Pinkston v. City of Chi.

234 N.E.3d 735

2023 IL 128575

Alec PINKSTON, Appellee,

v.The CITY OF CHICAGO, Appellant.

(Docket No. 128575)

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Filed November 30, 2023

Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District; heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, the Hon. Caroline K. Moreland, Judge, presiding.

Mary B. Richardson-Lowry, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Myriam Zreezny Kasper, Suzanne M. Loose, and Elizabeth Mary Tisher, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellant.

Thomas A. Zimmerman Jr. and Matthew C. De Re, of Zimmerman Law Offices, P.C., of Chicago, for appellee.

Mary Patricia Burns and Sarah A. Boeckman, of Burke Bums & Pinelli, Ltd., of Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Municipal League.

Elizabeth Monkus and Sara Staudt, of Chicago Appleseed Center for Fair Courts, and Brent E. Adams, of Woodstock Institute, both of Chicago, and Robert G. Black, of Law Offices of Robert G. Black, P.C., of Naperville, for amici curiae Chicago Jobs Council et al.

OPINION

JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Plaintiff, Alec Pinkston, filed a class-action complaint alleging defendant, the City of Chicago (City), had engaged in the routine practice of improperly issuing central business district tickets for parking meter violations. The City moved to dismiss, arguing plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and voluntarily paid his fine. The Cook County circuit court granted the motion, but the appellate court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 2022 IL App (1st) 200957, ¶ 3, 461 IlLDec. 340, 203 N.E.3d 942.

¶ 2 Now on appeal, the City argues dismissal of plaintiff’s class-action complaint was proper because he (1) failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and (2) voluntarily paid the fine. We reverse the judgment of the appellate court and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Within the Municipal Code of Chicago (Municipal Code), the City has established various provisions with respect to public parking, including the use of parking meters. The fine for exceeding the time purchased at a parking meter differs depending on whether the violation occurs in the "central business district" or the "non-central business district." At the time the alleged violation occurred in this case, the failure to comply with the parking meter regulations in the central business district resulted in a $65 fine. Chicago Municipal Code § 9-64-190(b) (amended Nov. 16, 2016); Chicago Municipal Code § 9-100-020(b) (amended at Chi. City Clerk J. Proc. 37,265, 88,062 (Nov. 16, 2016)). A $50 fine applied to a similar violation outside the central business district. Chicago Municipal Code § 9-64-190(a) (amended Nov. 16, 2016); Chicago Municipal Code § 9-100-020(b) (amended Apr. 21, 2021).

¶ 5 Section 9-4-010 of the Municipal Code defines the central business distinct as comprising the following area:

"beginning at the easternmost point of Division Street extended to Lake Michigan; then west on Division Street to LaSalle Street; then south on LaSalle Street to Chicago Avenue; then west on Chicago Avenue to Halsted Street; then south on Halsted Street to Roosevelt Road; then east on Roosevelt Road to its easternmost point extended to Lake Michigan." Chicago Municipal Code § 9-4-010 (amended July 21, 2021).

¶ 6 In October 2019, plaintiff filed a class-action complaint against the City. Therein, he alleged that on May 21, 2019, he parked his vehicle in a parking meter zone located at or near 1216 South Wabash Avenue in Chicago. He returned to his vehicle and found a parking ticket, purporting to be pursuant to section 9-64-190(b) of the Municipal Code for an expired parking meter within the central business district and carrying with it a $65 fine. According to plaintiff, 1216 South Wabash Avenue is located south of Roosevelt Road and thus outside the southernmost boundary of the central business district. Plaintiff alleged he paid the $65 fine "under duress."

¶ 7 Also in his complaint, plaintiff cited a May 2019 news article that analyzed a dataset containing information regarding parking tickets issued by the City. Based on the article, he claimed that, over a five-year period from 2013 to 2018, the City issued more than 30,000 central business district tickets for vehicles that were parked outside the central business district. Plaintiff alleged the City had a "routine practice" of issuing central business district tickets to vehicles parked outside the boundaries of that district. Thus, he claimed plaintiffs and proposed class members were subjected to fines for Municipal Code violations they did not commit.

¶ 8 On behalf of himself and a proposed class of similarly situated individuals, plaintiff set forth three counts in his complaint, seeking (1) a judgment declaring all central business district tickets issued to vehicles parked outside the district were facially invalid, void, and unenforceable; (2) an injunction to prevent the City from continuing to issue central business district tickets to vehicles parked outside the district; and (3) as a remedy for unjust enrichment, the repayment of fines, penalties, and interest the City had unjustly received and retained at the expense of him and class members.

¶ 9 In response, the City filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Procedure Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2018)), arguing plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and that failure deprived the circuit court of jurisdiction over his class-action lawsuit. The City contended the Municipal Code establishes an administrative process for challenging parking tickets, including providing for a hearing before the Chicago Department of Administrative Hearings (DOAH), and a finding of liability could be challenged by filing a complaint for judicial review under the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2018)).

¶ 10 In addition, the City argued plaintiff’s claims were barred by the voluntary payment doctrine and that his conclusory allegation that he paid "under duress" did not provide an exception to the doctrine.

¶ 11 In his response, plaintiff argued he did not need to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial review because several exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine applied, including that the administrative proceeding could not provide adequate relief, such as an injunction. Plaintiff also argued the voluntary payment doctrine did not bar his claims because his payment of the ticket amounted to compulsion and duress, as he and other class members could be subjected to late payment fees, interest, immobilization of vehicles, suspension of driver’s licenses, liens on personal property, and other costs associated with the City’s debt collection attempts.

¶ 12 In September 2020, the circuit court granted the City’s motion with prejudice. The court found plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and none of the exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine applied. The court did not base its decision on the voluntary payment doctrine, finding a factual question remained as to whether plaintiff’s payment of the parking ticket fine was truly voluntary.

¶ 13 Plaintiff appealed. While his appeal was pending, he filed an unopposed motion for judicial notice, asking the appellate court to take notice of the outcome of his proceedings before the DOAH. Plaintiff indicated he challenged his ticket before the DOAH but was still found liable The court allowed the motion.

¶ 14 In its response to the motion, the City included a letter dated May 27, 2019, in which plaintiff challenged his ticket, by mail, on the ground the parking meter application he used to pay the meter did not record the correct license plate. A printout of the administrative hearing indicates plaintiff did not show any evidence as to why a Minnesota license plate was on the receipt and thus he was found liable.

¶ 15 In its written opinion, the appellate court, with one justice dissenting, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 2022 IL App (1st) 200957, ¶ 3, 461 Ill.Dec. 340, 203 N.E.3d 942. Plaintiff had argued several exceptions to the exhaustion doc- trine applied, and the appellate court agreed one exception did apply, i.e., that the DOAH could not have provided him the ultimate relief he sought, including injunctive and monetary relief. Id. In response to the City’s argument on the voluntary payment doctrine, the court agreed with the circuit court that questions of fact remained, precluding dismissal on that basis. Id. ¶ 66.

¶ 16 The dissenting justice disagreed with the majority’s holding that plaintiff met an exception to the exhaustion of remedies doctrine, stating the relief plaintiff sought was premised on the factual finding of whether the ticket was proper, which was within the authority of the DOAH and not the circuit court. Id. ¶ 80 (Oden Johnson, J., dissenting).

¶ 17 In September 2022, the City petitioned this court for leave to appeal, and we allowed that petition. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2021). The Illinois Municipal League, Chicago Appleseed Center for Fair Courts, Chicago Council of Lawyers, Chicago Jobs Council, and Woodstock Institute sought, and we granted, leave to file amicus briefs. Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010).

¶ 18 ANALYSIS

¶ 19 The City raises two issues on appeal. First, the City argues plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and he could not avoid exhaustion by bringing a class action for equitable relief based on allegations of a routine course of conduct. Second, the City argues plaintiff voluntarily paid his fine and thus has no cause of action.

¶ 20 I. Standard of Review

[1] ¶ 21 The circuit court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint under section 2-619(a)(9) of the Procedure Code, which permits dismissal of an action where "the claim asserted against defendant is barred by...