Poole v. Saul

462 F.Supp.3d 137

Dana Alyce POOLE

v.Andrew M. SAUL, Commissioner, Social Security Administration

Civ. No. 3:19CV00927(SALM)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

Signed May 22, 2020

Ivan Michael Katz, Law Offices of Ivan M. Katz, New Haven, CT, for Dana Alyce Poole.

Alexander Broche, Social Security Administration, New York, NY, for Andrew M. Saul, Commissioner, Social Security Administration.

RULING ON CROSS MOTIONS

SARAH A. L. MERRIAM, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Dana Alyce Poole ("plaintiff"), brings this appeal under § 205(g) of the Social Security Act (the "Act"), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking review of a final decision by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the "Commissioner" or "defendant") denying her applications for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"). Plaintiff has moved to reverse the Commissioner's decision. [Doc. #23]. Defendant has filed a cross-motion seeking an order affirming the decision of the Commissioner. [Doc. #27].

For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff's Motion to Reverse the Decision of the Commissioner [Doc. #23 ] is DENIED , and defendant's Motion for an Order Affirming the Decision of the Commissioner [Doc. #27 ] is GRANTED .

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¹

Plaintiff filed applications for DIB and SSI on December 7, 2012, alleging disability beginning on March 1, 2012. See Certified Transcript of the Administrative Record, Doc. #15, compiled on July 29, 2019, (hereinafter, collectively, "Tr.") at 175-86. Plaintiff's applications were denied initially on May 17, 2013, see Tr. 136-43, and upon reconsideration on October 29, 2013. See Tr. 145-47.

On March 3, 2015, plaintiff, represented by Attorney Ivan M. Katz, appeared and testified at a hearing before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Deirdre R. Horton. See generally, Tr. 43-88. On June 26, 2015, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. See Tr. 23-41. On September 21, 2016, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review of the ALJ's June 26, 2015, decision. See Tr. 1-5.

On November 30, 2016, plaintiff, still represented by Attorney Katz, filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut seeking review of the ALJ's June 26, 2015, decision. See Poole v. Colvin, No. 3:16CV01959(MPS) (D. Conn. Nov. 30, 2016). On March 20, 2018, defendant filed a Motion for Entry of Judgment Under Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) with Reversal and Remand of the Cause to Defendant. Id. at Doc. #25. On March 21, 2018, Judge Michael P. Shea granted that motion and entered judgment in favor of plaintiff. See id. at Docs. #26, #27; see also Tr. 911. On May 8, 2018, the Appeals Council issued a Notice of Order of Appeals Council Remanding Case to Administrative Law Judge. See Tr. 912-18.

Following the Appeals Council's remand, on January 31, 2019, plaintiff, again represented by Attorney Katz, appeared and testified at a second hearing before ALJ Horton. See generally Tr. 839-82. Vocational Expert ("VE") Edmond J. Calandra appeared and testified by telephone at the hearing. See Tr. 867-80; see also Tr. 1181-82. On March 25, 2019, the ALJ issued a second unfavorable decision. See Tr. 815-38. Plaintiff did not seek Appeals Council review of the ALJ's March 25, 2019, decision. See Doc. #1 at 4. Accordingly, the ALJ's March 25, 2019, decision became the final decision of the Commissioner on May 27, 2019. See Tr. 816 ("If you do not file written exceptions and the Appeals Council does not review [the ALJ's] decision on its own, [the ALJ's] decision will become final on the 61^st day following the date of this notice."). The case is now ripe for review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The review of a Social Security disability determination involves two levels of inquiry. First, the Court must decide whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal principles in making the determination. Second, the Court must decide whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence. See Balsamo v. Chater, 142 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1998). Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it is more than a "mere scintilla." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938) ). The reviewing court's responsibility is to ensure that a claim has been fairly evaluated by the ALJ. See Grey v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1983).

The Court does not reach the second stage of review – evaluating whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's conclusion – if the Court determines that the ALJ failed to apply the law correctly. See Norman v. Astrue, 912 F. Supp. 2d 33, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) ("The Court first reviews the Commissioner's decision for compliance with the correct legal standards; only then does it determine whether the Commissioner's conclusions were supported by substantial evidence." (citing Tejada v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 770, 773-74 (2d Cir. 1999) )). "Where there is a reasonable basis for doubt whether the ALJ applied correct legal principles, application of the substantial evidence standard to uphold a finding of no disability creates an unacceptable risk that a claimant will be deprived of the right to have her disability determination made according to the correct legal principles." Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir. 1987).

"[T]he crucial factors in any determination must be set forth with sufficient specificity to enable [a reviewing court] to decide whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence." Ferraris v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582, 587 (2d Cir. 1984) (alterations added) (citing Treadwell v. Schweiker, 698 F.2d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1983) ). The ALJ is free to accept or reject the testimony of any witness, but a "finding that the witness is not credible must nevertheless be set forth with sufficient specificity to permit intelligible plenary review of the record." Williams ex rel. Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 260-61 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing Carroll v. Sec. Health and Human Servs., 705 F.2d 638, 643 (2d Cir. 1983) ). "Moreover, when a finding is potentially dispositive on the issue of disability, there must be enough discussion to enable a reviewing court to determine whether substantial evidence exists to support that finding." Johnston v. Colvin, No. 3:13CV00073(JCH), 2014 WL 1304715, at *6 (D. Conn. Mar. 31, 2014).

It is important to note that in reviewing the ALJ's decision, this Court's role is not to start from scratch. "In reviewing a final decision of the SSA, this Court is limited to determining whether the SSA's conclusions were supported by substantial evidence in the record and were based on a correct legal standard." Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Lamay v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 562 F.3d 503, 507 (2d Cir. 2009) ). "[W]hether there is substantial evidence supporting the appellant's view is not the question here; rather, we must decide whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision." Bonet ex rel. T.B. v. Colvin, 523 F. App'x 58, 59 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order).

Finally, some of the Regulations cited in this decision, particularly those applicable to the review of medical source evidence, were amended effective March 27, 2017. Those "new regulations apply only to claims filed on or after March 27, 2017." Smith v. Comm'r, 731 F. App'x 28, 30 n.1 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order). Where a plaintiff's claim for benefits was filed prior to March 27, 2017, "the Court reviews the ALJ's decision under the earlier regulations[.]" Rodriguez v. Colvin, No. 3:15CV01723(DFM), 2018 WL 4204436, at *4 n.6 (D. Conn. Sept. 4, 2018) ; White v. Comm'r, No. 17CV04524(JS), 2018 WL 4783974, at *4 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2018) (" ‘While the Act was amended effective March 27, 2017, the Court reviews the ALJ's decision under the earlier regulations because the Plaintiff's application was filed before the new regulations went into effect.’ " (citation omitted)).

III. SSA LEGAL STANDARD

Under the Social Security Act, every individual who is under a disability is entitled to disability insurance benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1).

To be considered disabled under the Act and therefore entitled to benefits, plaintiff must demonstrate that she is unable to work after a date specified "by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Such impairment or impairments must be "of such severity that [s]he is not only unable to do [her] previous work but cannot, considering [her] age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) ; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c) (requiring that the impairment "significantly limit[ ] ... physical or mental ability to do basic work activities" to be considered "severe" (alterations added)).

There is a familiar five-step analysis used to determine if a person is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. In the Second Circuit, the test is described as follows:

First, the Secretary considers whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If [s]he is not, the Secretary next considers whether the claimant has a "severe impairment" which significantly limits [her] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. If the claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is whether, based solely on medical evidence, the claimant has an impairment which is listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the claimant has such an impairment, the Secretary will consider [her] disabled without considering vocational factors such as age, education, and work experience;

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