Pooler v. Wilson, No. 2:19-cv-3347-DCN

452 F.Supp.3d 428

Dametrice POOLER, Plaintiff,

v.Alan WILSON, as Attorney General of the State of South Carolina, South Carolina Law Enforcement Division, and John Does 1-10, Defendants.

No. 2:19-cv-3347-DCN

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Charleston Division.

Signed April 3, 2020

Benjamin Wayne Lee, Matthew E. Yelverton, Yelverton Law Firm LLC, Jeffrey Wayne Buncher, Jr., Uricchio Howe Krell Jacobson Toporek Theos and Keith, Charleston, SC, for Plaintiff.

Alyssa Louise Agostino, Elloree A. Ganes, Robert H. Hood, Jr., Hood Law Firm, Charleston, SC, for Defendants.

ORDER

DAVID C. NORTON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

The following matter is before the court on defendant Alan Wilson's ("Wilson") motion to dismiss, ECF No. 2, defendant South Carolina Enforcement Division's ("SLED") motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, ECF No. 7, and Wilson and SLED's (collectively, "defendants") amended motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, ECF No. 13. For the reasons set forth below, the court finds as moot Wilson's motion to dismiss and SLED's motion to dismiss, grants defendants’ motion to dismiss in part, and remands the matter to state court.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Dametrice Pooler ("Pooler") brings this action challenging a South Carolina civil in rem forfeiture action and alleging violations of her civil rights and common law conversion. On December 13, 2017, SLED agents arrested Dwayne Walker ("Walker"), Pooler's ex-boyfriend, in Pooler's home and charged Walker with possession with intent to distribute narcotics. Incident to the arrest, SLED agents discovered and seized $104,596.00 in cash (the "currency"), in small bills, bound together with rubber bands, and hidden in a secret compartment underneath a bathtub in Pooler's home. Along with the currency, SLED agents discovered various narcotics in the hidden bathroom compartment. On August 13, 2019, Judge Jennifer McCoy held a forfeiture hearing in the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas for the Ninth Judicial Circuit, where she determined that the currency constituted proceeds of illegal drugs and forfeited it to the State of South Carolina, to be distributed among various state agencies.

On September 27, 2019, Pooler filed this lawsuit in the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas for the Ninth Judicial Circuit, bringing claims (1) challenging the validity of the South Carolina forfeiture proceeding under S.C. Code Ann. 44-53-586, (2) for violations of her civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and (3) for common law conversion. ECF No. 1-1. Her second amended complaint added a fourth claim, which alleges that two South Carolina forfeiture statutes violate the United States and South Carolina constitutions. Pooler asserts her state law claims and unconstitutionality claim against all defendants; however, she brings her § 1983 claim against only John Does 1-10, who represent the unnamed SLED agents who seized the currency from Pooler's home (the "unnamed SLED agents"). On November 27, 2019, defendants removed the case to this court based on the court's jurisdiction over Pooler's federal claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and over her state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. ECF No. 1.

On November 27, 2019, Wilson filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. ECF No. 2. On December 4, 2019, SLED filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. ECF No. 7. On December 11, 2019, Pooler responded to each of defendants’ motions. ECF No. 9. And on December 18, defendants replied. ECF No. 13. On December 11, 2019, Pooler filed an amended complaint. ECF No. 10. Accordingly, defendants filed an amended motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment on December 26, 2019. ECF No. 13. Pooler responded to the amended motion on February 6, 2020, ECF No. 21, to which defendants replied on February 13, 2020, ECF No. 22. Thus, this matter is ripe for the court's review.

II. STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept the plaintiff's factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011). But "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). On a motion to dismiss, the court's task is limited to determining whether the complaint states a "plausible claim for relief." Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Although Rule 8(a)(2) requires only a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The "complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

If, on a motion to dismiss, the court considers matters outside of the pleadings, such as a party's supporting memoranda and attachments, the court treats the motion as one for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). "The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (2010). At the summary judgment stage, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that each of Pooler's four claims fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Because Pooler's claims under § 1983 and the United States Constitution serve as the basis for the court's jurisdiction over this matter, the court addresses each of those claims first. Finding that both are untenable, the court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to those claims and remands Pooler's remaining claims to state court.¹

A. § 1983 Claim

A civil action under § 1983 allows "a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief." City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707, 119 S.Ct. 1624, 143 L.Ed.2d 882 (1999). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988).

Pooler asserts her § 1983 claim against the unnamed SLED agents. In her amended complaint, Pooler alleges that the unnamed SLED agents "seized Plaintiff's U.S. currency and failed to institute forfeiture proceedings in a reasonable time against Plaintiff." ECF No. 10, Amended Compl. ¶ 4. Based on these two factual allegations, Pooler's amended complaint alleges that the unnamed SLED agents "depriv[ed] Pooler of [ ] clearly-established [sic] and well-settled constitutional rights protected by the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution." Id. at ¶ 4. In opposition to the motion to dismiss, however, Pooler asserts a different argument, one that is not factually supported by the allegations of her complaint. In her briefs, Pooler contends:

Defendant Wilson instituted forfeiture proceedings against Mr. Walker, not Plaintiff, in the Berkley [sic] County matter. Patently absent from the order from the Berkley [sic] County matter [ ] is any reference to Plaintiff, any reference that due notice was provided to Plaintiff, or any mention whatsoever that Plaintiff had asserted any right or interest in the seized currency at issue.

ECF No. 21 at 20–21. Despite failing to allege the same in her complaint, Pooler now bases her entire § 1983 claim on the contention that the unnamed SLED agents violated her constitutional rights by failing to provide Pooler with notice of the underlying forfeiture action.² Indeed, in her briefs, Pooler relies on law that relates to the type of notice that the government must give an interested party to a forfeiture hearing. In short, Pooler's complaint alleges that the unnamed SLED agents violated her constitutional rights by unreasonably delaying initiation of a forfeiture proceeding, while her response to the motion to dismiss argues that the unnamed SLED agents violated her rights by failing to notify her of the underlying forfeiture proceeding. Both her allegations and her arguments must fail.

As an initial matter, the court must point out the strong factual implausibility of both the allegations in Pooler's complaint and her instant arguments with respect to her § 1983 claim, distinct as they may be. It seems very unlikely that SLED agents are responsible for initiating forfeiture proceedings or providing notice of such proceedings to interested parties. It seems more likely, and Pooler seems to recognize in her brief, that the Attorney General's Office would initiate such proceedings and provide such notice. See ECF No. 21 at 20 (noting that "Defendant Wilson instituted forfeiture proceedings" in this case). The implausibility of Pooler's allegations is reason enough for the court to dismiss Pooler's § 1983 claim against the unnamed SLED agents. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (noting that a plaintiff must "nudge[ ] [her] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible" to state a valid claim for relief). However, giving...