Pioneer Electronics (Usa) v. Superior Court

27 Cal.Rptr.3d 17

128 Cal.App.4th 246

PIONEER ELECTRONICS (USA), INC., Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent Patrick Olmstead, Real Party in Interest.

No. B174826.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4.

March 30, 2005.

Review Granted July 27, 2005.

Hughes Hubbard & Reed, William T. Bisset, Charles Avrith, and Alicia D. Mew, Los Angeles, for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Lange & Koncius, Joseph J.M. Lange, El Segundo, Jeffrey A. Koncius, Los Angeles; Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman, Sanford P. Dumain, Michael R. Reese; Robert I. Lax & Associates and Robert I. Lax for Real Party in Interest.

EPSTEIN, P.J.

This case concerns the requisite notice and opportunity to assert a consumer's privacy right which must accompany a precertification communication to members of a putative class.¹ As we shall discuss, the court must take reasonable steps to assure that the consumer receives actual notice of his or her right to grant or withhold consent of the release of personal information, and that consent for such release be by the consumer's positive act, rather than by mere failure to respond.

Patrick Olmstead purchased a DVD player from Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. (Pioneer). He claims it is defective. He brought suit against Pioneer on his own behalf and on behalf of a putative class of persons who purchased the same model of allegedly defective DVDs. Responding to a discovery request by Olmstead, Pioneer produced documents relating to complaints it received from consumers. Olmstead seeks identifying information about these persons; Pioneer asserts their right of privacy under the 1974 amendment to the California Constitution. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1 (Privacy Amendment).)²

The trial court ordered Pioneer to inform the approximately 700 to 800 complaining consumers, by letter, about the lawsuit, Olmstead's request for identifying information in order to contact them, their right to object to release of that information, and that failure to respond would be treated as consent to release of the information.

Pioneer seeks our intervention to compel the superior court to vacate that order. It does so on two grounds: that the order is in excess of the court's jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008³; and no disclosure of the identifying information should be made without the affirmative consent of the consumer.

The trial court's order was preceded by an earlier order under which the identifying information would be released only if the consumer checked a box indicating consent. We conclude, first, that the trial court had authority to reconsider and modify this order, notwithstanding the requirements of section 1008. On the merits, we conclude that an individual's name and other identifying information are matters embraced within the Privacy Amendment, that adequate steps to assure actual notice is a prerequisite to an assumed waiver of the consumer's right of privacy (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1), and that the measures taken in this case are inadequate.

Waiver may be express or implied. (Waller v. Truck Ins. Exchange, Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1, 31, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 900 P.2d 619.) Generally, an implied waiver based on failure to assert a right, including a constitutional right, must be accompanied by an informed intent to relinquish that right. (Id. at p. 31, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 900 P.2d 619; North Carolina v. Butler (1979) 441 U.S. 369, 371, 374-375, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 [waiver implied where no invocation of right to counsel]; People v. Riva (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 981, 989, 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 649 [waiver implied where defendant, who was not tricked or coerced, understood his rights but chose to speak with police].)

Although not couched in terms of waiver, that is what the trial court essentially meant when it decided that the consumer's failure to respond to Pioneer's letter would be treated as consent to disclosure and contact by Olmstead's counsel. Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right; the foundation of waiver is intent. (Waller v. Truck Ins. Exchange, Inc., supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 31, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 900 P.2d 619.) A consumer cannot be deemed to have intended to waive his or her right of privacy unless and until the consumer has notice of the need and opportunity to assert it. Here, the challenged order does not adequately assure that the consumer will receive actual notice. Absent notice, the consumer is unaware of the need to assert his or her privacy interest and is thereby deprived of a meaningful opportunity to do so. Absent an affirmative response from the consumer, there is no adequate basis to infer that the consumer has consented to the release of personal information.

We shall order, on remand, that the trial court fashion an order that provides reasonable assurance that the consumers receive actual notice of the right to grant or withhold consent to release of personal information, and that such information not be released as to any consumer unless that consumer affirmatively agrees to such release.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

Olmstead filed a motion to compel Pioneer to provide unredacted copies of consumer complaints it had received about the allegedly defective DVDs. The motion sought to require Pioneer to disclose the names and contact information of the complainants.

At a March 2004, hearing, the court stated that "the names are probably protected unless there's a Colonial Life letter that goes out." (The reference was to Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 785, 183 Cal.Rptr. 810, 647 P.2d 86 [disclosure of names and addresses of third parties in bad faith insurance action proper only if those parties specifically authorized release by signing and dating an enclosed form that so stated].) The clerk's minute for that proceeding reflects that the court ordered Pioneer "to write a `Colonial Pen' letter and then reveal the names of those consumers who do not object." The court's decision was refined in an order issued later that month. In it, the court stated that it "is in receipt of two versions of a `Colonial Life' letter to customers" and that "[t]he major difference is whether or not an affirmative response should be required. In order for the letter to have any meaning, it should require an affirmative response, as did the letter in the Colonial Life case."

The court then authorized the following text:

"`Dear Consumer:

"`In August, 2001, litigation was filed in California in which the plaintiff alleges that Pioneer DVD Players are not compatible with the DVD Video Standard and as such, are incapable of playing all DVD discs. As part of the litigation, Pioneer was required to provide the plaintiff's counsel with a copy of the record that it made of information or complaints you provided some time ago when you contacted Pioneer's customer service department about your Pioneer DVD Player. Before doing so, however, Pioneer removed all identifying information regarding your name, address and telephone number. The court has now directed that Pioneer send you this notice so that you can decide whether to authorize Pioneer to disclose your personal information to the plaintiff's counsel so they may contact you.

"`If you agree to the disclosure of this information to the plaintiff's counsel, please check the box on the enclosed form and return it to the address shown on the form. Not responding to this letter will be treated as declining contact from Plaintiff's counsel.'" (Italics added.)

Olmstead moved for reconsideration and clarification of this order. In April 2004, the court granted his motion, vacated its March order, and adopted Olmstead's new "proposed language for the letter on pages 8 & 9 of [the] motion."

This new letter differs from the old in three material respects: (1) in the third sentence, it substituted "your name, address, telephone number, fax number and e-mail address" in place of "your name, address, and telephone number"; (2) in the fourth sentence, it substituted the same language in place of "personal information"; and (3) in the final paragraph it added "do not" before "agree" and substituted "agreeing to" in place of "declining" and "by" in place of "from." The effect of these changes was to state that identifying information for the purpose of contact would be released unless the addressed consumer objected to the release.

Later that month, the court stayed its April order pending writ review by this court. We issued an alternative writ. We now grant the petition for writ of mandate.

DISCUSSION

I

Pioneer contends the superior court was without jurisdiction to enter its April 2004, order because Olmstead's motion for reconsideration and clarification failed to comply with the requirements of section 1008.⁴ Courts of Appeal are divided on the application of that statute to preclude reconsideration beyond the limited scope it provides.

"Some Courts of Appeal have stated that the power to correct judicial error in interim orders before judgment is an inherent judicial power derived from the California Constitution, and therefore this power cannot be impaired by statute. (See, e.g., Fischer v. First Internat. Bank (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1451 [1 Cal.Rptr.3d 162]; Scott Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Ins. Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 197, 210 [132 Cal.Rptr.2d 89]; Kerns v. CSE Ins. Group (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 368, 388 [130 Cal.Rptr.2d 754]; Wozniak v. Lucutz (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1042 [126 Cal.Rptr.2d 310]; Blake v. Ecker (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 728, 739, fn. 10 [113 Cal.Rptr.2d 422]; People v. Castello (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1247-1250 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 314].) Other Courts of Appeal have held that statutory restrictions on a court's power to reconsider its interim rulings, such as the restrictions found in ... section 1008, are valid and constitutional. (See, e.g., Baldwin v. Home Savings of America (19...