Ploof v. Arizona

ORDER

Honorable John J. Tuchi United States oh District Judge

At issue is Defendants'^[1] Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 8, Mot.) to which Plaintiff Jessica Ploof filed a Response (Doc. 9, Resp.) and Defendants filed a Reply (Doc. 17, Reply). The Court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without oral argument. LRCiv 7.2(f). For the reasons set forth below the Court grants Defendant's Motion in part and remands to state court for resolution of the remaining state law claims.

I. BACKGROUND

This case comes before the Court upon Defendants' removal from the Superior Court of Arizona in and for Maricopa County. In her Complaint filed with that court, Plaintiff alleges as follows. Plaintiff is the mother of H.P., a minor child born April 29, 2014. (Doc. 1, Ex. A, Compl. ¶ 20.) Although Plaintiff graduated from high school, she has struggled with an intellectual disability since childhood and has been diagnosed as mentally disabled. (Compl. ¶¶ 21-22.) For the first years of H.P.'s life, Plaintiff raised him

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as a single mother with the support of her family, particularly her mother, with whom Plaintiff resided at the time of the events at issue in this case. (Compl. ¶¶ 24-27, 65.)

When H.P. was five months old, he was diagnosed with low muscle tone, and Plaintiff's mother worked with Plaintiff to help her obtain assistance from the Division of Developmental Disabilities (“DDD”) to ensure H.P. received appropriate care. (Compl. ¶¶ 34-38.) Plaintiff, with the assistance of her mother, claims that she took H.P. to regular medical appointments, as well as physical therapy, Head Start preschool, and speech therapy in her home. (Compl. ¶¶ 40-46.) She maintains that none of the professionals who saw H.P. ever notified the Arizona Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) of any concern about his health or well-being. (Compl. ¶¶ 44, 45, 47.)

At some time prior to December 2016, Plaintiff became involved in a relationship with a man who was at her mother's residence when her mother walked in on him pouring an unknown substance into Plaintiff's drink. (Compl. ¶¶ 66-67.) Subsequently, Plaintiff ended the relationship, whereupon the man threatened to “call DCS and make false allegations against her.” (Compl. ¶¶ 69-70.) On December 20 and 21, 2016, DCS received two reports that Plaintiff was neglecting H.P. and her home was unsafe. (Compl. ¶¶ 73-74.)

On December 21, 2016, DCS personnel visited Plaintiff's home and reported that H.P. was “free from any visible injuries, ” was dressed appropriately, and “the home was free from any safety hazards.” (Compl. ¶¶ 76, 91.) At this time Plaintiff also submitted a hair and urine sample, which tested positive for alcohol, marijuana, and methamphetamine. (Compl. ¶¶ 93-94.) In response to Plaintiff's drug test results, DCS personnel met on January 11, 2017, to discuss a safety plan for H.P. and determined that Plaintiff's mother should be appointed “safety monitor for an in-home dependency.” (Compl. ¶¶ 95, 100.) Pursuant to her new role as a safety monitor, Plaintiff's mother was called in to take a substance abuse screening test on January 12, 2017, but she was called into work and did not complete the scheduled test. (Compl. ¶¶ 104-105.) That same day DCS social worker Defendant Megan Tafoya used a Temporary Custody Notice (“TCN”) to seize H.P. from

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Plaintiff's custody, stating that H.P. was at “imminent risk of harm” due to Plaintiff's substance abuse, and “immediate removal was required.” (Compl. ¶¶ 107-108, 112.)

After H.P. was removed from Plaintiff's custody, a hearing took place, where Defendant Paige Szymkowski, the DCS case manager assigned to the matter, testified that removal was necessary because Plaintiff's mother did not comply with the drug testing requirement, and attempted to use a “device” when she did present for drug testing. (Compl. ¶¶ 125, 126.)

In the months that followed, Plaintiff participated in TERROS substance abuse classes, parenting classes, and also submitted to a psychological evaluation. (Compl. ¶¶ 101, 168, 244.) However, the juvenile court terminated Plaintiff's parental rights under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8). (Compl. ¶ 251.) The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision. (Compl. ¶ 254; see Jessica P. v. Dep't of Child Safety, H.P., 471 P.3d 672, 680 (Ariz.Ct.App. 2020).)

On December 23, 2020 Plaintiff filed the Complaint now before this Court in the Superior Court of Arizona in and for Maricopa County.^[2] Plaintiff alleges that DCS failed to provide her with adequate services as required by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, that Defendants acted in violation of Plaintiff's Constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that Defendants acted with gross negligence under Arizona state laws. (See generally Compl. ¶¶ 256-412.)

On May 13, 2021, Defendants removed the matter to this Court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a) and 1446. (Doc. 1.) Defendants then brought a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on May 21, 2021, arguing that the Court should dismiss the action because (1) Plaintiff's section 1983 claims are time barred, (2) DCS is a non-jural entity and cannot be sued, and (3) Plaintiff's ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims are barred by both claim preclusion and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (Mot. at 4, 5, 7-8.) The Court now resolves each aspect of that Motion.

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II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A dismissal for failure to state a claim can be based on either (1) the lack of a cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).

When analyzing a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), “[a]ll allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1996). However, legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are not given a presumption of truthfulness, and “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998).

B. Statute of Limitations

Because section 1983 does not specify a statute of limitations, courts apply the most appropriate state statute of limitations in construing the timeliness of a section 1983 claim. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). For section 1983 claims in Arizona, courts use the statute of limitations established for personal injury claims, which is two years from the date the incident giving rise to a cause of action occurred. A.R.S. § 12-542; Cholla Ready Mix, 382 F.3d at 974. The statute of limitations begins to run “once a plaintiff has knowledge of the ‘critical facts' of his injury, which are ‘that he has been hurt and who has inflicted the injury.'” Bibeau v. Pac. Nw. Research Found., 188 F.3d 1105, 1108 (9th Cir. 1999), amended on denial of reh'g, 208 F.3d 831 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 122 (1979)).

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C. Jurisdiction Over Governmental Entity

Under Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the law of the state where the court is located determines a party's capacity to be sued. In Arizona, a government entity may be sued only if the legislature has specifically identified it as a jural entity. Payne v. Arpaio, No. CV-09-1195-PHX-NVW, 2009 WL 3756679, at *4 (D. Ariz. Nov. 4, 2009) (citation omitted).

In Monell, the Supreme Court held that a municipality is not liable for § 1983 claims under a theory of respondeat superior. Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Instead, a plaintiff must show that the municipality has adopted an “official policy” or “custom” that caused the alleged constitutional violation, “whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.” Id. “The ‘official policy' requirement was intended to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to actions for which the municipality is actually responsible.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). A Monell claim for municipal liability can be based on (1) a municipality's official written policies, id. at 480, (2) a “widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law, ” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), or (3) decisions by a person with “final policy-making authority, ” id. at 123.

D. Preclusion Doctrines

The judicially created doctrine of claim preclusion, or res judicata, “bars all grounds for recovery which could have been asserted, whether they were or not, in a prior suit between the same parties on the same cause of action.” Costantini v. Trans World Airlines, 681 F.2d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 1982)...