Postelle v. McWhite

Page 721

115 Md.App. 721

694 A.2d 529

Philip N. POSTELLE v. Peter McWHITE.

No. 1593, Sept. Term, 1996.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

June 3, 1997.

Douglas R. Taylor, Rockville, for Appellant.

Thomas J. Sippel (Janet Levis Tomko and Gill & Sippel, on the brief), Rockville, for Appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and WENNER and DAVIS, JJ.

DAVIS, Judge.

Philip N. Postelle appeals from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County entered on July 23, 1996, following a jury verdict for compensatory and punitive damages for wrongful eviction and conversion. On May 24, 1995, appellee Peter McWhite brought an action against appellant and AMCI Corporation. As to Count I of the suit, a claim against AMCI only, the court stayed the claim when AMCI declared bankruptcy. Appellee's claim also raises Counts II and III against appellant Postelle for his alleged wrongful eviction and conversion of appellee's property. At the conclusion of the trial, appellant stipulated liability with respect to both the counts of wrongful eviction and conversion, and the court directed a verdict as to liability in favor of appellee. Appellant also stipulated to compensatory damages in the amount of $1,807.50 for attorney's fees incurred by appellee in obtaining an injunction. The jury returned a verdict for compensatory and punitive damages totaling $19,972.20, including the stipulated attorney's fees. Appellant filed a motion for a new trial, and the court denied the motion on August 19, 1996. On August 21, 1996, appellant noted a timely appeal, and presents the following issues for our review which we restate below:

I. Whether the trial court erred when it denied appellant's motion to dismiss based on appellee's failure to establish monetary losses.

II. Whether there was sufficient evidence of actual malice to support an award of punitive damages.

FACTS

Appellee is a self-employed consultant. Appellant is the president and sole stockholder of Automation Management Consultants Incorporated (AMCI). The parties have known each other for about twenty years. In June 1990, AMCI leased one of its offices to appellee for $250 a month plus the costs of an additional telephone line. On August 15, 1990, the parties entered into an Agreement For Consulting Services under which appellee was to be paid $82.50 an hour for his work on a contract AMCI secured with the federal government.

Difficulties between appellee and AMCI developed when AMCI failed to provide appellee with timely payments for his work. In July 1994, AMCI owed appellee $22,275 for consulting services. Appellee asked appellant when payment could be expected and appellant told appellee that he would be paid when AMCI received payment from the government. Appellee discovered that the government had in fact paid appellant, and when the parties met again, appellee confronted appellant with this information. The meeting, however, did not result in payment by appellant, and therefore, appellee's lawyer composed a letter to appellant which appellee hand delivered on July 12, 1994.

The letter put appellant on notice that a lawsuit would be filed if the money that was due and owing was not paid. Subsequent to the delivery of the letter, the parties met. Appellee described appellant as "agitated." Appellant told appellee that "the lawsuit was a waste of time, that he knew how to jerk around the chains of lawyers, and that it was going to cause [appellee] more in legal fees than [he] could ever expect to get from the lawsuit, and [appellant] had been through this before."

On July 27, 1994, appellee filed a suit against AMCI to recover the $22,275 that AMCI owed him. The next day, July 28, 1994, Vincent Moralia served appellant, as resident agent for AMCI, with an original lawsuit for breach of contract. Moralia described the circumstances that led to service as "like in the movies." Moralia went to AMCI's offices and located appellant. When appellant saw Moralia walking towards him with papers, he ran around a table, pulling chairs behind him, and ran out the door. Moralia chased appellant, who headed for the stairwell and ran down three or four flights of stairs, followed by Moralia. Appellant then went back up the stairs to the sixth floor where he was confronted by Moralia, who served him with the summons and complaint. Appellant went into his office with the papers, slammed the door, and three seconds later, appellant opened his office door and threw the papers out of his office.

At the time appellant was being served, appellee was in his office. When appellee heard appellant slam his door, he came into the hallway and encountered appellant. Appellant told appellee to leave the office and that he was no longer welcome. Appellee left the office for approximately an hour, and when he returned, he discovered that a lock had been placed on his office door.

On July 28, 1994, appellee's attorney faxed appellant a letter advising appellant that he would be liable for locking appellee out of his office in retaliation for the complaint that he filed against AMCI for money that it owed to appellee. Appellee's attorney explained that appellee will suffer serious financial consequences and irreparable harm if he continues to be denied access to his office which contains his business materials and computer. The letter also informed appellant that, due to his conduct, appellee was unable to work on a contract for which he was being paid $640 per day. Finally, the letter stated that if appellant did not allow appellee access to his office, appellee would seek injunctive relief on July 29, 1994. Appellant testified that he never received this letter.

Subsequently, appellant arranged a meeting with appellee, but no agreement was reached and appellant did not allow appellee to return to his office. At the meeting, appellee reiterated to appellant that he was supposed to be working on another contract at a rate of $660 a day, but he was unable to work because the materials he needed were locked in his office.

On July 29, 1994, appellee's attorney sent appellant a letter notifying him that appellee would be seeking ex parte injunctive relief from the court on August 1, 1994 for locking appellee out of his office on July 28, 1994. On August 1, 1994, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County issued an ex parte injunction enjoining AMCI and its agents from interfering with appellee's access to his office.

Appellee gained access to his office on August 2, 1994. On August 4, 1994, appellee moved his equipment to a new office, and alleged that it took him approximately ten working days to set up the new office. Appellee testified that he ceased working on the contract with AMCI before he was locked out of his office, and as of July 28, 1994, he was working with Human Resources Research Incorporated. Appellee claims to have lost twelve to fourteen days of work at a rate of $640-$660 per day as a result of being locked out of his office. Appellee also testified that he suffered damages because he was unable to do marketing, and he incurred additional expenses when he had to relocate his office. At trial, the parties stipulated to damages in the amount of $1,807.50 for legal fees incurred in obtaining the injunction.

Appellee was paid $22,275 for his work, which was the subject of the first suit, after obtaining a default judgment against AMCI and attaching one of the corporate bank accounts to satisfy the judgment. This appeal arises from the second suit filed against AMCI and appellant. As we noted, the count in the second suit relating to AMCI was stayed when AMCI filed for bankruptcy. As for the counts relating to appellant, the court entered a directed verdict against appellant as to liability for wrongful eviction and conversion pursuant to appellant's stipulation, and the jury returned a verdict for compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of $19,972.20.

DISCUSSION

Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss appellee's claim because the evidence was insufficient to support a jury's finding of compensatory damages. In addition, appellant contends that appellee failed to establish actual malice, and therefore, the court should not have submitted the issue of punitive damages to the jury. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to appellee, we conclude that the trial court properly submitted the issues of compensatory and punitive damages to the jury.

I

Appellant stipulated liability with regard to wrongful eviction and conversion, and the court entered a directed verdict on liability. At the conclusion of plaintiff's case and at the conclusion of trial, appellant moved the court to dismiss the claim with respect to compensatory damages because, he argued, the evidence was insufficient to establish damages. ¹ The trial court, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to appellee, denied both of appellant's motions, and at the conclusion of the case, submitted the issue of damages to the jury. See Schreiber v. Cherry Hill Const. Co., 105 Md.App. 462, 493, 660 A.2d 970,cert. denied, Cherry Hill Constr. v. Schreiber, 340 Md. 500, 667 A.2d 341 (1995) and Metromedia Co. v. WCBM Maryland Inc., 327 Md. 514, 518, 610 A.2d 791 (1992); see also MD. RULE 2-519(b) (1997). The jury returned a verdict for compensatory damages with respect to the count for wrongful eviction, in the amount of $391.65 for moving costs and $3,520 for lost income opportunity. As for the conversion count, the jury returned a verdict for compensatory damages for lost income opportunity in the amount of $3,520 and $1,650.70 for loss of use.

We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support an award of compensatory damages, and the trial court properly submitted the issue to the jury. Appellant contends that appellee has not established compensatory damages other than those stipulated to, and he asserts that appellee...