Plotkins v. Cnty. of Kauaʻi, Fin. Div. Real Prop. Assessment

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PIERRE A. PLOTKINS, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF KAUAʻI, FINANCE DIVISION REAL PROPERTY ASSESSMENT, Defendant.

Civ. No. 24-00019 JMS-KJM

United States District Court, D. Hawaii

April 30, 2024

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS, ECF NO. 11

J Michael Seabright United States District Judge

Before the court is Defendant County of Kaua‘i, Finance Division Real Property Assessment's (“Defendant” or the “County”) Motion to Dismiss pro se Plaintiff Pierre A. Plotkins' (“Plaintiff” or “Plotkins”) Complaint for lack of jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). ECF No. 11. Defendant primarily argues that the action is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine based on prior proceedings and a state court judgment in the Fifth Circuit Court, State of Hawaii (“state court”). Based on the following, the court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

According to the Complaint, Plaintiff owns real property located at 5761 Lokelani Rd., Kapa‘a, on the island of Kaua‘i (the “Property”). ECF No. 113 at PageID.36. On October 5, 2022, the County filed in state court a Complaint to Foreclose Tax Lien against Plotkins in the amount of $65,206.91. Id. at PageID.35-37. On March 13, 2023, Plotkins filed a counterclaim against the County, challenging the state court's jurisdiction. ECF No. 11-4. Motions practice ensued between March 15, 2023, and July 21, 2023. See ECF Nos. 11-5 to 11-12. In the interim, the County obtained an entry of default against Plotkins for failure to file a timely response to its Complaint to Foreclose Tax Lien. See ECF No. 1113 at PageID.86. On July 26, 2023, the County sought default judgment against Plotkins, ECF No. 11-13, which he opposed, ECF No. 11-14. On September 18, 2023, the state court granted default judgment in favor of the County and appointed a Commissioner to sell the Property via public auction, ECF No. 11-15 (“state court judgment”). Plotkins did not appeal the state court judgment in the state court system.^[1]

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiff commenced this action in this court with a Complaint filed on January 15, 2024. ECF No. 1. Defendant filed its Motion to Dismiss on April 4, 2024. ECF No. 11. Plaintiff filed an Opposition on April 8, 2024. ECF No. 14. Defendant filed a Reply on April 10, 2024. ECF No. 16. The court finds this matter suitable for decision without a hearing under Local Rule 7.1(c).

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) authorizes a court to dismiss claims over which it lacks proper subject matter jurisdiction. “[U]nlike a rule 12(b)(6) motion, in a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the district court is not confined by the facts contained in the four corners of the complaint—it may consider facts and need not assume the truthfulness of the complaint.” Americopters, LLC v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 441 F.3d 726, 732 n.4 (9th Cir. 2006). That is, the parties may submit, and the court may consider, “extra-pleading material” and “resolve factual disputes” to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists. Assoc. of Am. Med. Colls. v. United States, 217 F.3d 770, 778 (9th Cir. 2000).

Also, to resolve Rule 12(b)(1) motions to dismiss, a court may take judicial notice of matters of public record filed in the case at hand. See MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986) (“On a motion to dismiss, we may take judicial notice of matters of public record outside the pleadings.”) (citation omitted). Federal Rule of Evidence 201 “permits a court to notice an adjudicative fact if it is ‘not subject to reasonable dispute.'” Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 201(b)). In other words, a court may take judicial notice of matters of public record, but it “cannot take judicial notice of disputed facts contained in such public records.” Id. And “[a] court must also consider and identify which fact or facts it is noticing from such a [record]. Just because the document itself is susceptible to judicial notice does not mean that every assertion of fact within that document is judicially noticeable for its truth.” Id.

B. Pro Se Pleadings

Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court liberally construes the Complaint and resolves all doubts in his favor. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). The court must grant leave to amend if it appears that Plaintiff can correct the defects in his Complaint, Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000), but if a claim or complaint cannot be saved by amendment, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. Sylvia Landfield Tr. v. City of L.A., 729 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Pub., 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008) (reiterating that a district court may deny leave to amend for, among other reasons “repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed . . . [and] futility of amendment”) (citation omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Rooker-Feldman

Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,^[2] federal district courts are precluded from reviewing state court judgments in “cases [1] brought by statecourt losers [2] complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments [3] rendered before the district court proceedings and [4] inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Brown v. Duringer Law Grp. PLC, 86 F.4th 1251, 1254 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)); Mothershed v. Justices of Supreme Court, 410 F.3d 602, 606 (9th Cir.), as amended on denial of reh'g, 2005 WL 1692466 (9th Cir. July 21, 2005). State court appeals belong in state court. Only the United States Supreme Court has federal jurisdiction to hear appeals from the final judgment of a state court. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). Noel explains the doctrine's “general formulation”:

If a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that decision, Rooker-Feldman bars subject matter jurisdiction in federal district court. If, on the other hand, a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly illegal act or omission by an adverse party, Rooker-Feldman does not bar jurisdiction.

341 F.3d at 1164. For example, Rooker-Feldman would not apply to bar a case where a party “alleges extrinsic fraud by an adverse party in procuring a state court judgment” because “such a claim does not challenge the state court decision directly.” Benavidez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1143 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140-41 (9th Cir. 2004)).

Application of Rooker-Feldman to bar suit in federal court requires the district court to, first, “determine whether the action contains a forbidden de facto appeal of a state court decision.” Bell v. City of Boise, 709 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158). Bell clarified that “[a] de facto appeal exists when ‘a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that decision.'” Id. (quoting Noel, 341 F.3d at 1164). “Proceedings end for Rooker-Feldman purposes when the state courts finally resolve the issue that the federal court plaintiff seeks to relitigate in a federal forum, even if other issues remain pending at the state level.” Mothershed, 410 F.3d at 604 n.1. In addition, courts “pay close attention to the relief sought by the federal-court plaintiff” in determining whether his action functions as a de facto appeal. Hooper v. Brnovich, 56 F. 4th 619, 624 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 777-78 (9th Cir. 2012)).

In other words, “is the federal plaintiff seeking to set aside a state judgment[?] .... If [so], then the district court lacks jurisdiction.” Noel, 341 F.3d at 1164.

Second, and “only when a plaintiff's suit in federal court is at least in part a forbidden de facto appeal of a state court judgment,” the court must then determine whether the claims raised in the federal court action are “‘inextricably intertwined' with an issue resolved by the state court judicial decision from which the forbidden de facto appeal is taken,” id. at 1165, or, so “inextricably intertwined with the state court's decision such that the adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling or require the district court to interpret the application of state laws or procedural rules,” Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted), so as to preclude the court's review of the state court judgment. See also Hooper, 56 F.4th at 624-25 (“Claims are inextricably intertwined if ‘the relief requested in the federal action would effectively reverse the state court decision or void its ruling.'”) (quoting Fontana Empire Ctr., LLC v. City of Fontana, 307 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 2002)).^[3]In challenging the particular outcome of a state court case, “[i]t is immaterial that [a plaintiff] frames his federal complaint as a constitutional challenge to the state courts' decisions, rather than as a direct appeal of those decisions.” Bianchi, 334 F.3d at 900 n.4; Cooper, 704 F.3d at 781.

By contrast, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “does not preclude a plaintiff from bringing an ‘independent claim' that, though similar or even identical to issues aired in state court, was not the subject of a previous judgment by the state court,” Cooper, 704 F.3d at 778 (citation omitted), in which case, “a statute or rule governing the [state court's] decision may be...