Piligian v. Icahn Sch. of Med. at Mount Sinai

490 F.Supp.3d 707

George J. PILIGIAN, MD., Plaintiff,

v.ICAHN SCHOOL OF MEDICINE AT MOUNT SINAI, Defendants

1:17-CV-01975 (ALC)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed September 28, 2020

Cynthia Rollings, Luna Droubi, Beldock Levine & Hoffman LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.

Brittany A. Buccellato, Cecilia Rose Ehresman, Dana Nicole Berber, Rory J. McEvoy, Akerman LLP, New York, NY, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

ANDREW L. CARTER, JR., United States District Judge:

On March 17, 2017, Plaintiff Doctor George Piligian brought the instant action against Defendant the Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai for federal and state disability discrimination and retaliation. (ECF No. 1). On October 24, 2019, Defendant moved for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 54–61). I referred this motion to Magistrate Judge Stewart D. Aaron for a Report and Recommendation ("R&R"). (See ECF No. 62). Judge Aaron issued an R&R on April 7, 2020, recommending that Defendant's motion be granted in part and denied in part. (R&R at ECF No. 75). Both Plaintiff and Defendant filed objections and responded. I now overrule those objections and adopt the R&R in full. (ECF Nos. 76–80).

I. BACKGROUND

I assume the parties’ familiarity with the factual background and procedural history of this case as laid out in Judge Aaaron's R&R.

A. Factual Background

In short, Plaintiff, a board-certified physician, alleges that while working for the Selikoff Center at Mount Sinai Hospital, he began experiencing adverse health effects related to looking at a computer screen, that caused nausea, vertigo, and vomiting. (ECF 73 at ¶ 12). In 2012, Plaintiff was diagnosed with Convergence Insufficiency, an eye disorder. (Id. at ¶ 11). According to Plaintiff, Defendant accommodated his condition until 2012 when Dr. Roberto Lucchini became the Chief of Occupational Medicine at Mount Sinai, where Plaintiff worked. At that time, Defendant allegedly implemented new productivity requirements which Plaintiff struggled to satisfy without reasonable accommodations. (Compl. at ¶¶ 7, 8, 41).

In 2013, the Selikoff Center merged with the Hospital's World Trade Center Monitoring Program ("WTC Program"). (Compl. at ¶ 42). Plaintiff had to take on new responsibilities after the merger. Plaintiff's workload, particularly his data-entry responsibilities increased significantly. (Id. at ¶¶ 51–53; ECF No. 73 at ¶¶ 32, 34). Plaintiff alleges that because of his eye condition, he struggled to comply with productivity standards and deadlines. (Compl. at ¶¶ 56; ECF No. 73 at ¶¶ 36, 37; Pil. Tr. At 98–99). He contends that the School should have provided him with commensurate accommodations as it was aware of his disability.

Plaintiff alleges that he requested accommodations only for his work in the WTC Program. Specifically, he alleges that in mid-June, he met with Lucchini and requested paper data entry forms, an administrative assistant to transcribe the forms, as well as other reasonable accommodations to allow him to comply with WTC Program data-entry requirements. (Compl. at ¶¶ 59–62; Piligian Decl. at ¶ 66–67). According to Plaintiff, his assistant at the Selikoff Center did not transfer with him to the WTC program. (See Piligian Tr. at 161–63). Plaintiff alleges that Lucchini did not respond to his requests and instructed Plaintiff to continue working. (Compl. at ¶ 63).

On the same day Plaintiff met with Lucchini, Lucchini emailed the WTC Program Administrator and an Administrative Manager at the Selikoff Center, informing them of Plaintiff's difficulties with data entry and asking what was feasible (presumably in terms of accommodations). (ECF No. 66-3). The Administrative Manager responded, indicated that he was under the impression Lucchini had decided not to reappoint Plaintiff, terminating his employment. (Id. ). The WTC Program Administrator wrote that she told Plaintiff she would provide him with paper forms and the assistance of a patient coordinator for data entry. (Id. ) Lucchini responded: "Yesterday I told [Piligian] that this is his duty with no help from patient coordinator. If he cannot do it there is no other job and he can leave." (Id. )

On June 20, 2013, Lucchini signed a letter to Piligian giving him advanced notice he would not be reappointed and that his current term would end on November 30, 2013. Lucchini gave Plaintiff the letter of non-reappointment on July 1, 2013. (ECF No 73 at ¶¶ 99–100).

B. Procedural Background

1. Complaint

Plaintiff brought this action in 2017, filing an eight-count complaint alleging: (1) discrimination based on disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"); (2) retaliation in violation of the ADA; (3) discrimination based on disability in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act; (4) retaliation in violation of the Rehabilitation Act; (5) discrimination based on disability in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL"); (6) retaliation in violation of NYSHRL; (7) discrimination based on disability in violation of New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL); and (8) retaliation in violation of NYCHRL. (Compl. at ¶¶ 75–118).

2. Summary Judgment

Following completion of discovery, Defendant moved for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims. (ECF Nos. 54–61). With respect to Plaintiff's disability discrimination claims, Defendant argued first that they were entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination because he did not show that the decision not to reappoint, or to terminate him, was made based on his disability. (ECF No. 61). Specifically, Defendant argued that the supervisors who decided to fire Plaintiff were unaware of Plaintiff's eye condition, so could not have made the decision on that basis. (Id. at 20–23). Further, Defendant contended that even if Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case, his federal and NYSHRL discrimination claims must be dismissed because Defendant demonstrated that Plaintiff was not reappointed for a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason. (Id. at 23–25). Second, Defendant argued summary judgment was appropriate on these claims because Plaintiff received every accommodation requested and thus could not establish that Defendant discriminated by failing to reasonably accommodate.

With respect to Plaintiff's federal retaliation claims, Defendant argued that that there was no causal connection between Plaintiff's request for accommodations and the decision not to reappoint him. (ECF No. 61 at 30–31). Specifically, Defendant argued that the two people who decided not to reappoint Plaintiff—Lucchini and Landrigan—were unaware of Plaintiff's eye condition at the time the decision was made, and thus, the non-reappoint decision could not have been retaliatory. (Id. ) Defendant also seems to have argued that summary judgment is warranted because the decision not to reappoint Plaintiff was premised on performance deficiencies that began and were documented prior to Plaintiff's alleged protected activity.

Finally, Defendant argued that Plaintiff's state law retaliation claims must fail because a request for accommodations is not a protected activity under either the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. (Id. at 23–24).

3. The R&R

Judge Aaron rejected Defendant's arguments as to Plaintiff's disability claims, finding there exists a genuine dispute as to whether Defendant had knowledge of Plaintiff's disability at the time the decision to terminate his employment was made (R&R at 20); that Plaintiff set forth a prima facie case of disability discrimination (Id. at 21); and that there exists a genuine dispute as to whether Defendant refused to provide at least some accommodations to Plaintiff (Id. at 21–22).

Judge Aaron also rejected Defendant's federal retaliation argument, finding that there exists genuine issues of material fact as to when the non-reappointment decision was made and what the decisionmakers knew about Plaintiff's eye condition at the time. (R&R at 22–23). Judge Aaron also found that there exists genuine issues of material fact as to whether the non-reappointment decision was part of a continuing course of disciplinary conduct that began before Plaintiff engaged in the alleged protected activity. For these reasons, Judge Aaron recommended Defendant's summary judgment be denied as to Plaintiff's federal retaliation claims. (Id. at 24).

Finally, Judge Aaron recommended that summary judgment be granted as to Plaintiff's state law retaliation claims. As to Plaintiff’ NYSHRL claim, Judge Aaron explained that while retaliation for complaining about the denial of an accommodation request may constitute protected activity under the NYSHRL, a request for accommodation alone does not. Plaintiff alleged only that he was retaliated against for requesting an accommodation. Accordingly, Judge Aaron concluded, his NYSHRL could not survive summary judgment. (R&R at 25–26).

As for Plaintiff's NYCHRL claim, Judge Aaron also recommended summary judgment be granted. As Judge Aaron explained, in 2018, the New York City Council amended the NYCHRL, to state expressly that a reasonable accommodation request constitutes protected activity. (R&R at 26) (quoting citing New York City, N.Y., Local Law No. 129 Int. No. 799 (2019)) (amending § 8-107(7)). The amendment took effect on November 11, 2019. Judge Aaron reasoned that the amendment was not retroactive, and thus, that Plaintiff's retaliation claim based on a request for accommodations should be dismissed. (R&R at 27–28).

C. Objections

Both parties now raise objections to Judge Aaron's R&R.

1. Defendant's Objections

Defendant object to the R&R's recommendations that summary judgment be denied as to Plaintiff's disability discrimination claims. First, Defendant argues that Judge Aaron failed to consider the testimonies of Carlina Melendez, Plaintiff's assistant for most of, and until the end of his employment period, and Julia Nicolaou, the WTC Program Administrator. (ECF 78 at 8,...