Pinson v. U.S. Dep't of Justice

JEREMY PINSON, Plaintiff, v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 18-486 (RC)

Re Document No. 103, 112, 119, 124

United States District Court, District of Columbia

August 5, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, United States District Judge

Denying Plaintiff's Renewed Motion to Appoint Counsel Plaintiff's Motion to Appoint Counsel, Plaintiff's Motion for Discovery or to Appoint Counsel, and Plaintiff's Motion for an Order Limiting Extensions of Time and for Reconsideration Regarding Appointment of Counsel.

I. INTRODUCTION

Pro se plaintiff Jeremy (“Grace”) Pinson^[1] is an inmate at U.S. Penitentiary (“USP”) Coleman II in Florida. While in federal custody, Pinson filed multiple Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests, seeking records from several component agencies of the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Central Intelligence Agency. She filed suit after allegedly receiving inadequate responses to these requests, asserting violations of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, and the Privacy Act, id. § 552a. Throughout the course of litigation, Pinson has also raised First and Eighth Amendment claims against various former and current government employees. This Court has already addressed several of these claims. See Pinson v. Dep't of Justice, No. 18-cv-0486, 2020 WL 1509517 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2020). Before it today are several of Pinson's motions: four motions regarding appointment of counsel, a motion for limited discovery, and a motion for an order limiting extensions for filing deadlines. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies all motions.

II. BACKGROUND

The Court has already explained the factual background of this case in detail in its prior opinions. See, e.g., Pinson v. DOJ, No. 18-cv-486, 2018 WL 5464706, at *1-2 (D.D.C. Oct. 29, 2018); Pinson, 2020 WL 1509517, at *2-13. It assumes familiarity with its prior opinions and confines discussion to the facts most relevant to resolving the present motions.

Currently, Pinson has several pending motions on the Court's docket. In the first of these motions, Pinson renews her request that the Court appoint her counsel-a request the Court has repeatedly denied. See Pl.'s Renewed Mot. to Appoint Counsel, ECF No. 103; see also Pinson, 2018 WL 5464706, at *8-9; Pinson v. U.S. DOJ, No. 18-cv-486, 2019 WL 1284595, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 20, 2019); Min. Order (May 28, 2019); Pinson, 2020 WL 1509517, at *26-27.^[2]She asserts that, as a result of a COVID-19-related prison lockdown, she has no access to the prison's law library resources, which she needs to litigate this case and seek counsel on her own. See Pl.'s Renewed Mot. to Appoint Counsel at 1-2. Since then, Pinson has been transferred from USP Tucson to USP Coleman II in Florida. See Pl.'s Notice of Change of Address, ECF No. 111. Shortly after her arrival at USP Coleman II, Pinson filed another motion to appoint counsel. See Pl's Mot. to Appoint Counsel, ECF No. 112. She now argues that she has limited access to the prison law library but has been unable to receive approval for additional time to use the library's resources. Id. at 2. Pinson also claims that “life-threatening” living conditions substantially limit her ability to use telecommunications devices to obtain an attorney. Id. at 1.

The next matter to be decided by the Court involves Pinson's motion for an order permitting limited discovery under Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or, in the alternative, to appoint counsel. See Pl.'s Mot. for Limited Discovery or to Appoint Counsel, ECF No. 119. In this motion, Pinson does not offer additional support to justify appointment of counsel. As to her discovery request, Pinson seeks information to respond to assertions made by the Defendants in support of their pending motion to dismiss. Specifically, Pinson seeks discovery on: (1) the “issue of availability of administrative remedies” accessible to inmates to show that such remedies were unavailable to her; (2) evidence of Defendant Anderl's contacts with individuals in Washington, D.C., to defend against Defendants' personal jurisdiction challenge; and (3) the release of evidence received through discovery in a separate case. Id. at 9.

Lastly, Pinson requests an order imposing limits on Defendants' ability to obtain extensions of time to answer Pinson's filings. See Pl.'s Mot. for Order Limiting Extension of Time Mots., ECF No. 124. She asks the Court to prohibit Defendants from requesting additional time to respond to Pinson's amended complaint except in “extraordinary circumstances.” Id. at 5. In this same motion, Pinson also seeks reconsideration on the previous denials of appointment of counsel. Id. at 1. In doing so, Pinson does not present any arguments in favor of reconsideration. The Court will now address Pinson's motions concerning appointment of counsel together before discussing her remaining requests.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Motions for Appointment of Counsel

While FOIA does not contain a provision authorizing appointment of counsel, federal courts are permitted by statute “to request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1); see also Willis v. FBI, 274 F.3d 531, 532 (D.C. Cir. 2001). However, a civil litigant is not guaranteed counsel. Gaviria v. Reynolds, 476 F.3d 940, 943 (D.C. Cir. 2007). “Instead, the district court judge controls the ‘discretionary' decision of whether to appoint counsel, and that decision ‘will be set aside only for abuse.'” Pinson v. DOJ, 273 F.Supp.3d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Willis, 274 F.3d at 532). Local Civil Rule 83.11 outlines four factors courts should balance when deciding motions for appointment of counsel: (i) the nature and complexity of the action; (ii) the potential merit of the pro se party's claims; (iii) the demonstrated inability of the pro se party to retain counsel by other means; and (iv) the degree to which the interests of justice will be served by appointment of counsel, including the benefit the court may derive from the assistance of the appointed counsel. D.D.C. Civ. R. 83.11(b)(3); see also Williams v. Court Servs. & Offender Supervision Agency for D.C., 878 F.Supp.2d 263, 266-68 (D.D.C. 2012) (applying factors). Any one factor may be controlling. See Willis, 274 F.3d at 532; Pinson, 273 F.Supp.3d at 5.

As previously noted, this Court has already considered and denied Pinson's requests for assigned counsel. The Court remains unpersuaded that any of the four factors delineated in the local rule justify appointment of counsel in this case.

As to the first factor, while this Court has recognized that this action is “reasonably complex, ” Pinson has proven substantially capable in prosecuting this action. See Pinson, 2020 WL 1509517, at *26.

Per the second factor, the potential merit of Pinson's claims cannot yet be determined. Due to a myriad of external circumstances, including the burdens of the COVID-19 pandemic, this action still remains in the preliminary phases of litigation. Indeed, in a separate motion not to be decided in this opinion, Pinson seeks to amend her complaint for a second time. See Pl.'s Mot. for Leave to File a Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 118.^[3] Therefore, this factor does not weigh towards Pinson's request at this time.

As to the third factor, Pinson has not demonstrated that she is unable to obtain counsel on her own. In one of her motions, Pinson states that her “life threatening” living conditions have impeded her efforts to obtain legal representation. See Pl.'s Mot. to Appoint Counsel at 1. However, none of Pinson's communications with the Court have indicated concrete efforts to obtain counsel, nor has she presented evidence of those efforts being unsuccessful.

Finally, the Court believes that appointing Pinson counsel from the Civil Pro Bono Panel would not serve the interests of justice. Pinson has a long history of navigating the federal judicial system and engaging in litigation against the government. She argues in one motion that she lacks access to resources, such as the prison law library, to pursue her suit. See id. at 1-2. But since making that assertion five months ago, Pinson has successfully filed three motions and one response. Her actions indicate that Pinson does in fact have access to legal resources and further demonstrates her keen ability to handle legal proceedings without the assistance of counsel. As a result, the Court finds that providing Pinson use of the Civil Pro Bono Panel's limited resources would not significantly supplement Pinson's ability to litigate her case.

Bearing these considerations in mind, the Court finds that Pinson has not presented sufficient (or any new) justification to warrant appointment of counsel. All her motions for the appointment of counsel are denied.

B. Limited Discovery Pursuant to Rule 56(d)

Pinson seeks limited discovery pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). See Pl.'s Mot. for Limited Discovery or to Appoint Counsel. The purpose of a Rule 56(d) motion is to allow a movant to avoid summary judgment if she can show, by affidavit or declaration, that she “cannot present facts essential to justify” her opposition to summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d); see also Seed Co. v. Westerman, 840 F.Supp.2d 116, 121 (D.D.C. 2012). To obtain Rule 56(d) relief, the movant must submit an affidavit that “state[s] with sufficient particularity” the reason why discovery is necessary. Ikossi v. Dep't. of Navy, 516 F.3d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (internal citation marks omitted) (quoting Strang v. U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, 864 F.2d 859, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).

Pinson intends to use the information requested to respond to Defendants' attempts to dismiss her complaint. See Pl.'s Mot. for Limited Discovery...