Pipkin v. Cain

1

DEVONTA PIPKIN, PETITIONER v. NATHAN BURL CAIN, ET AL. RESPONDENTS

No. 3:23CV434-MPM-JMV

United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Oxford Division

May 28, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MICHAEL P. MILLS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter comes before the court on the petition of Devonta Pipkin, through counsel, for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The State has moved to dismiss the petition; Pipkin has responded to the motion, and the State has replied. The matter is ripe for resolution. For the reasons set forth below, the State's motion to dismiss will be granted, and the instant petition will be dismissed with prejudice as untimely filed and without substantive merit.

Habeas Corpus Relief Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

The writ of habeas corpus, a challenge to the legal authority under which a person may be detained, is ancient. Duker, The English Origins of the Writ of Habeas Corpus: A Peculiar Path to Fame, 53 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 983 (1978); Glass Historical Aspects of Habeas Corpus, 9 St. John's L.Rev 55 (1934). It is “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law of England,” Secretary of State for Home Affairs v. O'Brien, A.C. 603, 609 (1923), and it is equally significant in the United States. Article I, § 9, of the Constitution ensures that the right of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, except when, in the case of rebellion or invasion public safety may require it. Habeas Corpus, 20 Fed Prac. & Proc. Deskbook § 56. Its use by the federal courts was authorized in Section14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Habeas corpus principles developed over time in both English and American common law have since been codified:

The statutory provisions on habeas corpus appear as sections 2241 to 2255 of the 1948 Judicial Code. The recodification of that year set out important procedural limitations and additional procedural changes were added in 1966. The scope of the writ, insofar as the statutory language is concerned, remained essentially the same, however, until 1996, when Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, placing severe restrictions on the issuance of the writ for state prisoners and setting out special, new habeas corpus procedures for capital cases. The changes made by the 1996 legislation are the end product of decades of debate about habeas corpus.

Id. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a federal court may issue the writ when a person is held in violation of the federal Constitution or laws, permitting a federal court to order the discharge of any person held by a state in violation of the supreme law of the land. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 311, 35 S.Ct. 582, 588, 59 L.Ed. 969 (1915).

Facts and Procedural Posture^[1]

Guilty Plea and Sentence.

Pipkin was jointly indicted with four other co-defendants on three counts: conspiracy (Count 1); burglary (Count 2); and capital murder (Count 3). Exhibit A (Indictment); see also SCR, 1st PCF.Supp. Vol. at 8-9.^[2] On June 16, 2014, Pipkin pled guilty to a reduced charge of deliberate-design murder (first degree murder). Exhibit B (Petition to Enter Plea of Guilty); see also SCR, 1^st PCF.Supp. Vol. at 50-74 (Guilty Plea Hearing Transcript). In exchange for his guilty plea, the charges in Counts 1 and 2 were remanded to the files, and Count 3 was reduced from capital murder to deliberate-design murder. Exhibit B; Exhibit C (Order on Agreed Motion to Reduce Charges); see also SCR, 1st PCF.Supp. Vol. at 52-53. On June 16, 2014, the circuit court sentenced Pipkin to life imprisonment in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). Exhibit D (Sentence of the Court) (with a signature date of June 17, 2014, and filing date of June 19, 2014); see also SCR, 1st PCF.Supp. Vol. at 71.

First Post-Conviction Proceeding.

On June 16, 2017, Pipkin, through counsel, filed his first motion for post-conviction relief (PCR motion)-exactly three years from the date of his guilty plea. SCR, 1st PCR at 938. Pipkin's counsel then filed two amended PCR motions. SCR, 1st PCR at 39-92. He alleged claims of: (1) insufficient factual basis for his plea; (2) involuntary guilty plea; (3) innocence based on “newly discovered evidence” of two co-defendants' affidavits; and (4) ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to “investigate the charges alleged in the indictment.” SCR, 1st PCR at 9-92. On March 9, 2018, the circuit court denied Pipkin's request for postconviction relief. Exhibit E (SCR, 1^st PCR at 95-101).

In denying relief, the circuit court found that Pipkin's ineffectiveness and involuntaryplea claims were unsupported, vague, and contrary to the record - and that his “newly discovered evidence” and insufficient-evidence claims were meritless. Exhibit E. On his insufficient-factual-basis claim, the circuit court detailed the State's offer of proof that included “the statements of one or more co-defendants, the statements of an uninvolved witness and corroborating DNA evidence.” Exhibit E at 6. The circuit court also acknowledged that Pipkin “was even provided an opportunity to contest the statements made by the State in its offer of proof and specifically stated that he did not dispute, disagree with, or need to clear up anything that the State said.” Exhibit E at 6. The circuit court thus determined “with the utmost confidence that the State offered a sufficient factual basis for [Pipkin]'s plea, that the prosecution could prove [Pipkin] guilty of the crime charged, and the substantial evidence of [Pipkin]'s guilt exists.” Exhibit E at 6.

The circuit court also analyzed Pipkin's newly-discovered-evidence claim and the attached affidavits of two of his co-defendants. Exhibit E at 4-5. The circuit court explained that alleged “newly discovered evidence is relevant only in situations where a defendant went to trial and was convicted” because “[w]hen a defendant pleads guilty, he is admitting that he committed the offense,” which “negates any notion that there is some undiscovered evidence which could prove his innocence.” Exhibit E at 5 (citing Townes v. State, 88 So.3d 812, 815 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Jones v. State, 915 So.2d 511 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005)). As the circuit court had already determined that Pipkin's “plea was voluntary and intelligently made,” it determined his newly-discovered-evidence argument was meritless. Exhibit E at 5.

Pipkin, through counsel, appealed the circuit court's denial of post-conviction relief. SCR, 1^st PCR, Briefs. Pipkin argued: (1) the State failed to establish a sufficient factual basis for Pipkin's plea; (2) Pipkin received ineffective assistance of counsel evidenced by statements of two of his co-defendants; and (3) those statements also proved his innocence. SCR, 1^st PCR, Briefs. The Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's denial of post-conviction relief. Exhibit F (Pipkin v. State, 296 So.3d 90 (Miss. Ct. App. 2019), reh'g denied, Feb. 19, 2020, cert. denied, 293 So.3d 832).

The Mississippi Court of Appeals agreed with the circuit court “that a factual basis supported Pipkin's guilty plea.” Pipkin, 296 So.3d at 92; see also SCR, 1^st PCR, Supp. Vol. at 55-61. “Most importantly, Pipkin agreed under oath to the factual basis recited by the State.” Pipkin, 296 So.3d at 92; see also 1st PCR, Supp. Vol. at 61, 68. Further, when “given the opportunity to disagree with the factual basis,” he “did not” and apologized ‘for the way it happened” because he “guess[ed] [he] was at the wrong place at the wrong time. It wasn't supposed to happen like that is all [he] got to say.'” Pipkin, 296 So.3d at 92; see also SCR, 1st PCR, Supp. Vol. at 61, 72.

Applying the Strickland standard, the Court of Appeals further concluded that Pipkin's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was meritless. Pipkin, 296 So.3d at 92 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). The court noted that “Pipkin insisted that he was satisfied with his attorney's representation” at his plea hearing and stated that he did not have any complaints about him. Pipkin, 296 So.3d at 93.

In addressing his ineffectiveness claim, the court also analyzed Pipkin's alleged “newly discovered evidence” of his innocence, which consisted of statements from two of his codefendants, Nicholas Sledge and LaShaundra McNeal, belatedly proclaiming that Pipkin was not involved in the crimes - contrary to the statements they had originally provided to the State. Pipkin, 296 So.3d at 92-93. The court explained that “the State had statements from all four of Pipkin's co-defendants, each of whom indicated Pipkin's involvement in the crime in varying degrees,” and “all four, including Sledge and McNeal, agreed that Pipkin was involved in the decision to rob [the victim].” Id. The court thus aptly recognized that “[e]ven if Sledge and McNeal recanted, the two other co-defendants gave statements indicating that Pipkin was involved and was carrying a gun[,] [a]nd Pipkin swore under oath that he was guilty of murdering [the victim].” Id. at 93. The Mississippi Court of Appeals thus held that “Pipkin d[id] not show how the outcome of his case would have been different.” Id.

The Mississippi Court of Appeals denied Pipkin's request for rehearing on February 11, 2020, and the Mississippi Supreme denied certiorari review on May 21, 2020. Exhibit G.

Second Post-Conviction Proceeding.

Over six months later, Pipkin, through counsel, filed a second PCR motion in the Mississippi Supreme Court. SCR, 2nd PCR at 2-29. On December 18, 2020, the Mississippi Supreme Court dismissed Pipkin's second PCR motion for lack of jurisdiction because he “entered a guilty plea” and “never ha[d] a direct appeal of his conviction and sentence[.]” Exhibit H (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-7); SCR, 2^nd PC...