Pineda v. Manpower Int'l, Inc.

523 S.W.3d 384

Juan PINEDA, Appellant

v.MANPOWER INTERNATIONAL, INC.; New Hampshire Insurance Company; Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc.; Death & Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund; and Welspun Pipes, Inc., et al., Appellees

No. CV–16–1055

Court of Appeals of Arkansas, DIVISIONS III & IV.

Opinion Delivered: May 31, 2017

Bell & Boyd, PLLC, by: Michael W. Boyd, Pine Bluff, for appellant.

Mayton, Newkirk & Jones, by: Mike Stiles, for appellees Manpower International, Inc., New Hampshire Insurance Company, and Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc.

Friday, Eldredge & Clark, LLP, Little Rock, by: James M. Simpson, Guy Alton Wade, and Phillip M. Brick, Jr., for appellees Welspun Pipes, Inc., Welspun Tubular, LLC, Saleem Sawar, Debasish Bhowmick, and Martin Cain.

RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge

Appellant Juan Pineda appeals from the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission's (the Commission) October 16, 2016 opinion affirming and adopting the December 22, 2015 opinion of the administrative law judge (ALJ). We affirm.

An understanding of the procedural history of the case is necessary to begin. Pineda filed a claim for medical and indemnity benefits based on severe injuries that he received to his back, right upper extremity, hips, and lower extremities on February 6, 2010. Pineda settled his workers'-compensation claim with Manpower, Inc., by a joint petition. A joint-petition hearing was held on July 25, 2013, and ALJ Barbara Webb approved a joint-petition filed by Pineda, and Manpower, Inc., and approved by the Death and Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund to resolve Pineda's workers'-compensation claim arising out of the injury that occurred on February 6, 2010. The joint-petition order was also dated July 25, 2013.

On February 1, 2013, several months prior to the joint-petition order, Pineda filed a complaint in the Pulaski County Circuit Court against Welspun Pipes, Inc., Welspun Tubular, LLC, Saleem Sawar, Debasish Bhowmick, and Martin Cain. Pineda asserted a claim for negligence arising from his work-related injury at Welspun. Welspun, Sawar, Bhowmick, and Cain affirmatively pled exclusivity of workers' compensation as a bar to Pineda's recovery.¹ On May 12, 2014, the circuit court held that the Commission had exclusive, original jurisdiction to determine whether Welspun was Pineda's employer and whether Welspun, Sawar, Bhowmick, and Cain were therefore immune from suit. By doing so, the circuit court granted the parties leave to pursue with the Commission the issue of Pineda's employment.

On May 13, 2014, Welspun Pipes, Inc., and Welspun Tubular, LLC, represented by the same counsel, requested a hearing to determine whether Pineda was its employee at the time of his injury. A prehearing order was entered by ALJ Chandra Black on September 16, 2014, following a prehearing telephone conference. A hearing was held on October 14, 2015. The ALJ accepted the stipulations agreed upon by the parties. The only live testimony received was from Martin Cain. Pineda's deposition was also offered and received as an exhibit.

On December 22, 2015, ALJ Black filed an opinion concluding that the Commission had jurisdiction and that Welspun is protected by the exclusive-remedy provision of Arkansas Code Annotated section 11–9–105 (Repl. 2012). Pineda appealed the decision to the Commission.

On October 16, 2016, the Commission entered an opinion and order affirming and adopting the decision of the ALJ. The Commission restated the findings that the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission has jurisdiction; that the proposed stipulations are hereby accepted as fact; that Welspun is protected by the exclusive-remedy provision of Arkansas Code Annotated section 11–9–105 ; and that the dual-employment doctrine applies in this matter, thereby resulting in the claimant's being jointly employed by Welspun and Manpower at the time of his compensable accident of February 6, 2010. This appeal follows.

On appeal, Pineda argues the following three points: (1) pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 11–9–805, the Commission lost jurisdiction of his workers'-compensation claim upon the entry of the joint-petition order; (2) Welspun Tubular, LLC, has failed to establish it was his employer, dual or otherwise; (3) even as a potential dual employer, Welspun Pipes, Inc., failed in its obligation to provide workers'-compensation coverage and benefits for him, which negates its special-employer privilege of exclusive-remedy protection.

Pineda was injured while working at the Welspun plant. Pineda initially applied for a job with Manpower, a temporary-employment agency, to work at Welspun. Manpower interviewed and hired Pineda before it assigned him to work at Welspun. Manpower maintained an office on Welspun's facilities near the Welspun plant. Manpower recruited, screened, and hired employees to work only for Welspun; it did not supply employees to any other company from its Little Rock, Arkansas, office.

The day Pineda was hired, he completed a Welspun safety orientation. The safety indoctrination was taught by a Welspun employee. Pineda was taken into the Welspun plant and received training from Welspun. Pineda started work the following day and went directly into the Welspun plant. He clocked in and clocked out at the Welspun plant. He reported to his Welspun supervisor, and Welspun assigned him to various jobs in the plant depending on where he was needed. Welspun reimbursed Manpower for Pineda's pay plus a premium for the services Manpower provided. Pineda would return to the Manpower office only to pick up his paycheck.

On February 6, 2010, Pineda went into the Welspun plant, and his supervisor sent him to the shipping area of the plant. Welspun maintains that he was under its direction and control. He was working for, supervised by, and under the sole direction of Welspun at the time of his injury. The staffing-services agreement between Manpower and Welspun Pipes was controlling at the time of Pineda's injury. Pursuant to the agreement, Manpower agreed that after a proper screening, it would provide employees to Welspun. Manpower also agreed to pay the Welspun employees their wages and benefits. Welspun agreed to supervise and control the work, premises, processes, and systems to be performed by the employees. All the work done by Manpower's temporary employees was work for Welspun. Welspun maintained the right to control their work.

Pineda's first point on appeal is that pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 11–9–805, the Commission lost jurisdiction of his workers'-compensation claim upon the entry of the joint-petition order. The statute provides:

(a) Upon petition filed by the employer or carrier and the injured employee requesting that a final settlement be had between the parties, the Workers' Compensation Commission shall hear the petition and take testimony and make investigations as may be necessary to determine whether a final settlement should be had.

(b)(1) If the commission decides it is for the best interests of the claimant that a final award be made, it may order an award that shall be final as to the rights of all parties to the petition.

(2) Thereafter, the commission shall not have jurisdiction over any claim for the same injury or any results arising from it.

(c) If an employee has returned to work or agreed to return to work, the commission shall not approve a joint petition which has allotted moneys for vocational rehabilitation or any indemnity benefits in excess of that payable as an anatomical impairment as established by objective and measurable findings.

(d) If the commission denies the petition, the denial shall be without prejudice to either party.

(e) No appeal shall lie from an order or award denying a joint petition.

Ark. Code Ann. § 11–9–805.

However, Pineda's argument is misplaced. He is correct in asserting that a joint-petition settlement prevents the Commission from exercising jurisdiction in cases where there is an additional claim or any results arising from the injury that was settled. See Sayre v. State of Ark. Second Injury Fund , 12 Ark. App. 238, 674 S.W.2d 941 (1984). However, in this case, Welspun is not seeking a hearing on the merits of Pineda's claim or a determination on any of the results of his claimed injuries. The only issue before the Commission was whether Welspun was Pineda's special employer at the time of his injury and therefore immune from suit. As a result, Arkansas Code Annotated section 11–9–805 is inapplicable. Because the application of the dual-employment doctrine presents issues of fact, the Commission has exclusive, original jurisdiction to determine whether Welspun is therefore immune from suit. Coonrod v. Seay , 367 Ark. 437, 441, 241 S.W.3d 252, 255–56 (2006). When a party to a lawsuit raises a question of whether a person enjoys immunity as an employer under the Workers' Compensation Act, the Commission must first decide the issue. Reynolds Metal Co. v. Circuit Court of Clark Cty. , 2013 Ark. 287, at 4, 428 S.W.3d 506, 509.

In the present action, the Commission had to exercise its jurisdiction to determine the issue of Pineda's dual employment because the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether an employee-employer relationship exists. See Johnson v. Bonds Fertilizer, Inc. , 375 Ark. 224, 227, 289 S.W.3d 431, 433 (2008). Welspun sought a finding on whether an employee-employer relationship existed between Pineda and Welspun at the time of the subject incident. Only the Commission has jurisdiction to make this determination; accordingly, we affirm the Commission's decision on Pineda's first point on appeal. The Commission correctly concluded that the joint-petition settlement did not deprive it of its jurisdiction to determine whether an employee-employer relationship existed between Pineda and Welspun because Welspun was not a party to the joint-petition settlement and because the Commission has exclusive, original jurisdiction to determine the...