► PLEA:
Alford Plea: "An Alford plea permits a defendant to plead guilty to a crime while maintaining innocence (see North Carolina v Alford, 400 US 25 [1970])" (People v Couser, 28 NY3d 368, 373 n 1 [2016]).
Alford Plea; Colloquy: "An Alford plea is permitted in New York only when 'it is the product of a voluntary and rational choice, and the record before the court contains strong evidence of actual guilt' (Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 475 [2000]). [The Court of Appeals has] held in this context that if a defendant's factual recitation 'negates an essential element of the crime, raising substantial doubt as to guilt, the trial court must inquire further to ensure that defendant's guilty plea is both knowing and voluntary' (id. [emphasis added])" (People v Couser, 28 NY3d 368, 379 [2016]).
Alford Plea; Generally: "Alford stands at the outer reaches of [the Court of Appeals'] settled doctrine that if a defendant's recitation of the facts negates an essential element of the crime, raising substantial doubt as to guilt, [then] the trial court must inquire further to ensure that defendant's guilty plea is both knowing and voluntary (People v Lopez, 71 NY2d 662, 666; People v Beasley, 25 NY2d 483, 487-488). Upon further inquiry, the court may accept the plea only if it determines the allocution sufficient (People v Lopez, supra, 71 NY2d, at 666). Even absent a recitation as to every essential element, the court may still accept the plea—now an Alford plea (People v Francis, 38 NY2d 150, 153, citing People v Serrano, 15 NY2d 304).
In New York, such a plea is allowed only when, as in Alford itself, it is the product of a voluntary and rational choice, and the record before the court contains strong evidence of actual guilt (see e.g. People v Miller, 91 NY2d 372, 377; People v Francabandera, 33 NY2d 429, 438 [a defendant suffering amnesia could not honestly confess guilt, but could voluntarily plead to a lesser charge in the face of overwhelming evidence of his culpability]; see also People v Friedman, 39 NY2d 463, 466 [upholding plea lacking an admission that defendant committed the criminal act as falling 'squarely within the type of plea sanctioned in North Carolina v Alford'])" (Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 475 [2000]).
Alford Plea; Rarity: "In New York, 'Alford pleas are, and should be, rare' (Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 474 [2000]). Such a plea is allowed only when, as in Alford itself, 'it is the product of a voluntary and rational choice, and the record before the court contains strong evidence of actual guilt' (id. at 475). And [the Court of Appeals has] said that 'from the State's perspective [Alford pleas] are no different from other guilty pleas; it would otherwise be unconscionable for a court to sentence an individual to a term of imprisonment' (id.). Indeed, [the Court has] made clear that an Alford plea may generally be used for the same purposes as any other conviction and that, like any other guilty plea, it may be used as a predicate for civil and criminal penalties (id.)" (Matter of Howard v Statute Elec., Inc., 20 NY3d 522, 525 [2013]).
Appeal Waiver: See entries for APPEAL AND ERROR (Waiver).
Bargaining Process: "The plea bargaining process includes 'the surrender of many guaranteed rights' (People v Seaberg, 74 NY2d 1, 7 [1989]), such as the right to a trial by jury and to confrontation (see People v Hansen, 95 NY2d 227, 230 [2000])" (People v Pacherille, 25 NY3d 1021, 1023 [2015]).
Challenge to Allocution: See entries for APPEAL AND ERROR (Preservation; Challenge to Guilty Plea).
Challenge to Constitutionality of Statute: As a general matter, "pleading guilty to a charge (irrespective of whether there is any attempt at reservation of the issue for appellate review) does not of itself foreclose appellate attack on the constitutionality of the statute under which the charge was laid" (People v Lee, 58 NY2d 491, 494 [1983]; see People v Hansen, 95 NY2d 227, 231 n 2 [2000]; People v Taylor, 65 NY2d 1, 5 [1985]).
Challenge to Guilty Plea; Preservation: "When a defendant pleads guilty to a crime, he or she generally must move to withdraw the plea or otherwise object to its entry prior to the imposition of sentence to preserve a challenge to the validity of the plea for appellate review (see People v Toxey, 86 NY2d 725, 726 [1995]; People v Claudio, 64 NY2d 858, 858-859 [1985])" (People v Williams, 27 NY3d 212, 214 [2016]).
Challenge to Guilty Plea; Preservation; Narrow Exception: "In Lopez, [the Court of Appeals] stated that 'in order to preserve a challenge to the factual sufficiency of a plea allocution there must have been a motion to withdraw the plea under CPL 220.60(3) or a motion to vacate the judgment of conviction under CPL 440.10' (Lopez, 71 NY2d at 665). Subsequent case law has made clear that a postallocution motion is generally required to raise other 'claim[s] that a guilty plea is invalid'—even those unrelated to the factual recitation—and that '[u]nder certain circumstances, this preservation requirement extends to challenges to the voluntariness of a guilty plea' (People v Peque, 22 NY3d 168, 198 [2013]; see also People v Clarke, 93 NY2d 904, 906 [1999]; People v Johnson, 82 NY2d 683, 685 [1993]).
"But in Lopez [the Court] carved out a narrow exception to the preservation requirement for the 'rare case' in which 'the defendant's recitation of the facts underlying the crime pleaded to clearly casts significant doubt upon the defendant's guilt or otherwise calls into question the voluntariness of the plea' (Lopez, 71 NY2d at 666). [The Court] also recognized a limited exception in Louree, concluding that a defendant can raise a Catu claim on direct appeal because of 'the actual or practical unavailability of either a motion to withdraw the plea' or a 'motion to vacate the judgment of conviction' (Louree, 8 NY3d at 546; see also Peque, 23 NY3d at 182 ['Taken together, Lopez and Louree establish that where a defendant has no practical ability to object to an error in a plea allocution which is clear from the face of the record, preservation is not required. At the same time, there are significant constraints on this exception to the preservation doctrine.'])" (People v Tyrell, 22 NY3d 359, 363-364 [2013]).
Clear Choice: "'A trial court has the constitutional duty to ensure that a defendant, before pleading guilty, has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and its consequences' (People v Ford, 86 NY2d 397, 402-403 [1995] [emphasis added]). 'The court is not required to engage in any particular litany when allo- cuting the defendant, but due process requires that the record must be clear that the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among alternative courses of action open to the defendant' (id. at 403 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). To fulfill this constitutional imperative, the trial judge must advise a defendant of the direct consequences of a plea and the resulting waiver of rights" (People v Louree, 8 NY3d 541, 544-545 [2007]).
Coercion: "'[I]t is well settled that "[a] defendant may not be induced to plead guilty by the threat of a heavier sentence if he [or she] decides to proceed to trial"' but, here, the statements and actions of the court during the []plea proceeding did not amount to impermissible coercion" (People v Jackson, 90 AD3d 1692, 1693 [4th Dept 2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 958 [2012]). "[I]t would [be] impermissibly coercive for [a court] to inform [a defendant] that it would impose the maximum sentence if defendant chose to go to trial rather than to enter a plea" (People v Boyd, 101 AD3d 1683, 1683 [4th Dept 2012]).
Coercion; Family: The Court of Appeals has "never recognized 'coercion' by family members as a reason for withdrawing a guilty plea. Indeed, [it has] recog- nize[d] that in times of trouble an accused person must often rely on the counsel of his family when making the difficult decision to plead guilty or stand trial. If this 'coercion' combined with a conclusory statement of innocence was grounds for upsetting a plea of guilty, [then] the plea would be essentially revocable at will" (People v Lewis, 46 NY2d 825, 826 [1978]).
Coercion; Harsher Sentence: A "'defendant's fear that a harsher sentence would be imposed if defendant were convicted after trial does not constitute coercion' " (People v Zimmerman, 100 AD3d 1360, 1362 [4th Dept 2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 1015 [2013]; see People v Jackson, 90 AD3d 1692, 1693 [4th Dept 2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 958 [2012]; People v Boyde, 71 AD3d 1442, 1443 [4th Dept 2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 747 [2010]).
Coercion; Limited Time Offer: A temporal offer is not improper where "'[t]he court, while impressing upon defendant . . . the potential sentence to which defendant was exposed under the indictment[], and the favorableness of the plea bargain, reiterated throughout the colloquy that the decision to either plead guilty or go to trial remained with the defendant'" (People v Mason, 56 AD3d 1201, 1202 [4th Dept 2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 927 [2009]). "Nor does 'the fact that defendant was required to accept or reject the plea offer within a short time period . . . amount to coercion'" (People v Wolf, 88 AD3d 1266, 1267 [4th Dept 2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 863 [2012]).
Colloquy; Court's Duty: "A trial court has the constitutional duty to ensure that a defendant, before pleading guilty, has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and its consequences" (People v Ford, 86 NY2d 397, 402-403 [1995] [emphasis added]). "The court is not required to engage in any particular litany when allocuting the defendant, but due process requires that the record must be clear that the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among alternative courses of action open to the defendant" (id. at 403 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). "To fulfill this constitutional imperative, the trial judge must advise a defendant of the direct consequences of a plea and the...
