Podguski v. Kijakazi

1

JONATHAN PODGUSKI Plaintiff, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI,^[1] Comm. of Social Security, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 21-cv-02752-RAL

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

April 10, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION

RICHARD A. LLORET, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

The Commissioner of Social Security, through the decision of an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), denied Mr Podguski's application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”). Because I find no error, I will affirm the ALJ's decision.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 24, 2015, Plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB), alleging disability beginning May 25, 1996, due to impairments including attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and Asperger's Syndrome. R 303-11, 389. The state agency denied the application at the initial review level. R. 125. Mr. Podguski requested and received an administrative hearing, initially held August 3 2017, at which Mr. Podguski requested a continuance to obtain legal representation. R. 70-77. Two more hearings were held, with the ALJ sending Mr. Podguski for a consultative examination after the February 2, 2018, hearing, and finally convening on November 13, 2018. R. 61-68, 79-89. The ALJ heard testimony from Mr. Podguski, (now represented by counsel), Plaintiff's mother, and a vocational expert. Id. The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on December 27, 2018, but the Appeals Council remanded the case for a new hearing on May 26, 2020. R. 120-23.

A new ALJ conducted a hearing on October 2, 2022, during which Plaintiff (still represented by counsel), and a vocational expert testified. R. 34-59. This second ALJ filed her decision on October 19, 2020, finding that Mr. Podguski could perform a range of unskilled work at all exertional levels and was not disabled. R. 10-19. Mr. Podguski requested review by the Appeals Council. R. 300-02. The Appeals Council upheld the decision, denying review on April 21, 2021. R. 1-6. The ALJ's decision of October 19, 2020, found Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform work at all exertional levels, but with non-exertional limitations of: unskilled, simple, routine tasks; simple decisions; occasional changes in the workplace; and occasional interaction with co-workers and supervisors and no direct public interaction. With the Appeals Council's denial of review, the ALJ's decision is the Commissioner's final decision for purposes of judicial review. R. 14. Mr. Podguski timely filed a request for review in this court on June 23, 2021. Doc. No. 2.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. The Claimant's Background

Mr. Podguski was 19 years old on the date of his application for benefits, making him a “younger person” under the regulations. R. 18. He graduated from high school and can communicate in English. R. 39-40. Mr. Podguski has no past relevant work. R. 57.

B. The ALJ's Decision

The ALJ found that Mr. Podguski was not eligible for DIB because he has not been under a disability, as defined by the Social Security Act. R. 19. In reaching this decision, the ALJ made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Social Security's five-step sequential evaluation process.^[2]

At step one, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Podguski had not engaged in substantial gainful activity (“SGA”) since June 18, 2015, the alleged onset date. R. 12. At step two, the ALJ determined that Mr. Podguski had the following severe impairments: autism spectrum disorder (ASD); anxiety disorder; post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD); attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD); and mood disorder. Id. The ALJ noted that although Mr. Podguski is 5'6” tall and weighs about 200 pounds, making his body mass index (BMI) score 35.5, there was no evidence of record indicating that Plaintiff's weight “has more than a minimal effect on the claimant's ability to perform basic work activities; therefore, the [ALJ] finds that it is not considered severe.” R. 12-13. Mr. Podguski does not dispute the ALJ's analysis at steps one and two. At step three, the ALJ compared Mr. Podguski's impediments to those contained in the Social Security Listing of Impairments (“listing”).^[3] Specifically, the ALJ compared Mr. Podguski's severe impairments to the listings 12.04, 12.06, 12.10, and 12.15 (Depressive, bipolar, and related disorders; anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorders; autism spectrum disorder; and trauma- and stressor-related disorders, respectively). The ALJ found that Mr. Podguski did not meet any listing criteria, R. 13-14. Mr. Podguski does not dispute this finding.

Prior to undertaking her step four analysis, the ALJ assessed Mr. Podguski's residual functional capacity (“RFC”), or “the most [Mr. Podguski] can [] do despite [his] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1). The ALJ found that Mr. Podguski had the RFC to perform work at any exertion level, as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b), but with the following non-exertional limitations: unskilled, simple, routine tasks; simple decisions, occasional changes in the workplace; and occasional interaction with co-workers and supervisors, and no direct public interaction. R. 14. At step four, the ALJ found that Mr. Podguski does not have relevant past work. R. 18. At step five, based on the RFC and testimony from a vocational expert, the ALJ determined that Mr. Podguski would be able to perform the requirements of representative occupations such as laundry laborer, hand packer, and housekeeper/cleaner. R. 18. Because these jobs exist in significant numbers in the national economy, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Podguski was not disabled. R. 19.

Mr. Podguski contends the ALJ erred by determining that the Plaintiff was not disabled. Plaintiff's Brief (Pl. Br.) at 2. Plaintiff contends that the evidence in the record supports a finding that “the Plaintiff would need frequent reminders how to perform tasks after the standard learning period for a job,” making him incapable of maintaining any work. Pl. Br. at 5, citing R. 57. The record citation is to the ALJ's second and third hypothetical posed to the vocational expert (VE) at the October 7, 2020, hearing:

Q. If you assume an individual would end up being off-task and unproductive 15 to 20% of the day as a result of frequent lapses in focus and concentration, would that individual be able to maintain any work?

A. No.

Q. If an individual would need frequent reminders on how to perform job tasks, and if we assume that were even after the standard learning period for that job, would that individual be able to maintain any work?

A. No.

R. 57-58.

The Commissioner responds that the record contains sufficient evidence to uphold the ALJ's decision. Commissioner's Response (Com. Res.) at 1, 2, 4. Plaintiff did not file a reply.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

My review of the ALJ's decision is deferential. I am bound by her findings of fact to the extent those findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999)). Accordingly, my review of the ALJ's findings of fact is limited to determining whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). If the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence, her disability determination must be upheld. Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). Substantial evidence “is more than a mere scintilla but may be less than a preponderance.” Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988). I must rely on the record developed during the administrative proceedings along with the pleadings in making my determination. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). I may not weigh the evidence or substitute my own conclusions for those of the ALJ. Chandler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011).

The ALJ's legal conclusions and application of legal principles are subject to plenary review. See Krysztoforski v. Chater, 55 F.3d 857, 858 (3d Cir. 1995). I must determine whether the ALJ applied the proper legal standards in reaching the decision. See Coria v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 245, 247 (3d Cir. 1984). Accordingly, I can overturn an ALJ's decision based on an incorrect application of a legal standard even where I find that the decision otherwise is supported by substantial evidence. Payton v. Barnhart, 416 F.Supp.2d 385, 387 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (citing Friedberg v. Schweiker, 721 F.2d 445, 447 (3d Cir. 1983)).

DISCUSSION

The ALJ did not err by deciding that Mr. Podguski did not prove he was disabled during the relevant period.

Mr Podguski claims the ALJ should have found him disabled because the record supports a finding that Plaintiff needs frequent reminders in order to stay on task, precluding employment under the VE's testimony. Pl. Br. at 4. The specific evidence Plaintiff cites is Plaintiff's testimony that he cannot stay focused if given too many tasks, (R. 44), combined with records of Concern Counseling Services that diagnose Plaintiff with anxiety disorder, ADHD, mood disorder and autism disorder, as well as a GAF score of 50 on April 21. 2015. (R. 545-681).^[4] Pl. Br. at 4. Plaintiff acknowledges that the only other GAF score in the record, a “subsequent” score recorded by Concern Counseling, was 65. Id. Plaintiff argues that these records support a finding that Mr. Podguski “has issues with maintaining focus and completing simple tasks without a reminder which are clearly linked to his severe...