Pittman v. Bombardier Recreational Prods.

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KATHLEEN PITTMAN, Plaintiff, v. BOMBARDIER RECREATIONAL PRODUCTS, INC., and BRP US, INC., Defendants.

No. 3:22-cv-1115 (VAB)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

June 23, 2023

RULING AND ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

VICTOR A. BOLDEN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Kathleen Pittman (“Plaintiff”) has sued Bombardier Recreational Products, Inc. (“Bombardier”) and BRP US, Inc. (“BRP”) (collectively “Defendants”) for negligence. Notice of Removal at 10 ¶ 6, ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”). Ms. Pittman allegedly suffered an injury while participating in a Can-Am Rider Education Course owned by Defendants. Id. at 9 ¶¶ 3-5.

Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety based on lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. Mot to Dismiss, ECF No. 12-1 (“Mot.”).

For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

Ms Pittman will have until July 28, 2023, to seek leave to file an Amended Complaint. If the Court grants her motion for leave to file an Amended Complaint, Ms Pittman shall complete service on both parties in compliance with this Ruling and Order.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Factual Allegations

Defendants allegedly own, advertise, and solicit a “3-wheel motorcycle riding course named Can-Am Rider Education.” Compl. at 9 ¶ 3.

On August 26, 2020, Ms. Pittman allegedly participated in a Can-Am Rider Education Course offered in New Haven, Connecticut. Id. at 9 ¶ 4. During the course, an instructor allegedly grabbed and twisted Ms. Pittman's head with her motorcycle helmet on. Id. at 9-10 at ¶ 5.

Ms. Pittman alleges that Defendants' negligence in their hiring, training, and supervision of the Can-Am Rider Education Course, their failure to warn, their failure to develop policies to prevent harm, and their violation of their own policies, rules, and regulations caused her injury. Id. at 10 ¶ 6.

As a result of the incident, Ms. Pittman allegedly suffered spinal injuries, headaches, and muscle, nerve, soft tissue, and bone-related injuries. Id. at 10-11 ¶ 7. Ms. Pittman seeks to recover for her alleged medical expenses, economic loss, and pain and suffering. Id. at 10-11 ¶¶ 7-10.

B. Procedural History

On August 9, 2022, Ms. Pittman filed her Complaint in Connecticut State Court. Compl.

On September 2, 2022, Defendants filed a notice of removal to federal court. Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1.

On September 6, 2022, Defendants filed a notice of pending motions in state court and a statement concerning removal. Notice of Pending Mots., ECF No. 8; Notice Statement Concerning Removal, ECF No. 9.

On October 14, 2022, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. Mot.

Ms. Pittman did not file a response.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. 12(b)(2)

On a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), the “plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the court has jurisdiction over the defendant.” In re Magnetic Audiotape Antitrust Litig., 334 F.3d 204, 206 (2d Cir. 2003). Where, as here, the parties have not engaged in discovery on the jurisdictional question, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing that jurisdiction exists. Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 59 (2d Cir. 2012); Bank Brussels Lambert v. Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez, 171 F.3d 779, 784 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Where a court [has chosen] not to conduct a full-blown evidentiary hearing on the motion, the plaintiff need make only a prima facie showing of jurisdiction through its own affidavits and supporting materials.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

“This prima facie showing must include an averment of facts that, if credited by the ultimate trier of fact, would suffice to establish jurisdiction over the defendant.” Licci, 673 F.3d at 59 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Glenwood Sys., LLC v. Med-Pro Ideal Sols., Inc., No. 3:09-cv-956 (WWE), 2010 WL 11527383, at *2 (D. Conn. May 4, 2010) (“At this stage of the proceedings, if the court relies upon pleadings and affidavits, the plaintiff must make out only a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction, and the affidavits and pleadings should be construed most favorably to the plaintiff.” (citing CutCo Indus., Inc. v. Naughton, 806 F.2d 361, 365 (2d Cir. 1986))), aff'd, 438 Fed.Appx. 27 (2d Cir. 2011) (summary order), as amended (Sept. 23, 2011).

In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2), a court considers the facts as they existed when the plaintiff filed the complaint. See Glenwood Sys., 2010 WL 11527383, at * 2 (citing Klinghoffer v. S. N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro in Amministrazione Straordinaria, 937 F.2d 44, 52 (2d Cir. 1991)).

B. 12(b)(6)

A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). Any claim that fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted” will be dismissed. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In reviewing a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), a court applies a “plausibility standard” guided by “[t]wo working principles.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

First, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.; see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations . . . a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” (internal citations omitted)). Second, “only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Thus, the complaint must contain “factual amplification . . . to render a claim plausible.” Arista Records LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Turkmen v. Ashcroft, 589 F.3d 542, 546 (2d Cir. 2009)).

When reviewing a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court takes all factual allegations in the complaint as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The court also views the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and draws all inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Cohen v. S.A.C. Trading Corp., 711 F.3d 353, 359 (2d Cir. 2013); see also York v. Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., 286 F.3d 122, 125 (2d Cir. 2002) (“On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, we construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting the complaint's allegations as true.”).

A court considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) generally limits its review “to the facts as asserted within the four corners of the complaint, the documents attached to the complaint as exhibits, and any documents incorporated in the complaint by reference.” McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2007). A court may also consider “matters of which judicial notice may be taken” and “documents either in plaintiffs' possession or of which plaintiffs had knowledge and relied on in bringing suit.” Brass v. Am. Film Techs., Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 150 (2d Cir. 1993); Patrowicz v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 359 F.Supp.2d 140, 144 (D. Conn. 2005).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that the Complaint should be dismissed in its entirety because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction and because Ms. Pittman has failed to state a claim.

The Court will address each issue in turn.

A. Personal Jurisdiction

Three requirements must be met in order for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction: “First, the plaintiff's service of process upon the defendant must have been procedurally proper. Second, there must be a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction that renders such service of process effective .... Third, the exercise of personal jurisdiction must comport with constitutional due process principles.” Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Org., 835 F.3d 317, 327 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Licci, 673 F.3d at 59-60).

Defendants argue Ms. Pittman's Complaint fails under each of the three requirements.

1. Improper Service

“When a case is removed from a state court” and service was made before removal, “the federal district court must look to state law to determine whether service of process was valid.” USHA Holdings, LLC v. Franchise India Holdings Ltd., 11 F.Supp.3d 244, 259 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (citations omitted). Under Connecticut General Statute § 52-59d,

(a) Notwithstanding any provision of the general statutes relating to service of process, civil process shall not be served outside of the United States of America in violation of any applicable treaty or convention, including without limitation, the Hague Convention on Service of Process Abroad.

(b) If service of process cannot be made under the applicable treaty or convention within sixty days, the Superior Court may, upon application, order service of process upon such terms as the court deems reasonably calculated to give the defendant actual notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to enable the defendant to defend.

The United States and Canada are signatories to the Hague Convention, Signify N. Am. Corp. v. Axis Lighting Inc., No. 19cv5516 (DLC), 2019 WL 4994288, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2019) (“Canada and the United States are both signatories to the Hague Convention.”), and “compliance with the [Hague] Convention is mandatory in all cases to which it applies,” Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 705 (1988).

Bombardier^[1]argues that Ms. Pittman failed to properly serve Bombardier, which is a Canadian corporation. Opp'n at 7. Bombardier...