Poindexter v. Dep't of Human Res.

946 F.Supp.2d 1278

Jennifer POINDEXTER, Plaintiff,

v.DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 2:12–CV–327–WKW.

United States District Court,

M.D. Alabama,

Northern Division.

May 21, 2013.

Order Denying Reconsideration June 14, 2013.

Henry Lomax Cassady, Cassady & Cassady, P.C., Fairhope, AL, Thomas Bynum Albritton, Albrittons Clifton Alverson Moody & Bowden, PC, Andalusia, AL, for Plaintiff.

Joel Christopher Marsh, Larry Allen Lynn, Jr., Alabama Dept of Human Resources, Tara Smelley Knee, Alice Ann Byrne, Alabama Department of Personnel, Montgomery, AL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

W. KEITH WATKINS, Chief Judge.

This suit arises out of Plaintiff Jennifer Poindexter's resignation, which she argues was a constructive discharge. Plaintiff, a former employee of the Alabama Department of Human Resources (“DHR”), alleges that DHR, the Alabama State Personnel Board, and five of the agencies' current and former employees violated Plaintiff's constitutional right to procedural due process. She also brings a number of state law causes of action.

Before the court are Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment. (Docs. # 26, 27.) Plaintiff responded in opposition (Doc. # 35), but only the DHR Defendants replied (Doc. # 36). Having considered the arguments of counsel and the relevant law, the court finds that Defendants' motions are due to be granted in part and denied in part.

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The court exercises subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. It has jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To succeed on summary judgment, the movant must demonstrate “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The court must view the evidence and the inferences from that evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Jean–Baptiste v. Gutierrez, 627 F.3d 816, 820 (11th Cir.2010).

The party moving for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). This responsibility includes identifying the portions of the record illustrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Id. A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence allowing a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict in its favor. Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir.2001). If the movant meets its evidentiary burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish—with evidence beyond the pleadings—that a genuine dispute material to each of its claims for relief exists. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

III. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a former employee of DHR who worked in the agency's Conecuh County office as a Financial Support Supervisor. Her twenty-year career appears to have been uneventful until April 9, 2010. That day, Defendants Kelly Lever, the Assistant Personnel Director for DHR, and Louis Holt, the then-Chief Investigator for DHR Internal Affairs, arrived in Conecuh County. They handed Plaintiff a letter informing her that an administrative hearing would take place on April 30, 2010, to determine whether she violated agency rules regarding food stamps when she used her nephew's food stamp card. The letter accused Plaintiff of “unauthorized use” of the card and identified eight dates and locations where Plaintiff allegedly used the card, outside of the presence of her nephew or another authorized user. (Doc. # 1, Ex. 1.) The letter informed Plaintiff that if evidence at the hearing showed she had impermissibly used the card, she could face “disciplinary actions of increasing severity,” ranging from suspension to termination. (Doc. # 1, Ex. 1.)

Defendants Holt, Lever, and Rosa Mickles—the then-head of the Conecuh County DHR office—were the bearers of this bad news, and Holt recorded part of the conversation. They informed Plaintiff she could resign to avoid a potential termination. Lever told her three times that the evidence against her was “overwhelming” and that the agency would “seek termination of [her] employment.” (Doc. # 26–7 at 99, 103.) Lever said Plaintiff's conduct was “a very, very severe act of fraud.” (Doc. # 26–7 at 99.) Lever opined that in cases like Plaintiff's, it was “usually best” for the employee to resign, and said that Defendant Mickles was prepared to accept Plaintiff's resignation “in lieu of going to a hearing.” (Doc. # 26–7 at 99.) Ultimately, Lever told Plaintiff, it was “[her] decision.” (Doc. # 26–7 at 99.) Defendant Holt told Plaintiff he would not have been there if the agency did not “have a serious case.” (Doc. # 26–7 at 101.)

Plaintiff asked whether she had to make her decision immediately. She specifically asked whether she could consult an attorney first. (Doc. # 26–7 at 103.) Lever told her that though she did not “have to say at this very moment,” Plaintiff would need to speak with an attorney “as soon as possible to turn in [her] resignation” if she intended to resign. (Doc. # 26–7 at 103.) Though Lever insisted she was not forcing Plaintiff to give an answer and only “trying to get a general idea” of Plaintiff's thoughts (Doc. # 26–7 at 104), moments earlier, Lever had said, “[I]f you do not resign, you will be relieved of your duties.... [Y]ou will basically be staring at four walls until the date of the hearing.” (Doc. # 26–7 at 103.) She also told Plaintiff she would have to “turn over all [her] keys to ... the building [and] anything in [her] office.” (Doc. # 26–7 at 104.) When Plaintiff asked if she needed to write a letter immediately if she decided to resign, Lever told her that would be best.

Plaintiff then asked if she could make a phone call, and Defendants allowed her to call her husband. (Doc. # 26–7 at 106.) When the meeting reconvened after Plaintiff's call, Holt forgot to resume recording. (Doc. # 26–4 at 2.) “Lever and Holt, with the tape recorder turned off,” then threatened Plaintiff with criminal prosecution if she did not resign. (Doc. # 35–1 ¶ 11.) Defendants dispute that allegation, but they admit Holt earlier told Plaintiff that receiving food stamp benefits to which one is not entitled “constitutes a crime.” (Doc. # 26–7 at 103.) In any case, after she called her husband, Plaintiff penned a handwritten letter that read, “I resign my position as Financial Support Supervisor effective today April 09, 2010.” (Doc. # 1–2.) She included those words on Defendants'instruction and signed the letter before her husband arrived. (Doc. # 35–1 ¶¶ 11–13.) Mickles immediately accepted Plaintiff's resignation, signing and so indicating on the bottom of the letter. (Doc. # 1–2.)

When her husband arrived, Plaintiff attempted to withdraw her resignation, but Defendants told her it was too late. Her resignation was effective. The hearing scheduled for April 30, 2010, never occurred.

Another hearing did occur, however. In September 2010, Plaintiff made a claim for unemployment benefits. To determine her eligibility, the Hearing and Appeals Division of the State Department of Industrial Relations held an evidentiary hearing. Plaintiff and DHR were the parties to that action, and both were represented by counsel. The Hearing Officer concluded that Plaintiff “did not resign her position voluntarily,” but, instead, that Defendants “compelled [her] into submitting her resignation.” (Doc. # 1–6 at 2.) The Officer found that Defendants “had already decided to terminate the claimant,” and Defendants' statements when they spoke to her “could be reasonably interpreted to mean that the administrative hearing would be futile.” (Doc. # 1–6 at 2.) Thus, Plaintiff was eligible for unemployment compensation benefits.

Plaintiff brought this suit, accusing seven Defendants of eight causes of action—three claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and five under state law. Plaintiff has since abandoned three of her state law claims; ¹ she maintains her claims for violations of the Alabama Constitution (Count IV) and for the tort of misrepresentation (Count VI).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. The State and its agencies are immune from suit.

The Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts from entertaining suits brought against unconsenting states. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); see also Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66–67, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (holding that “a State is not a ‘person’ within the meaning of § 1983”). The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against states—absent abrogation of immunity—regardless of the relief sought or the claims asserted. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101–02, 104 S.Ct. 900.

Both the State Personnel Board and DHR are state agencies, Ala.Code §§ 36–26–4, 38–2–8, and Alabama has preserved its immunity. Ala. Const. Art. 1, § 14. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' claims against DHR and the State Personnel Board are due to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See McClendon v. Ga. Dep't of Cmty. Health, 261 F.3d 1252, 1256 (11th Cir.2001) (“[F]ederal courts lack jurisdiction to entertain claims that are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”).

B. Count I states no § 1983 claim.

Plaintiff brings three counts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In the first, she seeks a writ to compel payment “according to her contract.” (Doc. # 1 ¶ 28.) The essence of this claim is that Plaintiff's resignation was not effective, and thus she is still a DHR employee. Accordingly, Plaintiff argues, she is entitled to payment “as required by law.” (Doc. # 1 ¶ 30; Doc. # 35 at 26–27.) Assuming everything Plaintiff says is true, the facts might give rise to a breach of contract claim, but not a constitutional claim. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (providing a...