Pinkney v. State

192 So.3d 337

Bobby Joe PINKNEY a/k/a Bobby Pinkney, Appellant

v.STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.

Bobby Joe Pinkney a/k/a Bobby Pinkney, Appellant

v.State of Mississippi, Appellee.

Bobby Joe Pinkney a/k/a Bobby Pinkney, Appellant

v.State of Mississippi, Appellee.

Nos. 2014–CP–00583–COA

2014–CP–00594–COA

2014–CP–00605–COA.

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

Nov. 24, 2015.

Rehearing Denied May 17, 2016.

Bobby Joe Pinkney, appellant, pro se.

Office of the Attorney General by Lisa L. Blount, attorney for appellee.

Office of the Attorney General by Barbara Wakeland Byrd, attorney for appellee.

Before IRVING, P.J., BARNES and JAMES, JJ.

JAMES, J., for the Court:

¶ 1. Bobby Joe Pinkney (pro se) appeals from the dismissals of his motions for postconviction relief (PCR) by the Circuit Court of Hinds County, Mississippi, Second Judicial District.¹ We affirm each of the trial court's dismissals.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. In 1984, Bobby Joe Pinkney murdered Tracey Thompkins Hickman during a burglary. He was found guilty of capital murder and sentenced to death. Pinkney v. State, 538 So.2d 329, 333 (Miss.1988). The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. Id. at 359. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to the supreme court “for further consideration in light of Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990).” Pinkney v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 1075, 110 S.Ct. 1800, 108 L.Ed.2d 931 (1990). On remand, the supreme court held that it had no authority to reweigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the case to determine whether Pinkney should receive the death penalty. Pinkney v. State, 602 So.2d 1177, 1179 (Miss.1992). Consequently, the supreme court remanded the case to the trial court “to impanel another sentencing jury to consider punishment....” Id.

¶ 3. On remand, Pinkney and the State entered a plea agreement. Pinkney v. State, 757 So.2d 297, 298 (¶ 4) (Miss.2000) (overruled in part by Rowland v. State, 42 So.3d 503, 508 (¶ 13) (Miss.2010) ). On August 7, 1995, to avoid the possibility of the death penalty, Pinkney pled guilty to the lesser-included offense of murder and, by criminal information, to burglary of an occupied dwelling. Id. at 298, 300 (¶¶ 4, 11). For murder, the trial court sentenced Pinkney to life in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Id. at 298 (¶ 4). For burglary, the trial court sentenced Pinkney to fifteen years, to run consecutively to his life sentence for murder. Id.

¶ 4. On August 12, 1998, Pinkney filed an unsuccessful PCR motion. Id. at 301 (¶ 16). On appeal, Pinkney argued that his constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy was violated because “it was impermissible for the State to charge in one indictment capital murder and the same burglary that was necessary to support the capital murder offense, and then for the trial court to accept pleas in both the charges arising out of the same indictment.” Id. at 298–99 (¶ 5). The supreme court held that “Pinkney's motion for post-conviction relief is barred by two separate procedural bars: his failure to raise his claim in the circuit court[,] and the three-year statute of limitations.” Id. at 300 (¶ 16).

¶ 5. Alternatively, the supreme court held that there was no merit to Pinkney's claim because “[d]ouble jeopardy [was] not implicated[,] nor was Pinkney's sentence for burglary in excess of the maximum allowed by statute.” Id. at 301 (¶ 16). Further, the supreme court found that “[t]he record clearly shows that Pinkney pled guilty to the lesser offense of murder and to the offense of burglary. By pleading guilty to murder, Pinkney's maximum sentence was life—not death.” Id. at 300 (¶ 12).

¶ 6. In April 2014—over eighteen years after his guilty pleas—Pinkney simultaneously filed three PCR motions. In cause number 252–14–13, Pinkney claimed that accepting his guilty plea to the lesser charge of murder amounted to double jeopardy, because he had previously been convicted of capital murder of the same victim. Pinkney also alleged that the murder charge in the indictment was insufficient because it did not include all of the essential elements of murder. Lastly, Pinkney claimed that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney allowed him to plead guilty to murder when the indictment was allegedly insufficient. The trial court summarily dismissed Pinkney's PCR motion.

¶ 7. Pinkney's second 2014 PCR motion was cause number 252–14–14. Pinkney repeated his claim that accepting his guilty plea to burglary amounted to double jeopardy because he had once been charged with capital murder, and the underlying offense to that charge had been burglary. Pinkney also claimed that the criminal information to which he pled guilty was insufficient because it did not allege “the particular crime he intended to commit.” Pinkney also claimed that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney allowed him to plead guilty to what he claimed was an insufficient criminal information. The trial court summarily dismissed Pinkney's second PCR motion.

¶ 8. Finally, in cause number 252–14–15, Pinkney claimed that the capital-murder indictment was insufficient, and he received ineffective assistance of counsel when he was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. Like Pinkney's other two PCR motions, the trial court summarily dismissed it.

¶ 9. The trial court summarily dismissed each of Pinkney's motions because the trial court found that the matters raised by Pinkney had been addressed in Pinkney's previous PCR appeal. Pinkney appeals all three denials.

¶ 10. We affirm the trial court's dismissals, but for different reasons than those relied on by the trial court. This Court “may affirm a trial court's decision if the correct result is reached, even if the trial court reached the result for the wrong reasons.” Boone v. State, 148 So.3d 377, 379 (¶ 7) (Miss.Ct.App.2014) (internal citations omitted). The following issues are before this Court on appeal: (1) whether Pinkney's PCR claims are procedurally barred; (2) whether the trial court erred by dismissing the PCR motions without an evidentiary hearing; (3) whether Pinkney was subjected to double jeopardy; (4) whether the indictment and information were fatally defective; and (5) whether Pinkney received ineffective assistance of counsel.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 11. When reviewing a trial court's decision to deny a PCR motion, we review questions of law de novo and will not disturb the circuit court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Holloway v. State, 31 So.3d 656, 657 (¶ 5) (Miss.Ct.App.2010). The trial court may summarily dismiss a PCR motion where it plainly appears from the face of the motion, any annexed exhibits, and the prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to any relief. Miss.Code Ann. § 99–39–11(2) (Rev.2015). “On appeal from the summary dismissal of a motion for PCR, this Court determines whether the motion presents a claim procedurally alive substantially showing denial of a state or federal right.” Smith v. State, 149 So.3d 1027, 1031 (¶ 7) (Miss.2014) (citing Gable v. State, 748 So.2d 703, 704 (¶ 3) (Miss.1999) ).

DISCUSSION

I. Evidentiary Hearing

¶ 12. Pinkney argues that the trial court erred by denying his PCR motions without an evidentiary hearing. However, the right to an evidentiary hearing is not guaranteed. Garrett v. State, 110 So.3d 790, 792 (¶ 6) (Miss.Ct.App.2012). “A trial court enjoys wide discretion in determining whether to grant an evidentiary hearing.” Williams v. State, 4 So.3d 388, 392 (¶ 11) (Miss.Ct.App.2009) (citing Hebert v. State, 864 So.2d 1041, 1045 (¶ 11) (Miss.Ct.App.2004) ).

¶ 13. A trial court may summarily dismiss a PCR motion without an evidentiary hearing “[i]f it plainly appears from the face of the motion, any annexed exhibits[,] and the prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to any relief....” Miss.Code Ann. § 99–39–11(2). “This court will affirm the summary dismissal of a PCR motion if the movant fails to demonstrate ‘a claim [is] procedurally alive substantially showing the denial of a state or federal right.’ ” White v. State, 59 So.3d 633, 635 (¶ 4) (Miss.Ct.App.2011) (quoting Robinson v. State, 19 So.3d 140, 142 (¶ 6) (Miss.Ct.App.2009) ). Because Pinkney failed to demonstrate a claim that is procedurally alive substantially showing the denial of a state or federal right, the trial court did not err in summarily dismissing Pinkney's PCR motions.

II. Procedural Bars

¶ 14. Under the Uniform Post–Conviction Collateral Relief Act (UPCCRA), a PCR motion following a guilty plea is untimely unless it is filed within three years after entry of the judgment of conviction. Watts v. State, 97 So.3d 722, 725 (¶ 7) (Miss.Ct.App.2012) (citing Miss.Code Ann. § 99–39–5(2) (Rev.2015)). Moreover, “[a]n order dismissing a PCR motion is final and shall be a bar to a second or successive motion.” Madden v. State, 52 So.3d 411, 412 (¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2010) (citing Miss.Code Ann. § 99–39–23(6) (Rev.2015)). Pinkney filed his latest PCR motions over eighteen years following his judgment of conviction, which is obviously beyond the applicable three-year limitations period. Also, Pinkney has previously filed a PCR motion, which was dismissed. Consequently, his PCR motions are time-barred and successive-writ barred unless he can show an exception to these procedural bars. See Bell v. State, 95 So.3d 760, 763 (¶ 10) (Miss.Ct.App.2012) (citing White, 59 So.3d at 635 (¶ 8) ).

¶ 15. Pinkney argues no statutory exception to the procedural bars. However, “errors affecting fundamental constitutional rights are excepted from the procedural bars.” Rowland, 42 So.3d at 507 (¶ 12). But the mere suggestion of a constitutional-right violation is not sufficient to surmount the time-bar. Ross v. State, 87 So.3d 1080, 1082 (¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2012) (citing Chandler v. State, ...