Pigford v. Vilsack

146 F.Supp.3d 137

Timothy Pigford et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Tom Vilsack, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture, Defendant.

Cecil Brewington et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Tom Vilsack, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 97-1978 (PLF)

Civil Action No. 98-1693 (PLF)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed November 23, 2015

Anthony Herman, Covington & Burling LLP, David A. Branch, Law Office of David Branch, Jacob A. Stein, Stein, Mitchell & Muse, L.L.P., Richard Talbot Seymour, Law Office of Richard T. Seymour, P.L.L.C., Barbara Kim Kagan, Steptoe & Johnson, LLP, Joshua A. Doan, U.S. Department of Justice, Richard Talbot Seymour, Law Office of Richard T. Seymour, P.L.L.C., Washington, DC, Charles Jerome Ware, Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Columbia, MD, Faya R. Toure, Selma, AL, Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Charles J. Ogletree Consulting, Cambridge, MA, for Plaintiffs.

Matthew Josephson, Megan Anne Crowley, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, United States District Judge

This matter is before the Court on the motion for fees, costs, and expenses filed by Faya Rose Toure, a/k/a Rose M. Sanders (“Ms. Sanders”), which seeks $17,212 for work performed and expenses incurred between September 1, 2014 and December 30, 2014, implementing the Consent Decree in this case. The United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) does not dispute that Ms. Sanders is entitled to an appropriate fee for her work on the wind-down stipulation and order during this time, but it challenges all of Ms. Sanders's time entries as “block billing” and some as non-payable, too vague, or not reflecting proper billing judgment. Upon consideration of the parties' arguments, documentary submissions, and the relevant legal authorities, the Court will grant Ms. Sanders's motion in part and deny it in part, awarding her fees, costs, and expenses in the amount of $10,056.80.¹

I. BACKGROUND

Ms. Sanders is a former partner in the law firm Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders & Pettaway, LLC and one of several class counsel for the plaintiffs in this class action. Mot. at 1, 3. In that role, Ms. Sanders collaborated between September 1, 2014 and December 30, 2014 with other class counsel and USDA on the negotiation and drafting of a wind-down stipulation and order that resolved outstanding issues in the case. Mot. at 6-9; Opp. at 1. On December 31, 2014, Ms. Sanders moved for $17,212 in attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses for her work “implementing the Consent Decree, for the period from September 1, 2014 through December 30, 2014.” Mot. at 1. USDA argues that Ms. Sanders “is entitled to no more than $2,360.60 in fees” for her work during that period. Opp. at 10.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Consent Decree in this class action states that “[c]lass counsel ... shall be entitled to reasonable attorney[s'] fees and costs under [the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”) ], 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(d) ... that are generated in connection with the filing of this action and the implementation of this Consent Decree.” Pigford v. Glickman , No. 97–1978, Consent Decree (Apr. 14, 1999) at 22-23, ¶ 14(a) [Dkt. 167]. The ECOA permits plaintiffs who prosecute “successful action[s]” to seek reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(d) (“In the case of any successful action ... the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the court, shall be added to any damages awarded by the court.”). The Court's prior opinions on attorneys' fees for class counsel make clear that “[s]uccess” includes “all portions of the implementation phase” but excludes “assisting an individual farmer whose [Track A or Track B] claim ultimately failed.” See Pigford v. Glickman , No. 97–1978, Opinion and Order (Mar. 8, 2001) at 8 [Dkt. 411]. The Court created a quarterly schedule for class counsel to submit fee motions, which requires that “for fees, costs and expenses incurred by any class counsel or of counsel after June 30, 2002 ... such class counsel or of counsel shall file motions for his own fees, costs and expenses, on a quarterly basis, on the 30th day of March, June, September and December.” See Pigford v. Veneman , 239 F.Supp.2d 68, 73 (D.D.C.2003).

Once the court has determined that the class counsel was successful, it then must decide whether the fees sought are reasonable by calculating “the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate,” Hensley v. Eckerhart , 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983), the so-called “Lodestar figure.” See Sierra Club v. Jackson , 926 F.Supp.2d 341, 346 (D.D.C.2013). On the issue of reasonableness, counsel must submit supporting documentation with the motion for attorneys' fees, providing sufficient detail so that the court can determine “with a high degree of certainty” that the hours billed were actually and reasonably expended, that the hourly rate charged was reasonable in view of the attorneys' reputation, level of skill, and experience with respect to this type of case, and that the matter was appropriately staffed to do the work required efficiently and without duplicative billing. See In re Olson , 884 F.2d 1415, 1428–29 (D.C.Cir.1989) ; see also Hensley v. Eckerhart , 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933 ; Covington v. Dist. of Columbia , 57 F.3d 1101, 1107 (D.C.Cir.1995). “At a minimum, a fee applicant must provide some information about the attorneys' billing practices and hourly rate, the attorneys' skill and experience, ... the nature of counsel's practice as it relates to this kind of litigation, and the prevailing market rates in the relevant community.” Rooths v. Dist. of Columbia , 802 F.Supp.2d 56, 60 (D.D.C.2011). “In this Circuit, courts 'require that fee applications include contemporaneous time records of hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of the work with supporting documents, if any.' ” Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. U.S. Dep't of Justice , No. 12–1491, 142 F.Supp.3d 1, 9, 2015 WL 6529371, at *6 (D.D.C. Oct. 27, 2015) (quoting In re Donovan , 877 F.2d 982, 994 (D.C.Cir.1989) ). “Once a plaintiff has provided such information, there is a presumption that the number of hours billed and the hourly rate are reasonable, and the burden then shifts to the defendant[ ] to rebut the plaintiff's showing of reasonable hours and reasonable hourly rates for attorneys of [the relevant] skill level and experience for [the] kind of case.” Watkins v. Vance , 328 F.Supp.2d 23, 26 (D.D.C.2004).

III. DISCUSSION

There is no dispute that Ms. Sanders's work on the wind-down stipulation was “successful” under the ECOA and she therefore is entitled to reasonable fees, costs, and expenses. USDA raises a number of arguments, however, in support of its contention that Ms. Sanders's request for $17,212 is based upon “block billing,” that several sets of time entries are non-payable or too vague, and that several time entries are inflated and do not reflect “billing judgment.” The Court will address each of USDA's arguments in turn.

A. Block Billing

USDA characterizes all of the entries in Ms. Sanders's four-page time sheet as constituting “serial or block billing.” See Opp. at 3; Mot. at 6-9. The term “block billing” commonly refers to a single time entry that lists multiple tasks, thus making it impossible to evaluate each task's reasonableness. See Role Models America, Inc. v. Brownlee , 353 F.3d 962, 971 (D.C.Cir.2004) ; see also Blackman v. Dist. of Columbia , 677 F.Supp.2d 169, 179–80 (D.D.C.2010) (finding entries reasonable where counsel “[did] not actually lump multiple tasks together and the relatively few entries that do contain more than one task are of relatively minor significance and amount to minimal time”).

Here, USDA cites no specific entries in Ms. Sanders's time sheet as “serial or block billing,” see Opp. at 3, but almost every entry therein does list multiple tasks. See Mot. at 6-9. Generally, it is incumbent upon a party objecting to claimed fees to identify, for example in the context of block billing, why the multiple tasks billed together do not “appear interrelated” or why the entry lacks “sufficient clarity and detail” for the Court to “evaluate each task's reasonableness.” See Pigford v. Vilsack , 89 F.Supp.3d 25, 33–34 (D.D.C.2015) ; cf . Venable LLP v. Overseas Lease Grp., Inc. , No. 14–2010, 2015 WL 4555372, at *4 n. 9 (D.D.C. July 28, 2015) (rejecting “overbilling allegations” as “merely conclusory” because they “do not point to specific facts that show how [one party] actually overbilled [the other]”). While several of Ms. Sanders's entries do in fact contain entirely unrelated tasks, see, e.g ., Mot. at 7 (time entry for October 27, 2014), it is not so clear that others do. Moreover, USDA has mounted separate challenges on different grounds to many discrete tasks that Ms. Sanders billed together with other tasks, indicating that USDA was able to evaluate their reasonableness. See Opp. at 3-7. In most cases, the Court is also able to discern from the descriptions of the tasks identified in Ms. Sanders's entries what work was done sufficiently to evaluate the reasonableness of the time spent. Furthermore, the time entries that USDA does not challenge on grounds other than block billing are of “relatively minor significance and amount to minimal time.” See Blackman v. Dist. of Columbia , 677 F.Supp.2d at 180. The Court therefore will not reduce the fee award for purported block billing.

B. Non-Payable or Vague Entries

USDA contends that Ms. Sanders seeks fees for non-payable tasks and that several of her time entries are too vague to warrant fees. Opp. at 3-8. The Court will address each of those purportedly non-payable or vague time expenditures in turn.

First, USDA claims $1,820 “is for work performed in a different quarter” and therefore non-payable. Opp. ...