Pierre v. Consulate Gen. of Haiti

1

MARC PIERRE; et al., Plaintiffs, v. CONSULATE GENERAL OF HAITI, et al., Defendants.

No. 22-CV-8504 (LTS)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

May 22, 2023

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Plaintiff Marc Pierre, who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”), brings this action under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. He styles his pleading as a class action and seeks relief on behalf of Haiti and other individuals, identifying himself as a “lead Plaintiff.” (ECF 5, at 1.)

By order dated December 20, 2022, the Court dismissed the claims brought on behalf of Haiti and the individual plaintiffs and granted Pierre 30 days' leave to assert any claims he wished to bring on his own behalf. On January 20, 2023 Plaintiff filed a 788-page amended complaint, in which he seeks “to redress the violation of procedural due process of the International Court of Justice by the United Nations regarding Uni-lateral Declaration on Behalf of Haiti dated October 17 of 2018.” (Id. at 4.) (the “2018 Haiti Declaration”).

For the reasons set forth in this order, the Court dismisses the amended complaint.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ P. 12(h)(3).

While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.

BACKGROUND

In its December 20, 2022, order, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint to assert his own claims, explaining that he could not assert claims on behalf of any other plaintiff. In the amended complaint, Plaintiff largely reasserts the same claims he asserted in the original complaint, providing a comprehensive history of Haiti. He includes, however, a description of his attempts to submit the 2018 Haiti Declaration to the Consulate General of Haiti, which the Court understand to be either the consular office or the individual in charge of the office. The person currently in charge of the Consulate General of Haiti in New York is a woman with the title, Cheffe de Poste A.I.^[1]For the purposes of this order, the Court will use the term Chef de Poste when referring to the person in charge of the Consulate General because Plaintiff refers to this individual as a man; when referring to the office, the Court will use the term Consulate General. The Court summarizes Plaintiff's allegations as follows.

In 2018, Plaintiff conducted “an investigation [that] led to the creation of” the 2018 Haiti Declaration, “which requested, Immediate Injunctive Relief on the Government of President Jovenel Moise due to the revelation of his administration being connected to drugs, Michael Martely, and misappropriation of Petrocaribe funds.” (ECF 5, at 14.) Plaintiff sought the return of $18,000,000,000 “in missing Haiti Earthquake Relief funds and for me to lead an Independent Haiti Reconstruction Commission [IHRC] funded by the United Nations to rebuild Haiti.” (Id.)

Also in 2018, Plaintiff brought the 2018 Haiti Declaration to the Defendant Consulate General of Haiti in New York, New York, where the “technocrats at the embassy were dumbfounded by my Unilateral Declaration, the information it contained and didn't know how to process it.” (Id. at 16.) Plaintiff explained to the consular staff that he “wanted to help them recover the missing IHRC funds and rebuild Haiti.” (Id.) He further “explained the process to the administrative clerks and that he needed it to be forwarded to the UN Secretary General by the Ambassador to the UN after review but they placated me for weeks without letting me talk to any technocrats at the consulate or processing my document.” (Id.) Plaintiff states that notwithstanding his request to speak with the Chef de Poste, the consular staff “refused to let me speak with him.” (Id.)

Plaintiff “also sent a certified copy of the [2018 Haiti Declaration] to the UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres for processing . . . in November 2018 and waited for a response but never got one.” (Id. at 17.) In 2020, Plaintiff continued to seek to ensure that the 2018 Haiti Declaration would be “endorse[d] and process[ed],” but his attempts were unsuccessful. (Id. at 18.) Plaintiff started the Haiti Reformation Project (“HRP”) and acted as its “Attorney-in-Fact, Agent and Representative.” (Id.) Through the HRP, Plaintiff advocated on behalf of the Haitian diaspora and created a “Tabula-Rasa Accord,” which was given to now-deceased President Moise, on April 2, 2021, who then scheduled a national referendum for a new Constitution, scheduled for June 27, 2021.^[2]

Plaintiff names as defendants (1) the Consulate General of Haiti, (2) Core Group Members France, Canada, and the United States,^[3]and (3) the current Prime Minister of Haiti, Ariel Henry, seeking a response to Plaintiff's Tabula-Rasa Accord.

DISCUSSION

A. Alien Tort Statute

Plaintiff asserts that this Court has jurisdiction of his due process claims under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), which invests district courts with “original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Plaintiff's claims, however, do not sound in tort. Rather, he seeks an order from this Court directing the Prime Minister of Haiti, the Chef do Poste, and the United States, Canada, and France to respond to his submissions. Because the ATS does not confer jurisdiction on this Court to order these officials and governments to respond to Plaintiff's submissions, this Court lacks jurisdiction under the ATS to hear Plaintiff's claims.

B. Mandamus Relief

The Court construes the amended complaint as a request for mandamus relief because Plaintiff asks this Court to compel foreign actors to accept his 2018 Haiti Declaration and consider his Tabula-Rasa Accord. This Court cannot, however, issue any such order. While the Court does have jurisdiction of “any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff,” 28 U.S.C. § 1361, such jurisdiction does not extend to non-federal actors, see generally Columbia Artists Mgmt., LLC v. Swenson & Burnakus, Inc., No. 05-CV-7314 (LBS), 2008 WL 4387808, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2008) (“It is well-settled that ‘federal courts have no general power to compel action by state officials.'”) (quoting Davis v. Lansing, 851 F.2d 72, 74 (2d Cir.1988) (rejecting application for writ of mandamus compelling state court judge to permit defense counsel's use of race-based peremptory challenges)). Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff's request for relief compelling foreign officials to accept and consider his Declaration and Accord.

C. Sovereign Immunity - Claims Against the United States

The Court must dismiss any claims Plaintiff is bringing against the United States under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. This doctrine bars federal courts from hearing all suits against the federal government, including suits against any part of the federal government, such as a federal agency, except where sovereign immunity has been waived. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941)); Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 510 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Because an action against a federal agency or federal officers in their official capacities is essentially a suit against the United States, such suits are . . . barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, unless such immunity is waived.”). The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff's claims against the United States under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).^[4]

D. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act

Plaintiff's claims against the Prime Minister of Haiti and the governments...