Pollansky v. Pollansky

162 Conn.App. 635

133 A.3d 167

Steven POLLANSKY

v.Anna POLLANSKY et al.

No. 36954.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Sept. 25, 2015.

Decided Jan. 26, 2016.

Robert F. Cohen, Bristol, with whom, on the brief, was Forest E. Green, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Wayne C. Gerlt, South Windsor, for the appellees (defendants).

BEACH, PRESCOTT and BEAR, Js.

BEAR, J.

This appeal is the latest skirmish in the ongoing dispute between the plaintiff, Steven Pollansky, and his mother, the defendant Anna Pollansky,¹ concerning the plaintiff's claim of entitlement to real property allegedly promised to him by his father, Andrew Pollansky, many years ago. Anna Pollansky previously had initiated a summary process action against the plaintiff and his family seeking immediate possession of three parcels of property located in Coventry, which they occupied. The plaintiff's primary claim in the summary process action, raised by way of special defense, was that he occupied the Coventry property pursuant to an ownership interest that was orally promised to him by Andrew Pollansky. After a trial, the court in the summary process action rendered judgment in favor of Anna Pollansky, and this court affirmed that judgment. See Pollansky v. Pollansky, 144 Conn.App. 188, 71 A.3d 1267 (2013).

The plaintiff subsequently instituted the present action against the defendants. In a four count complaint alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and adverse possession, the plaintiff claimed an ownership interest in the Coventry property, an ownership interest in his father's investment property in Mansfield, and money damages. The trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendants, ruling that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel precluded all of the causes of action and issues raised by the plaintiff in the present case. On appeal, the plaintiff asserts that the court improperly rendered summary judgment because (1) his breach of contract claim alleging his ownership interest was not litigated in the summary process action, thereby precluding application of the doctrine of res judicata; and (2) many of the issues raised in his remaining counts for unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and adverse possession were not fully and fairly litigated in the summary process action, thereby precluding application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. We reverse the judgment of the trial court in favor of the defendants on the plaintiff's counts of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit. We affirm the judgment in all other respects.

Many of the relevant facts and procedural history were set forth by this court in Pollansky v. Pollansky, supra, 144 Conn.App. at 188, 71 A.3d 1267. "In the 1960s, [Anna Pollansky] and her late husband, Andrew Pollansky, jointly purchased three adjoining parcels of land in Coventry, totaling 84.5 acres.... Andrew Pollansky operated a sand and gravel business on the [Coventry] property until he retired in approximately 1992. The [plaintiff], the son of Andrew Pollansky and [Anna Pollansky], worked in his father's gravel business on the [Coventry] property from his teenage years until his father retired. After Andrew Pollansky retired, he and [Anna Pollansky] permitted the [plaintiff and his family] to access the [Coventry] property for recreational purposes and, as to the [plaintiff and his wife], for operation of their businesses.... [Anna Pollansky] and Andrew Pollansky gave the [plaintiff] permission to operate [his] businesses on the [Coventry] property, but there were no written agreements or leases to that effect....

"When Andrew Pollansky died in July, 2010, [Anna Pollansky] became the sole owner of the [Coventry] property. [Anna Pollansky], who was in her eighties at the time of [the summary process] trial, wished to sell or to rent the property to subsidize her income. [Anna Pollansky] asked the [plaintiff] to pay rent for the use of the [Coventry] property for [his] businesses, but the parties had not been able to come to any agreement on rent. As a result, [Anna Pollansky] asked the [plaintiff] to vacate the [Coventry] property so that she could sell or rent it to obtain additional income, but the [plaintiff] refused to do so.

"[Anna Pollansky] brought a summary process action against the [plaintiff] seeking immediate possession of the [Coventry] property. [Anna Pollansky] claimed that, although the [plaintiff] once had the right and privilege to occupy the [Coventry] property, that right or privilege had terminated. The [plaintiff] alleged [the following as a special defense]: that Andrew Pollansky had granted [the plaintiff] an ownership interest in the [Coventry] property....

"The court found that [Anna Pollansky] proved her summary process action: that she was the owner of the [Coventry] property, that she continued to permit the [plaintiff] to operate a business on the [Coventry] property after her husband's death, that she terminated her permission when she asked the [plaintiff] to vacate the premises and served [him] with a valid notice to quit, and that the [plaintiff] remained in possession. The court found that the [plaintiff] had not proven [his] special [defense]. The court entered a judgment of immediate possession in favor of [Anna Pollansky]." Id., at 189–91, 71 A.3d 1267. This court affirmed the trial court's judgment in the summary process action. See id., at 189, 71 A.3d 1267.

The following additional facts are relevant to our consideration of the issues raised in this appeal. The trial in the summary process action took place on January 6, 2012, and January 27, 2012. In his special defense in the summary process action, the plaintiff alleged that he occupied the Coventry property "pursuant to an ownership interest in the premises granted by Andrew Pollansky." In support of this special defense, the plaintiff testified that Andrew Pollansky promised to convey the Coventry property to him in exchange for services and improvements to the Coventry property. The plaintiff testified as to a variety of services he had performed over the years, including land clearing, grading, drainage, and business management services. He also testified that he had assisted his parents in a number of legal proceedings related to the Coventry property, including a tax foreclosure, a zoning application, and litigation with an abutting landowner. The plaintiff testified that Andrew Pollansky indicated to him on a number of occasions throughout his life that he would not have been able to keep the property if not for the plaintiff's efforts. The plaintiff's wife, Darby Pollansky, was called as a witness as well. Darby Pollansky testified, among other things, that Andrew Pollansky promised the Coventry property to the plaintiff on many occasions. Finally, the plaintiff testified at length as to his services on the Mansfield property. Specifically, he testified that the house regularly had been damaged by tenants, and that he had repaired the walls, painted, and performed carpentry services. The plaintiff claimed that he was never paid for any of his services. Anna Pollansky testified that, to her knowledge, Andrew Pollansky never promised the Coventry property to the plaintiff, but she admitted that the plaintiff worked on the Coventry property for thirty-six years. Additionally, she testified that she had paid the plaintiff whenever he did work at the Mansfield property.

The court, Cobb, J., found the following facts in the summary process action. The plaintiff worked with Andrew Pollansky on the Coventry property from his teenage years until his father retired in 1992. The plaintiff, however, did not produce any written documents, including letters, deeds, contracts, or testamentary documents promising or granting the plaintiff an interest in the Coventry property. The only evidence adduced by the plaintiff concerning his father's promise to convey the Coventry property was his and Darby Pollansky's self-serving and hearsay testimony, which the court did not credit. Conversely, the court credited Anna Pollansky's testimony. Accordingly, it held that the plaintiff's father never promised to convey an ownership interest to the plaintiff, and it rendered judgment of immediate possession in favor of Anna Pollansky. The court did not make any findings or rulings concerning the Mansfield property.

The plaintiff subsequently commenced the present action against the defendants. ²

In the breach of contract count of the complaint, the plaintiff made the following allegations. The plaintiff worked continuously and without compensation for decades at Andrew Pollansky's business on the Coventry property. The plaintiff also worked without compensation for decades at the Mansfield property. The plaintiff performed services at and made improvements to both of these properties pursuant to an oral agreement with Andrew Pollansky, whereby in consideration of his performance of these services, his father would convey the properties to the plaintiff. Notwithstanding the plaintiff's many years of performance, the defendants failed to convey the properties to him. The unjust enrichment count of the complaint incorporated many of the allegations in the breach of contract count and contained an additional allegation that the defendants, as Andrew Pollansky's heirs, were unjustly enriched by the plaintiff's uncompensated services for the benefit of and his improvements to the properties. The quantum meruit count incorporated many of the allegations of the prior counts and contained an additional allegation that the plaintiff was entitled to the reasonable value of his services. In the adverse possession count, the plaintiff alleged that he had obtained title to the Coventry and Mansfield properties by virtue of his "open, visible, notorious, adverse, exclusive, continuous, [and] uninterrupted" use of these properties for more than fifteen years. The defendants thereafter filed special defenses to the breach of...