Plumley v. Mayfield

Marvin Plumley, Warden, Huttonsville Correctional Center, Respondent Below, Respondent v. William Laval Mayfield, Petitioner Below, Respondent

No. 15-0018

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

November 20, 2015

(Ohio County 10-C-139)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner and respondent below Marvin Plumley, Warden, Huttonsville Correctional Center ("the State"), by counsel David Stackpole, appeals the December 9, 2014, order of the Circuit Court of Ohio County that granted the amended petition for writ of habeas corpus subjiciendum filed by respondent and petitioner below William Laval Mayfield, who had been convicted of one count of battery on a police officer, second offense. Respondent, by counsel Robert G. McCoid, filed a response. The State submitted a reply.

This Court has considered the parties' briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court's order is appropriate under Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

On March 4, 2008, Wheeling Police Department Patrolmen Scott Barger and Brian Hails responded to a call at an apartment complex in the North Park area of Ohio County, where they observed two females, Ebony Gray and Santesha Nightengale, fighting on the floor. The officers also observed respondent, who was Ms. Nightengale's boyfriend, bending over the women, yelling, and trying to break up the scuffle. Officer Barger testified that as he attempted to pull Ms. Gray off of Ms. Nightengale, respondent, who was standing to the left of the doorway, "put his hands on my chest and shoved me away and told me: We don't need you here; I have this under control." Officer Barger told respondent repeatedly to "get out of our way, allow us to do what we needed to do." As Officer Hails pulled Ms. Gray off of Ms. Nightengale and began to escort her down the hallway, away from the scene, petitioner ran after them, put his arm between the officer and Ms. Gray, and shoved Officer Hails against the wall, away from Ms. Gray. Ms. Gray then ran back down the hallway and attacked Ms. Nightengale again. Officer Hails arrested respondent while Officer Barger broke up the second fight between the women and arrested Ms. Gray. It is undisputed that neither officer was injured.

The officers arrested respondent and charged him with the misdemeanor offense of obstructing an officer. That charge was thereafter dismissed in magistrate court upon motion by the prosecuting attorney. Nineteen days later, respondent was charged with two felony counts of battery on a police officer, second offense.¹

Trial began on July 14, 2008. On the morning thereof, the State made an oral motion in limine to preclude respondent from introducing evidence of the fact that he was originally charged with the misdemeanor offense of obstructing an officer. Respondent vigorously objected; however, the court overruled respondent's objection and granted the State's motion.²

The jury found respondent guilty on one of the two counts of battery upon a police officer. An identity trial was subsequently held for the purposes of the State's recidivist pleading, wherein a second jury determined respondent to be the same person previously convicted of the felony offenses of wanton endangerment involving a firearm and possession with intent to deliver a Schedule I controlled substance. Respondent was sentenced to life in prison.

Respondent's direct appeal of his conviction was refused by this Court by order entered September 9, 2009.

On July 18, 2014, respondent filed an amended petition for writ of habeas corpus subjiciendum. Respondent's petition was granted by order entered December 9, 2014, in which the habeas court held that the trial court (1) denied respondent the right to meaningfully confront his accusers by prohibiting him from impeaching the officers with evidence that they hadinitially charged him with the relatively minor misdemeanor offense of obstructing an officer, and (2) improperly allowed the 404(b) evidence. See n.2, supra.³ The habeas court thus vacated respondent's conviction for battery on a police officer, second offense, and his subsequent conviction as a lifetime habitual offender. Respondent was awarded a new trial. It is from this order that the State now appeals.

This Court reviews the habeas court's order granting respondent's request for habeas relief under the following standard:

In reviewing challenges to the findings and conclusions of the circuit court in a habeas corpus action, we apply a three-prong standard of review. We review the final order and the ultimate disposition under an abuse of discretion standard; the underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard; and questions of law are subject to a de novo review.

Syl. Pt. 1, Mathena v. Haines, 219 W.Va. 417, 633 S.E.2d 771 (2006).

The State argues that the habeas court erred in concluding that respondent's constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him was violated when he was foreclosed from cross-examining the complaining officers as to their decision to charge him with the misdemeanor offense of obstruction of an officer. As indicated above, the obstruction charge was dismissed upon a motion by the prosecuting attorney and, nineteen days later, respondent was charged with two felony counts of battery on a police officer, second offense. It is undisputed that no new facts had come to light between the initial arrest for obstructing and the time respondent was charged with battery. The habeas court concluded that the trial court "hamstrung [respondent] from exploring on cross-examination why the officers apparently did not regard [the officers'] conduct as being 'insulting and provoking' on the heels of their arrest of him for the offense of obstructing a police officer but evidently concluded later that it was."⁴ The habeas court further found that the trial court barred "meaningful cross-examination on the issue comprising the very heart of the State's case," that such cross-examination could have permitted the jury to "assess[] the credibility of the arresting officers through their answers and demeanor when pointedly asked by trial counsel why they elected not to charge [respondent] with battery on an officer, secondoffense, when it was within their discretion to do so[,]" and that this was "a serious error of constitutional magnitude."

The State argues that the habeas court wrongfully assumed that the officers changed their minds with regard to whether respondent's conduct was "insulting or provoking" and that it was the prosecuting attorney, acting within his discretion, who directed that the felony charges be filed. The State further argues that cross-examination on the issue would not have been permitted in any event because neither the obstructing charge nor the battery charge were covered on direct examination. Finally, the State argues, any error in denying petitioner the right to cross-examine the officers on the obstructing charge was harmless because it did not have any prejudicial impact on the jury verdict. To the contrary, the State contends that it would have adversely impacted the State's case because such questioning would have encouraged the jury to second-guess the prosecutor's decision and infringe upon the same.

"The Confrontation Clause contained in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . . . be confronted with the witnesses against him.' This clause was made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution." Syl. Pt. 1, State v. James Edward S., 184 W.Va. 408, 400 S.E.2d 843 (1990), overruled on other grounds by, State v. Mechling, 219 W.Va. 366, 633 S.E.2d 311 (2006).

Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Kaufman, 227 W.Va. 537, 711 S.E.2d 607 (2011). Furthermore, "[a]n essential purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure an opportunity for cross-examination. In exercising this right, an accused may cross-examine a witness to reveal possible biases, prejudices, or motives." Syl. Pt 1, in part, State v. Mason, 194 W.Va. 221, 460 S.E.2d 36 (1995), overruled on other grounds by State v. Mechling, 219 W.Va. 366, 633 S.E.2d 311 (2006).

We find no error in the habeas court's conclusion that respondent's constitutional right to confront his accusers was violated. The officers were not only the key witnesses against respondent, they were also the victims of the alleged battery. As such, the credibility of their testimony was critical to the State's case. At trial, the officers conceded that they were not injured as a result of respondent's actions and that respondent was trying to help and protect Ms. Nightengale, who was pregnant with his child. At the time of the incident at issue, the officers, in their discretion, determined that respondent had committed the relatively minor offense of obstructing an officer.⁵ It is undisputed that no new facts were discovered between the time the obstructing charge was dismissed and the time respondent was charged with battery on an officer, second offense. Given this fact, respondent was entitled to impeach the officers withevidence of their decision, at the time of the altercation, to charge respondent with a much lesser offense. This line of questioning would have been particularly significant given that the battery charge was determined by the sentencing court to be a violent crime that carried capital sentencing implications for respondent; as a result of respondent's conviction, he received a life sentence under the recidivist statutes.

"'Errors involving deprivation of constitutional rights will be regarded as harmless only if there is...