action if the Court determines it "(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). In addition, if the Court "determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court must dismiss the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); see also Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp. v. Hellas Telecomms., S.À.R.L., 790 F.3d 411, 416-17 (2d Cir. 2015) (A district court may dismiss an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) when the court "lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it . . . ." (quoting Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000))).

b. Plaintiff fails to state a due process claim

Although Plaintiff does not identify a federal statute or constitutional provision that would apply to his claims, his allegations of "malicious prosecution," unfair hearings and the deprivation of his license suggest that he is suing to vindicate his constitutional rights. In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court construes his allegations to assert a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the denial of procedural due process. See Diaz v. United States, 633 F. App'x 551 (2d Cir. 2015) (noting that pro se parties are "entitled to a liberal construction of [their] pleadings, which should be read to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest" (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Green v. United States, 260 F.3d 78, 83 (2d Cir. 2001))).

In a section 1983 suit brought to enforce procedural due process rights related to an alleged deprivation of property, a court must determine "(1) whether a property interest is implicated, and, if it is, (2) what process is due before the plaintiff may be deprived of that interest." Nnebe v. Daus, 644 F.3d 147, 158 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Ciambriello v. Cty. of Nassau,292 F.3d 307, 313 (2d Cir. 2002)). The Second Circuit has held that a taxi driver "has a valid property interest in his existing license and is thus entitled to procedural due process incident to the revocation of that license." Mordukhaev v. Daus, 457 F. App'x 16, 20 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Nnebe, 644 F.3d at 158); Nnebe, 644 F.3d at 158 ("[A] taxi driver has a protected property interest in his license." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

"When reviewing alleged procedural due process violations, the Supreme Court has distinguished between (a) claims based on established state procedures and (b) claims based on random, unauthorized acts by state employees." Hellenic Am. Neighborhood Action Comm. v. City of New York ("HANAC"), 101 F.3d 877, 880 (2d Cir. 1996) (first citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532 (1984); and then citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541 (1981)). Where the claim is based on a random, unauthorized act by state employees, "the 'due process' required by the fourteenth amendment is satisfied by the availability at the state level of an adequate post-deprivation hearing." Kraebel v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Hous. Pres. & Dev., 959 F.2d 395, 404 (2d Cir. 1992). In New York, "an Article 78 proceeding is a perfectly adequate postdeprivation remedy." HANAC, 101 F.3d at 881. Such a proceeding is "an amalgam of the common law writs of certiorari to review, mandamus, and prohibition," and through it, "constitutional issues can be decided." Id.; see also Locurto v. Safir, 264 F.3d 154, 174 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that an Article 78 proceeding "permits a petitioner to submit affidavits and other written evidence, and where a material issue of fact is raised, have a trial of the disputed issue, including constitutional claims"); Campo v. N.Y.C. Emps.' Ret. Sys., 843 F.2d 96, 101 (2d Cir. 1988) ("Article 78 provides the mechanism for challenging a specific decision of [an] . . . administrative agency." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, where a plaintiff alleges he was deprived of a protected interest due to a random, unauthorized act by a state employee, he must pursue his claim through an Article 78 proceeding. See HANAC, 101 F.3d at 881; see alsoNenninger v. Vill. of Port Jefferson, 509 F. App'x 36, 39 n.2 (2d Cir. 2013).

However, "[w]hen the deprivation occurs in the more structured environment of established state procedures, rather than random acts, the availability of postdeprivation procedures will not, ipso facto, satisfy due process." HANAC, 101 F.3d at 880; see also Reid v....