Pinkney v. State

427 Md. 77

46 A.3d 413

Jerome PINKNEY

v.STATE of Maryland.

No. 97, Sept. Term, 2011.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

June 22, 2012.

Martha Gillespie, Assistant Public Defender (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Petitioner.

Gary E. O'Connor, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Respondent.

Argued before: BELL, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, ADKINS, BARBERA and McDONALD, JJ.

GREENE, J.

In this case, Petitioner, Jerome Pinkney, was charged in the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Baltimore City, with second degree assault, resisting arrest, and disorderly conduct. Following Petitioner's prayer for a jury trial, the case was transferred to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Prior to the scheduled trial date, Petitioner filed a motion with the trial court, requesting to discharge the assistant public defender appointed as his counsel in the case. The trial court issued an Order denying Petitioner's motion, but indicating that he could renew the motion at trial. On December 21, 2009, Petitioner's case was called for trial. A colloquy ensued between Petitioner and the trial judge, during which Petitioner expressed a belief that his trial counsel was not representing him effectively. After asking Petitioner to state his reasons for requesting discharge of counsel, the trial judge determined that the reasons were not meritorious, and the judge denied Petitioner's motion. The trial proceeded with Petitioner being represented by the Office of the Public Defender, and Petitioner was convicted of second degree assault.¹ The judge imposed a sentence of eighteen months imprisonment.

Petitioner noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court violated Maryland Rule 4–215(e)² by failing to inform him of his right to dischargecounsel and proceed to trial pro se. Pinkney v. State, 200 Md.App. 563, 565, 28 A.3d 118, 119 (2011). The intermediate appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, concluding that the trial judge was not required, under the plain language and meaning of Rule 4–215(e), to inform Petitioner of the right to conduct his trial pro se, in the absence of a statement by Petitioner reasonably indicating a desire to represent himself at trial. Pinkney, 200 Md.App. at 576, 28 A.3d at 126. We granted certiorari, Pinkney v. State, 424 Md. 55, 33 A.3d 981 (2011), to answer the following question posed by Petitioner: “When an accused moves to discharge counsel under Maryland Rule 4–215(e) and the trial judge finds that the accused has not presented meritorious reasons for the discharge, may the judge require the accused to proceed to trial with his assigned counsel without first informing him that he may discharge counsel himself and proceed pro se if he chooses?” We shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and hold that the trial judge was not required to inform Petitioner of his right to pro se representation in a situation where the trial court denied Petitioner's unmeritorious request to discharge trial counsel and Petitioner made no statement that reasonably could be understood as indicating a desire to invoke the right to self-representation.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 29, 2009, several detectives from the Baltimore City Police Department, working in a plainclothes capacity, were traveling in an unmarked vehicle on Harford Road in Baltimore City. At approximately 5:00 p.m., the detectives observed a group of people standing near the intersection of Harford Road and Cliftview Avenue. Detective Austin Sailor testified that he saw currency “flying in the air.” The detective stated that he witnessed a female bend down to pick up some of the currency, and a man, who the detective identified as Petitioner, struck the female in the face. Detective Chris Merino, who was also riding in the unmarked vehicle, similarly testified that he observed Petitioner strike a female in her face with a closed fist. On the basis of these facts, Petitioner was arrested and tried in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.

For purposes of our review of the trial judge's interpretation and application of Maryland Rule 4–215(e), we focus primarily on those facts relevant to Petitioner's request to discharge his trial counsel. Prior to trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Petitioner filed a motion with the trial court, seeking to discharge his trial counsel, who had been appointed by the Office of the Public Defender. Petitioner asserted that his trial counsel was conspiring with the State's Attorney and was not representing him effectively. In his motion, Petitioner stated, “I ask the court to find me legal counsel[.]” The trial judge denied Petitioner's motion without prejudice, indicating in his Order that Petitioner could renew the motion at trial.

When Petitioner's case was called for trial on December 21, 2009, the following discussion ensued on the record:

Ms. Polk: State of Maryland v. Jerome Pinkney, 809247030. Lauren Polk for the State.

Mr. Thornton: Brandon Thornton, Your Honor. Mr. Pinkney is here, and we're at a point where Mr. Pinkney is petitioning the court to discharge the service of the Public Defender. Your Honor, he is not speaking to me and he does not wish to stand with me at the trial table.

The Court: All right. Mr. Pinkney, you need to stand at the trial table, because your case has been called whether Mr. Thornton is representing you or not.

Ms. Polk: State's ready, Your Honor.

The Court: Now, very quickly Mr. Pinkney. What's the problem with Mr. Thornton in your eyes?

The Defendant: Huh?

The Court: What problem do you have with Mr. Thornton representing you?

The Defendant: I don't want him to represent me. I asked him something last time. You asked me, what did I say? He said, nothing, like you know.

The Court: Have you hired an attorney, Mr. Pinkney?

The Defendant: No.

The Court: All right. Well, Mr. Thornton is the attorney you had from the Public Defender's Office. Are you able to talk with him about your case?

The Defendant: Two minutes ain't ample time to talk to nobody about no case. The only time I've seen him is when I come in here. He talked to me for about two minutes.

The Court: All right. Mr. Thornton, have you had time to prepare for trial in this case?

Mr. Thornton: Your Honor, we don't have any witnesses. It is what is it.

The Court: Have you reviewed what the State has in discovery?

Mr. Thornton: Yes.

The Court: Mr. Pinkney, are there any witnesses to this event that you've identified?

The Defendant: What do you mean?

The Court: Have you identified any witnesses to this alleged event?

The Defendant: On my behalf?

The Court: Yeah, beside from you obviously. Have you identified anyone who might serve as a witness in this case?

The Defendant: No. I haven't had nobody been here (inaudible).

The Court: In this situation, Mr. Pinkney, there isn't a whole lot to prepare for the case, beside from being familiar with the police reports, for Mr. Thornton to be ready to cross examine the officers and then to talk with you; and I don't want you to say anything about the incident. But, to talk with you about your version of the events and whether there's a possibility that you're going to testify in the case. But, there's not a whole lot to prepare in the case other than that.

You've written me a letter that says, you think that Mr. Thornton is working with the State, but I don't understand what the basis for that would be. I see Mr. Thornton frequently. He tries cases before me. He does so very ably. I don't understand what the issue is with Mr. Thornton.

The Defendant: He got a motion—he filed for motion of discovery. He thinks it's going to take—he gets the State burden and wants the discovery. He never gave no pre-trial investigation of the crime scene, no. (Inaudible.)

The Court: There is no—if there are no other witnesses, there's nothing to investigate.

The Defendant: It's a (inaudible) somebody was here. He never went to see—to talk to the person who was there that I took a hit of (inaudible).

The Court: All right. I'm not satisfied that there's any basis for you to discharge Mr. Thornton as your Counsel. He's assigned by the Public Defender's Office and that's the—a very capable attorney that you got to represent you in this case. Counsel, is this case ready for trial?

The jury trial proceeded with Mr. Thornton representing Petitioner. The State entered a nol pros for the charge of resisting arrest. Following the conclusion of the State's case-in-chief, Petitioner made a Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, which the trial judge granted with regard to the disorderly conduct charge. After deliberations, the jury convicted Petitioner of second degree assault, the sole charge before it for consideration, and the judge sentenced Petitioner to eighteen months imprisonment.

Petitioner noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, contending that the trial judge had violated Maryland Rule 4–215(e) by failing to inform him of his right to conduct his trial pro se after denying his request to discharge trial counsel. Pinkney, 200 Md.App. at 570, 28 A.3d at 122. The Court of Special Appeals noted that Petitioner did not dispute that he had been given an opportunity by the trial judge to explain his reasons for requesting discharge of his trial counsel. Id. Using canons of statutory construction, the intermediate appellate court concluded that “where the trial court finds no meritorious reason for the defendant's request [to discharge counsel] and does not permit discharge of counsel, under a plain reading of Md. Rule 4–215(e), there is no requirement that the trial court advise the defendant of the right to proceed pro se.” Pinkney, 200 Md.App. at 572, 28 A.3d at 123–24. In discussing the dichotomy between the mutually exclusive rights of assistance of counsel and self-representation, the Court of Special...