Pinkney v. Meadville

KOBE PINKNEY, Plaintiff v. MEADVILLE, PENNSYLVANIA, et al, Defendants

Case No. 1:19-cv-167

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

April 27, 2020

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE RICHARD A. LANZILLO

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT

[ECF NOS. 53, 55, 57 & 59]

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. Introduction

Having granted Plaintiff Kobe Pinkney's Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment as to certain claims within this Court's federal question jurisdiction, the Court is now obliged to reach the merits of the Defendants' motions to dismiss Pinkney's state law claims over which it previously declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. The Court has detailed the procedural and factual background of this case in its prior decisions, see ECF Nos. 70, 80, and will not repeat that background here. Because the new information upon which Pinkney based his Rule 60(b) motion does not alter the Court's analysis of his state law claims, the Defendants' motions to dismiss those claims remain ripe for decision.

II. Analysis

A. Pinkney's Invasion of Privacy by Way of False Light (Count VII), Invasion of Privacy by Way of Unreasonable Intrusion (Count IX), and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count XI) Claims Against the Media Defendants Defendants Meadville Tribune (Tribune), Community Newspaper Holding, Inc. (CNH), and Meadville Tribune reporter Keith Gushard (Gushard) (collectively, Media Defendants) have moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint's invasion of privacy/false light claims (Counts VII & IX) and intentional infliction of emotional distress claim (Count XI) against them. ECF No. 57. For the reasons set forth herein, their motion will be granted and the claims against the Media Defendants will be dismissed with prejudice.

i. Invasion of Privacy

a. Elements of Claims

Pennsylvania courts have recognized four types of invasion of privacy torts: (1) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another; (2) appropriation of another's name or likeness; (3) publicity given to private facts; and (4) publicity placing a person in a false light. See DeAngelo v. Fortney, 515 A.2d 594, 595 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (citing Vogel v. W.T. Grant Co., 327 A.2d 133, 136 n.9 (Pa. 1974)). See also Santillo v. Reedel, 634 A.2d 264, 266 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A. In the Amended Complaint, Pinkney invokes (4) and (1), alleging that the Tribune, CNH, and Gushard placed him in a false light and unreasonably intruded upon his seclusion by reporting and publishing the news articles dated April 15, 2019, and May 16, 2019 pertaining to his alleged involvement in the assault of Happel.

To maintain a claim for false light liability, a plaintiff "must show that a highly offensive false statement was publicized by [the defendants] with knowledge or in reckless disregard of the falsity." Santillo, 634 A.2d at 266 (citing Neish v. Beaver Newspapers, Inc., 581 A.2d 619, 624 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)). Therefore, a plaintiff must establish: (1) that the defendant published material that is not true; (2) that the material is highly offensive to a reasonable person; and (3) that the defendant acted with knowledge or in reckless disregard of the falsity of the material and/or the false light in which it would place the plaintiff. See Anderson v. Perez, 677 Fed. Appx. 49, 52 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Graboff v. Colleran Firm, 744 F.3d 128, 136 (3d Cir. 2014)). "Mere negligence is not enough to support a claim for false light invasion of privacy." Id. at 52-53 (citing Rush v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 732 A.2d 648, 654 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999)). However, the "'[l]iteral accuracy of separate statements will not render a communication "true" where . . . the implication of the communication as a whole was false.'" Larsen v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 543 A.2d 1181, 1189 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (quoting Dunlap v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 448 A.2d 6, 15 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982)). A false light claim can be supported upon proof of the publication of information that, while itself true, tends to imply something false. See id. To prevail under such a theory, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant created a false impression by knowingly or recklessly publicizing selective pieces of true information. See id.

To establish a tortious intrusion upon his or her seclusion, a plaintiff must show "'an intentional interference with [a person's] interest in solitude or seclusion, either as to his person or his private affairs or concerns.'" DeAngelo, 515 A.2d at 595 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B, comment a). In so doing, a plaintiff must establish that "the interference with [his or her] seclusion is a substantial one, of a kind that would be offensive to the ordinary reasonable [person], as a result of conduct to which the reasonable [person] would strongly object." Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B, comment d). To state an actionable claim for intrusion upon seclusion, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant has intruded into a private place or invaded the private seclusion of the plaintiff's person or affairs. See Harris by Harris v. Easton Pub. Co., 483 A.2d 1377, 1384 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984). Such an action "does not depend on any publicity given to the person whose interest is invaded or to his affairs." Id. This tort therefore addresses situations where defendants have invaded the plaintiff's seclusion through their actions. Defendants are not liable for the mere examination of public records. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B, comment c. Although Pinkney purports to raise his claim in Count IX as one for unreasonable intrusion on his seclusion, as further discussed below, the facts he alleges regarding the Media Defendants do not correlate to this species of invasion of privacy. As the Court will explain, Pinkney does not allege that any of the Media Defendants intruded into his privacy, but rather that they made public that which he alleges to be a private fact - his home address. He appears, therefore, to be attempting to plead the third type of privacy invasion, publicity given to private facts. The elements of such a claim are: (1) publicity, given to (2) private facts, (3) which would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (4) not of legitimate concern to the public. See Harris, 483 A.2d at 1384. Regardless, as discussed below, it ultimately makes no difference how Pinkney characterizes his claim at Count IX; he has failed to state a claim in any event.

b. Application to Count VII

Count VII of the Amended Complaint alleges the facts upon which Pinkney bases his claim that the Media Defendants are liable for placing him in a false light.¹ Specifically, he asserts that Gushard wrote an article that was published by the Tribune,² reporting that ADA DiGiacomo had given a public statement "that even though the criminal case against Plaintiff had been withdrawn and dismissed, Plaintiff nevertheless remained a suspect in the investigation of the brutal April 7, 2019 assault against Rhett Happel at Julian's Bar in Meadville, Pennsylvania." ECF No. 50, ¶154. He further alleges that there was "overwhelming evidence presented to the Commonwealth" of his innocence, and that, therefore, ADA DiGiacomo's "statement that Plaintiff is still a suspect for the assault of Rhett Happel is at best misleading if not an outright lie, which portrays Plaintiff in a false light, leading his peers at Allegheny College as well as the general public to wrongly believe that Plaintiff was the man who brutally assaulted Happel." Id., ¶155. Count VII therefore only expressly alleges facts regarding the May 16, 2019 article written by Gushard and published by the Tribune and CNH. In his brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss, however, Pinkney references both the May 16 article and the April 15 article and claims that both placed him in a false light. ECF No. 66, p. 39.

Even assuming that Count VII does contain allegations regarding the April 15 article, Pinkney's argument regarding that article suffers from an obvious flaw: the article was written and published before the Media Defendants would have had any reason to question the veracity of the facts contained in the police records that served as the basis for the article. As discussed above, Pinkney's counsel sent the allegedly exculpatory information regarding Pinkney to Gushard in response to the article. In other words, the Media Defendants had no access to the information at the time the article was published. Evidence as to communication after the publication does not speak to the defendants' state of mind at the relevant time. See Anderson, 677 Fed. Appx. at 53. Pinkney offers no explanation how, in light of this timing, the Media Defendants acted with knowledge or in reckless disregard of the facts in publishing the April 15 article. Indeed, courts have routinely dismissed false light claims based on statements accurately publicizing a plaintiff's arrest even where the plaintiff was later exonerated. See, e.g., Minor v. Cumberland Tp., 2015 WL 5691120, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2015); Martin v. Hearst Corp., 777 F.3d 546, 551 (2d Cir. 2015).

Pinkney's false light claims regarding the May 16 article fare no better. While that article was at least written and published after Pinkney's counsel had communicated the evidence exonerating his client to Gushard, the article accurately reported that the charges against Pinkney had been withdrawn but that, according to ADA DiGiacomo, Pinkney remained a suspect to the crime. Pinkney himself admits that the article was a "largely verbatim account[] of the Crawford County District Attorney's prosecution of Plaintiff." ECF No. 66, p. 39. It is important to note that the article did not state or reasonably imply that Pinkney committed the crime, merely that the District Attorney's office still considered him to be a suspect. There is...