Pitts v. Harrington

1

JOSEPH PITTS, #A0259019, Plaintiff, v. SCOTT HARRINGTON, Defendant.

CIVIL No. 21-00249 DKW-KJM

United States District Court, D. Hawaii

December 13, 2021

ORDER DISMISSING IN PART AND STAYING IN PART ACTION

Derrick K. Watson, United States District Judge.

Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Joseph Pitts' Second Amended Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint (“SAC”) brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.^[1] ECF No. 16. Pitts alleges that Defendant Scott Harrington, the warden at the Halawa Correctional Facility (“HCF”), violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by issuing a memorandum that limits to thirty minutes a day Pitts' telephone calls with his defense counsel in an ongoing state criminal case. To the extent Pitts seeks injunctive or declaratory relief related to his ongoing state criminal proceedings, those claims are DISMISSED. To the extent Pitts seeks damages based on an alleged violation of his constitutional rights, those claims are STAYED. The Clerk of Court will ADMINSTRATIVELY CLOSE this case until the ongoing state criminal proceedings against Pitts are concluded.

I. SCREENING

The Court is required to screen all in forma pauperis prisoner pleadings against government officials pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a). See Byrd v. Phx. Police Dep't, 885 F.3d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 2018). Claims or complaints that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or seek damages from defendants who are immune from suit must be dismissed. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010).

Screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a) involves the same standard of review as that used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). Under this standard, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A claim is “plausible” when the facts alleged support a reasonable inference that the plaintiff is entitled to relief from a specific defendant for specific misconduct. See id.

In conducting this screening, the Court liberally construes pro se litigants' pleadings and resolves all doubts in their favor. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). The Court must grant leave to amend if it appears the plaintiff can correct the defects in the complaint. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130. When a claim cannot be saved by amendment, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. See Sylvia Landfield Tr. v. City of Los Angeles, 729 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2013).

II. BACKGROUND^[2]

Pitts is currently incarcerated at the HCF. ECF No. 16 at 2; see also VINE, https://www.vinelink.com/classic/#/home/site/50000 (follow “Find an Offender, ” then enter “Pitts” in “Last Name” field and “Joseph” in “First Name” field) (last visited Dec. 10, 2021). He is awaiting retrial in State v. Pitts, No. 1PC091000097 (Haw. 1st Cir. Ct.).^[3] See Hawaii State Judiciary, https://www.courts.state.hi.us/ (follow “eCourt Kokua*, ” select “Click Here to Enter eCourt* Kokua, ” select “Case Search, ” and enter “1PC091000097” in “Case ID or Citation Number” field) (last visited Dec. 10, 2021). Pitts is represented in state court by his court-appointed counsel, John Schum, Esq. See Pitts, 1PC091000097, Dkt. No. 580.

Pitts filed his original Complaint on May 26, 2021. ECF No. at 1. He alleged that Warden Harrington and another prison official violated the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments by instituting a policy that limited inmates to thirty minutes each day for legal telephone calls.^[4] Id. at 5-10. Pitts noted that he had a second civil rights case pending in this district, see Pitts v. Espinda, Civ. No. 20-00431 LEK-KJM (D. Haw.), “an active [Prison Rape Elimination Act] case against HCF officials, ” and an “open case with the State Ombudsman Office.” ECF No. 1 at 5-6.

The Court issued an Order Dismissing Complaint with Partial Leave to Amend on July 14, 2021. ECF No. 4. To the extent Pitts sought money damages from prison officials in their official capacities, the Court dismissed with prejudice those claims because they were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 8-9. The Court dismissed Pitts' First Amendment claims because Pitts failed to identify a nonfrivolous legal claim that was frustrated or impeded, and he failed to allege that a prison official took some adverse action against him because of his protected conduct. Id. at 9-12. The Court dismissed Pitts' Sixth Amendment claims because he did not plausibly allege that his access to counsel was unreasonably burdened, and he failed to allege that a prison official improperly interfered with his confidential relationship with counsel. Id. at 12-16. The Court dismissed Pitts' Fourteenth Amendment claim because he failed to plausibly allege that the telephone policy amounted to punishment. Id. at 16-18.

Pitts filed his First Amended Complaint on August 13, 2021, naming Warden Harrington as the only Defendant. ECF No. 10. Pitts alleged that Warden Harrington issued a May 28, 2021 memorandum that “restrict[ed] [his] legal access to thirty minutes per day.” Id.at 4. Pitts further alleged that the memorandum “actively frustrate[ted] and impede[d] [his] speech” and “[h]is ability to access counsel/assist in his own criminal defense, ” and “stymie[d] [his] access to the State Ombudsman Office . . . and other attorneys and legal agencies for consultation and assistance.” Id.

The Court issued an Order Dismissing First Amended Complaint with Partial Leave to Amend on August 27, 2021. ECF No. 11. To the extent Pitts sought money damages from Warden Harrington in his official capacity, the Court again dismissed with prejudice those claims because they were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 8-9. Once more, the Court dismissed Pitts' First Amendment claims because Pitts failed to identify a nonfrivolous legal claim that was frustrated or impeded. Id. at 10-12. The Court dismissed Pitts' Sixth Amendment claims because he did not plausibly allege that his access to counsel was unreasonably burdened. Id. at 11-13. Finally, the Court dismissed Pitts' Fourteenth Amendment claims because he failed to present a plausible claim based on a state-created liberty interest. Id. at 13-15.

Pitts filed the SAC on November 22, 2021. ECF No. 16. The SAC includes a single count focusing on Pitts' ongoing state criminal proceedings. Pitts alleges that Warden Harrington's May 28, 2021 memorandum “burdens, significantly interferes [with, ] and unjustifiably obstructs [Pitts'] access to his attorney and to assist in his own defense.” Id. at 4. According to Pitts, he is “fighting a potential life sentence” and it is “[i]mpossible to review thousands of pages of discovery/transcripts evidence/dictate motions/discuss trial [strategies] . . . in thirty minutes per day.” Id. at 3. Pitts seeks injunctive and declaratory relief, and damages. Id. at 8.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Eleventh Amendment

“The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages in federal court against a state, its agencies, and state officials acting in their official capacities.” Aholelei v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101-03 (1984). It does not bar official-capacity suits against state officials for prospective relief to enjoin alleged ongoing violations of federal law. See Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10 (1989). Nor does it bar suits for damages against state officials in their personal capacities. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1991); Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 491 (9th Cir. 2003).

To the extent Pitts seeks money damages against Warden Harrington in his official capacity, those claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and therefore remain DISMISSED with prejudice. See Mitchell v. Washington, 818 F.3d 436, 442 (9th Cir. 2016) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars claims for damages against a state official acting in his or her official capacity.”). The Eleventh Amendment does not bar Pitts' claims for money damages against Warden Harrington in his individual capacity, nor does it bar Pitts' claims for prospective relief against Warden Harrington in his official capacity based on any ongoing violations of federal law.

B. Younger Abstention Doctrine

“Younger abstention is a jurisprudential doctrine rooted in overlapping principles of equity, comity, and federalism.” Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.2d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The Supreme Court held in Younger that federal courts “should abstain from staying or enjoining pending state criminal prosecutions absent extraordinary circumstances.” Bean v. Matteucci, 986 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2021).

“Younger abstention is appropriate when: (1) there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) the proceeding implicates important state interests; (3) there is an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges; and (4) the requested relief seeks to enjoin or has the practical effect of enjoining the ongoing state judicial proceeding.” Page v. King, 932 F.3d 898 901-02 (9th Cir. 2019). Younger abstention principles apply throughout state appellate proceedings, requiring full appellate review of a state court judgment before federal court intervention is permitted. Dubinka v. Judges of the Super. Ct., 23 F.3d...