Plymire v. Kijakazi, 20-CV-574

ALONDRA PLYMIRE, Plaintiff, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, ^[1]Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant.

No. 20-CV-574

United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin

July 26, 2021

DECISION AND ORDER

WILLIAM E. DUFFIN U.S. Magistrate Judge

1. Introduction

Alleging that she has been disabled since March 15, 2015 (Tr. 15) plaintiff Alondra Plymire seeks supplemental security income. After her application was denied initially (Tr. 66-80) and upon reconsideration (Tr. 81-101), a hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Dean Syrjanen on March 7, 2019 (Tr. 31-65). On April 12, 2019, the ALJ issued a written decision, concluding that Plymire was not disabled. (Tr. 12-30.) After the Appeals Council denied Plymire's request for review on March 2, 2020 (Tr. 1-6), she filed this action. All parties have consented to the full jurisdiction of a magistrate judge (ECF Nos. 4, 6), and this matter is ready for resolution.

2. ALJ's Decision

In determining whether a person is disabled, an ALJ applies a five-step sequential evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). At step one the ALJ determines whether the claimant has engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i). The ALJ found that “[t]he claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 23, 2017, the application date.” (Tr. 17.)

The analysis then proceeds to the second step, which is a consideration of whether the claimant has a medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments that is “severe.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii), (c). An impairment is severe if it significantly limits a claimant's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 416.922(a). The ALJ concluded that Plymire has the following severe impairments: “bipolar disorder, anxiety disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder.” (Tr. 17.)

At step three the ALJ is to determine whether the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments is of a severity to meet or medically equal the criteria of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (called “the listings”), 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1525, 416.920(a)(4)(iii), 416.925. If the impairment or impairments meets or medically equals the criteria of a listing and also meets the twelve-month durational requirement, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509, 416.909, the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If the claimant's impairment or impairments is not of a severity to meet or medically equal the criteria set forth in a listing, the analysis proceeds to the next step. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). The ALJ found that “[t]he claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” (Tr. 17.)

In between steps three and four the ALJ must determine the claimant's residual functional capacity (RFC), which is the most the claimant can do despite her impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a). In making the RFC finding, the ALJ must consider all of the claimant's impairments, including impairments that are not severe. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(2). In other words, “[t]he RFC assessment is a function-by-function assessment based upon all of the relevant evidence of an individual's ability to do work-related activities.” SSR 96-8p. The ALJ concluded that Plymire has the RFC

to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: she is capable of performing simple, routine and repetitive tasks. The claimant is limited to understanding, remembering, and carrying out no more than simple instructions. She is capable of performing low stress work, defined as jobs with no inflexible or fast-paced production requirements, involving only simple work related decision making, and no more than occasional changes in work setting. The claimant is limited to jobs with tasks that are performed independently and involve no more than occasional interaction with supervisors, coworkers, and no more than incidental contact with the public.

(Tr. 19.)

After determining the claimant's RFC, the ALJ at step four must determine whether the claimant has the RFC to perform the requirements of her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(iv), 416.960. The ALJ concluded that Plymire had no past relevant work. (Tr. 24.)

The last step of the sequential evaluation process requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant is able to do any other work, considering her RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(v), 416.960(c). At this step the ALJ concluded that there were jobs that Plymire could perform, including laundry worker (Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) Number 361.687-018), dishwasher (DOT Number 318.687-010), and sorter (DOT Number 526.687-010). (Tr. 24.) Therefore, Plymire was not disabled.

3. Standard of Review

The court's role in reviewing an ALJ's decision is limited. It must “uphold an ALJ's final decision if the correct legal standards were applied and supported with substantial evidence.” L.D.R. by Wagner v. Berryhill, 920 F.3d 1146, 1152 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)); Jelinek v. Astrue, 662 F.3d 805, 811 (7th Cir. 2011). “Substantial evidence is ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'” Summers v. Berryhill, 864 F.3d 523, 526 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Castile v. Astrue, 617 F.3d 923, 926 (7th Cir. 2010)). “The court is not to ‘reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the Commissioner.'” Burmester v. Berryhill, 920 F.3d 507, 510 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539 (7th Cir. 2003)). “Where substantial evidence supports the ALJ's disability determination, [the court] must affirm the [ALJ's] decision even if ‘reasonable minds could differ concerning whether [the claimant] is disabled.'” L.D.R. by Wagner, 920 F.3d at 1152 (quoting Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008)).

4. Analysis

4.1. Symptom Severity

“In determining whether an individual is disabled, [the ALJ must] consider all of the individual's symptoms, including pain, and the extent to which the symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical and other evidence in the individual's record.” SSR 16-3p. The ALJ must assess the individual's symptoms-i.e., “the individual's own description or statement of his or her physical or mental impairment(s)”-using a two-step process. SSR 16-3p. First, the ALJ must determine “whether there is an underlying medically determinable physical or mental impairment(s) that could reasonably be expected to produce an individual's symptoms, such as pain.” SSR 16-3p. If step one is satisfied, at step two the ALJ must “evaluate the intensity and persistence of those symptoms to determine the extent to which the symptoms limit an individual's ability to perform work-related activities ." SSR 16-3p. In addition to considering all other relevant evidence, the ALJ must also consider the following factors to the extent they are relevant:

1. Daily activities;

2. The location, duration, frequency, and intensity of pain or other symptoms;

3. Factors that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms;

4. The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication an individual takes or has taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms;

5. Treatment, other than medication, an individual receives or has received for relief of pain or other symptoms;

6. Any measures other than treatment an individual uses or has used to relieve pain or other symptoms (e.g., lying flat on his or her back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, or sleeping on a board); and

7. Any other factors concerning an individual's functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms.

SSR 16-3p.

The ALJ's “decision must contain specific reasons for the weight given to the individual's symptoms, be consistent with and supported by the evidence, and be clearly articulated so the individual and any subsequent reviewer can assess how the adjudicator evaluated the individual's symptoms.” SSR 16-3p. Although the court is not assessing the claimant's character or truthfulness, SSR 16-3p, this evaluation was previously characterized as a “credibility” assessment, see SSR 96-7p, and that language persists in the caselaw. See, e.g., Hinds v. Saul, 799 Fed.Appx. 396, 400 (7th Cir. 2020); Brian J. v. Saul, 438 F.Supp.3d 903, 908 (N.D. Ill. 2020). The ALJ's conclusion is entitled to “special deference, ” and the court may disrupt it only if that assessment was “patently wrong.” Burmester v. Berryhill, 920 F.3d 507, 510 (7th Cir. 2019); Summers v. Berryhill, 864 F.3d 523, 528 (7th Cir. 2017).

The ALJ gave various reasons for his conclusion that Plymire's “medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant's statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record . " (Tr. 21.) He noted that Plymire suffered similar mental health problems “at the time she was working as an interpreter at above the substantial gainful activity level.” (Tr. 21.) He continued, “Notably, the claimant stopped working due to pregnancy and not her mental health conditions.” (Tr. 21.)

The ALJ also found Plymire's complaints about “decreased memory, concentration, multiple bad days per week, and fatigue requiring she nap for multiple hours during the day” inconsistent with her “having presented to her care providers with her memory intact,...