Pisarz v. GC Servs. Ltd.

DANIELLE PISARZ, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. GC SERVICES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP and JOHN DOES 1-25, Defendants.

Civ. Action No.16-4552 (FLW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

March 24, 2017

*NOT FOR PUBLICATION*

OPINION

WOLFSON, District Judge:

Plaintiff Danielle Pisarz ("Plaintiff") filed this suit against Defendant GC Services LP ("Defendant"), a collection agency, for violating the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act ("FDCPA" or the "Act") by making communications intended to harass, deceive and mislead Plaintiff in connection with its attempt to collect a debt. In lieu of an answer, Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint on standing grounds, as well as for failure to state a claim. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Count I of the Complaint is dismissed, however, Defendant's motion to dismiss Count II is denied.

BACKGROUND

On or around July 10, 2016, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant began calling Plaintiff in an attempt to collect a consumer debt. According to Plaintiff, the debt arose out of a transaction that is "primarily for personal, family or household purposes." Compl., ¶ 18. Because the debt was allegedly past due, Defendant called Plaintiff's cellular phone number and left a voicemail. Id. at ¶ 22. The voicemail stated, "[t]his message is for Danielle Pisarz, my name is Al Lease. Please return my call at your earliest convenience at 877-551-9781. Use your reference number 104338. Our hours are 11:00 am to 10:00 pm." Id. at ¶ 23. According to Plaintiff, she does not recall receiving any calls from Defendant prior to the July 10, 2016 call. Id. at ¶ 24. Plaintiff further alleges that upon listening to the voicemail message, she called the toll-free number and "was told that the call was from the Defendant, a debt collector attempting to collect a debt." Id. at ¶ 25. Plaintiff avers that this was the first time Defendant identified to Plaintiff that it was a debt collector.

Thereafter, Plaintiff filed her two-count Complaint alleging that the failure to disclose in the voicemail that the call was from a debt collector, Defendant "caused the Plaintiff a real harm, that the Plaintiff would not know that she was communicating with a debt collector, and that any information the Plaintiff provided would be used for that purpose." Id. at ¶ 27. In that connection, Plaintiff claims that Defendant violated § 1692d(6) because it engaged in conduct, i.e., by failing to disclose its identity, that was calculated to "harass, oppress, or abuse" Plaintiff while collecting a debt. Id. at ¶ 31. In addition,based on the same conduct, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated § 1692e by engaging in "false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt." Id. at ¶ 35.

In the instant matter, Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint in its entirety for lack of standing in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). In the alternative, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the FDCPA.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

In reviewing a motion to dismiss on the pleadings, the court "accept[s] all factual allegations as true, construe[s] the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine[s] whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Phillips v. Cnty of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation and quotations omitted). As such, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted does not attack the merits of the action but merely tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) ("[a] pleading that states a claim for relief . . . must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief"). In other words, to survive a Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim for relief thatis plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

However, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all the allegations contained in the complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Plaintiff need not meet any particular "probability requirement" but must show that there is "more than a sheer possibility that the defendant has act unlawfully." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Moreover, "[c]ontext matters in notice pleading" and a complaint will fail to state a claim if the "factual detail in the claim is so underdeveloped that it does not provide a defendant with the type of notice of a claim which is contemplated by Rule 8." Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232 (citation omitted).

When presented with a motion to dismiss, the court should engage in a two-part analysis. Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210. First, the court must separate the factual and legal elements of each claim. Id. It "must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions." Id. at 210-11 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Second, the court must determine whether the facts alleged are "sufficient to show that the plaintiff has 'a plausible claim for relief.'" Id. at 211 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). The plausibility determination is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. In other words, for the plaintiff to prevail, the "complaint must do more than allegethe plaintiff's entitlement to relief;" it must "'show' such an entitlement with its facts." Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (citing Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234-35); see Covington v. International Ass'n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 118 (3d Cir. 2013) ("[A] claimant does not have to 'set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim.' The pleading standard 'is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint merely has to state a 'plausible claim for relief.'" (citations omitted)).

II. Standing under Spokeo

Defendant argues that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring her FDCPA claims because her alleged statutory harm is not sufficiently concrete and particularized to satisfy an injury-in-fact under Spokeo. I do not agree.

Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to "Cases" and "Controversies." Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439 (2007). Indeed, "[s]tanding to sue is a doctrine rooted in the traditional understanding of a case or controversy." Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547. "The standing inquiry . . . focuse[s] on whether the party invoking jurisdiction had the requisite stake in the outcome when the suit was filed." Constitution Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 360 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008)) (alterations original).

To show standing, a plaintiff must establish: "(1) an injury-in-fact, (2) a sufficient causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 272 (3d Cir. 2016) (quotingFinkelman v. Nat'l Football League, 810 F.3d 187, 193 (3d Cir. 2016)) (internal quotations and citations omitted). "The plaintiff, as the party invoking federal jurisdiction, bears the burden of establishing these elements." Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547 (citing FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990)). "Where, as here, a case is at the pleading stage, the plaintiff must 'clearly . . . allege facts demonstrating' each element." Id. (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518 (1975)) (footnote omitted).

To allege injury-in-fact, "a plaintiff must claim the invasion of a concrete and particularized legally protected interest resulting in harm that is actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Nickelodeon, 827 F.3d at 272 (quoting Finkelman, 810 F.3d at 193) (internal quotations omitted). A harm is "concrete" only "if it is 'de facto'; that is, it must actually exist"—it cannot be merely "abstract." Id. (quoting Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548). Moreover, a harm need not be tangible, to be "concrete." To determine whether an "intangible" harm constitutes an injury-in-fact sufficient for standing purposes, consideration should focus on whether the purported injury "has a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts." Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (citation omitted). In that connection, "Congress may 'elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law.'" Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992)) (alteration original).

Importantly, in the context of a statutory violation, allegations of a "bare procedural violation [under the statute], divorced from any concrete [or substantive] harm" cannot satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (citing Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496 (2009) ("[D]eprivation of a procedural right without some concrete interest that is affected by the deprivation . . . is insufficient to create Article III standing")). Stated differently, not every "bare" violation of a right granted by a statute is inherently injurious. Rather, such a violation must result in a "concrete" harm. That requirement remains in...