Potts v. Moreci

REGINALD M. POTTS, Jr., Plaintiff, v. DANIEL MORECI, MICHAEL MILLER, VICTOR THOMAS, FRANK ARCE,HUGH WALSH, COMMANDER SHEAHAN, THOMAS CINTRON, HAZEL DERDEN,DIEGO DIMARCO, ROBERT JEWELL, and THOMAS DART, individuallyand as SHERRIFF OF COOK COUNTY, Defendants.

No. 12 C 5310

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

September 29, 2017

Judge Jorge L. Alonso

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Reginald Potts sues defendants, Daniel Moreci, Michael Miller, Victor Thomas, Frank Arce, Hugh Walsh, Commander Sheahan, Thomas Cintron, Hazel Derden, Officer DiMarco, Robert Jewell (all of whom are employees of the Cook County Sheriff's Office), and Sheriff Tom Dart, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for claims arising out of the conditions of his confinement during his pretrial detention in the Cook County Jail. Defendants have moved for partial summary judgment. For the following reasons, the Court grants the motion in part and denies it in part.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was in pretrial detention in Cook County Jail ("the Jail") from November 10, 2007 to March 9, 2016. (Defs.' LR 56.1 Stmt., ¶ 1, ECF No. 187.) He was initially placed in general population, but in December 2007, plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation. (Id., ¶ 15-16.) Plaintiff testified at his deposition in this case that he was never told why he was being put in segregation, and neither side has pointed to evidence of any contemporaneous hearing at which the matter was discussed and plaintiff was informed of the reasons for the decision. (See Defs.' LR 56.1 Resp. to Pl.'s Stmt. of Add'l Facts ¶ 1, ECF No. 214.). There were various levels of segregation in the Jail during the relevant time frame, and the conditions of confinement varied somewhat among levels, but there appears to be no dispute that plaintiff was detained in Division IX in one level of segregation or another, under conditions in which he was required to spend 23 hours per day confined to his cell, during numerous, often lengthy, stints adding up to approximately four years. (See id., ¶¶ 3-4, Pl.'s LR 56.1 Resp. to Defs.' LR 56.1 Stmt., ¶¶ 16, 19, ECF No. 198.) During these stints in segregation, each inmate in plaintiff's tier or "wing" was allowed out into the dayroom—shackled, handcuffed, and alone—for only an hour per day (see Defs.' LR 56.1 Resp., ¶ 3), when he was free to shower, watch television, or use the phone for personal calls.

Plaintiff filed numerous grievances concerning his conditions of confinement. (See Defs.' LR 56.1 Resp., ¶ 5; Pl.'s LR 56.1 Resp., ¶ 20.) He claims that a number of the individual defendants—Daniel Moreci, Michael Miller, Victor Thomas, Frank Arce, Hugh Walsh, Commander Sheahan, Thomas Cintron, Hazel Derden, Diego DiMarco, and Robert Jewell (hereinafter, "the individual defendants")—either filed or approved allegations of a multitude of disciplinary infractions against plaintiff during his detention in the Jail. (See Defs.' LR 56.1 Resp., ¶ 8; Pl.'s LR 56.1 Resp., ¶ 30.) During his detention at the Jail, plaintiff incurred 151 disciplinary infractions, although, in many of these cases, it was his word against the defendants', and he claims not to have actually committed the underlying offense. (Pl.'s LR 56.1 Resp., ¶ 30.) Based on these disciplinary infractions, the Jail authorities punished plaintiff in various ways,especially by extending his time in segregation. (See Defs.' LR 56.1 Resp., ¶¶ 11-12; Pl.'s LR 56.1 Stmt. of Add'l Facts, Ex. 15, ECF No. 199-15 at 106.) Plaintiff also claims that Jail authorities punished him by restricting phone privileges and access to materials related to his various cases in litigation (Defs.' LR 56.1 Resp., ¶¶ 13-16), and placing him at times on a diet consisting solely of "Nutraloaf," a nutritious but unappetizing meatloaf-like food (id., ¶ 19). Additionally, plaintiff claims that defendants, either personally or by approving or refusing to interfere with the actions of other officers, restricted plaintiff's access to mail and improperly read confidential materials sent to plaintiff in the mail (id., ¶¶ 15-16); interfered with plaintiff's discussions with his criminal defense attorneys by monitoring or recording him (id., ¶ 14); placed plaintiff in a cell with plumbing issues without correcting the plumbing problems (id., ¶ 27); lit plaintiff's cell twenty-four hours per day, even at night, or refused to move him from a cell with a broken light switch or otherwise fix the electrical problem (Pl.'s LR 56.1 Resp., ¶¶ 43-45); and sprayed him with oleoresin capsicum ("OC") spray (i.e. pepper spray) even when he was not threatening harm to officers or other inmates (Defs.' LR 56.1 Resp., ¶ 17). Plaintiff claims that Sheriff Dart was personally aware of these issues, but took no action. (Id., ¶¶ 24, 28-31.)

Plaintiff's complaint contains six counts, all but the last brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on alleged violations of his constitutional rights during his pretrial detention in the Jail: Count I, retaliation for filing grievances in the exercise of First Amendment rights; Count II, violation of procedural due process rights; Count III, violation of plaintiff's equal protection rights; Count IV, violation of plaintiff's Sixth Amendment right of access to the courts; Count V, municipal liability for the deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional rights pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978), based onwidespread practices and Sheriff Dart's knowledge and approval of plaintiff's treatment; and Count VI, indemnification of defendants by Cook County pursuant to state law.

ANALYSIS

"The Court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Wackett v. City of Beaver Dam, 642 F.3d 578, 581 (7th Cir. 2011). The Court may not weigh conflicting evidence or make credibility determinations, but the party opposing summary judgment must point to competent evidence that would be admissible at trial to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact. Omnicare, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., 629 F.3d 697, 705 (7th Cir. 2011); Gunville v. Walker, 583 F.3d 979, 985 (7th Cir. 2009). A genuine dispute is one that could change the outcome of the suit, and is supported by evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to return a favorable verdict for the non-moving party. Spivey v. Adaptive Mktg. LLC, 622 F.3d 816, 822 (7th Cir. 2010).

Defendants seek partial summary judgment on the following grounds: (1) the individual defendants did not violate any of plaintiff's constitutional rights when he was initially placed in segregation; (2) the conditions of confinement of which plaintiff complains were not caused by the retaliation of Cook County Sheriff's officers or by a violation of due process, but by other factors, particularly plaintiff's own behavioral misconduct; (3) plaintiff was not denied access to the courts because the alleged interference with pending legal proceedings did not cause him to any suffer any adverse consequences in those proceedings; (4) plaintiff's equal protection claim fails because other inmates were treated similarly; (5) plaintiff's claim against Sheriff Dart in his individual capacity fails because there is no evidence that Sheriff Dart knew anything about plaintiff, hisplacement in segregation, his grievances, or his disciplinary infractions; and (6) plaintiff's Monell claim fails because he does not establish that Sheriff Dart or the Sheriff's Office had any official policy or widespread practice that caused a violation of plaintiff's rights.

I. INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS AND INITIAL PLACEMENT IN SEGREGATION

The individual defendants, all of whom are Jail officers, some in supervisory roles, argue that plaintiff's initial placement in segregation did not violate his constitutional rights.

A. Retaliation

The individual defendants contend that they are not liable for retaliating against plaintiff based on his initial placement in segregation in December 2007 because they were not involved in the initial decision to place plaintiff in segregation and, in any case, the decision came before plaintiff filed any grievances or lawsuits against Cook County Jail officers. Because, according to defendants, plaintiff did not file his first grievance until after he had already been in segregation for one month, his initial placement in segregation cannot have been in retaliation for filing grievances, based simply on the sequence of events.

Plaintiff does not appear to dispute this contention; indeed, based on the allegations of the operative Second Amended Complaint, it is not clear that he ever intended to rely on this theory of retaliation. But to whatever extent, if at all, plaintiff claims that he was initially placed in segregation in retaliation for protected First Amendment activity, summary judgment is granted for defendants on that part of plaintiff's retaliation claim.

B. Due Process

According to defendants, plaintiff was placed in administrative (not disciplinary) segregation after he was charged with murder on December 8, 2007—and after the ChicagoTribune published a December 9, 2007 article about the crime plaintiff had been charged with committing, which included the detail that plaintiff had previously escaped from federal custody in the Dirksen Federal Building in Chicago in 2002 and was not recaptured for two weeks. (Defs.' LR 56.1 Stmt., ¶ 15.) According to Assistant Executive Director Gilberto Romero, who defendants believe probably made the decision to place plaintiff in segregation (although he does not recall doing so), detainees might be placed in administrative segregation if they were "extremely high risk," i.e., "escapees" or "highly aggressive inmates." (Id. ¶¶ 17-18.) The individual defendants contend that they did not personally make, and did not...