Potts v. Potts

1

SHANNON POTTS, Plaintiff, v. BLYDEN POTTS, Defendant.

No. 3:19-cv-01403

United States District Court, N.D. New York

September 27, 2021

DECISION AND ORDER

THOMAS J. McAVOY, Senior United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Shannon Potts (“Plaintiff”), a Fire Lieutenant with the City of Binghamton Fire Department (“Fire Department”), commenced this diversity action against Defendant Blyden Potts (“Defendant”) Plaintiff's brother. Plaintiff alleges that on November 14, 2018, Defendant sent a defamatory email to the Chief of the Fire Department that “caused the City of Binghamton to suspend Plaintiff from his employment duties from December 27, 2018 through July 30, 2019, without pay.” 2^nd Am. Compl. (“SAC”), Dkt. No. 44 ¶ 28; see Id. ¶ 48 (“As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's November 14, 2018 email to Plaintiff's employer, Plaintiff was suspended from active duty without pay from December 27, 2018 until July 30, 2019 . . . .”). Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant's November 14, 2018 email caused him to undergo “a series of psychological examinations and consultations with various City of Binghamton personnel and a mental health professional, ” id. ¶ 48, to be stripped of his firearms and firearms permit, id. ¶ 49, to suffer the loss of employment income, fringe benefits, and career advancement opportunities, to incur expenses to recover his firearms permit, and to suffer “personal and bodily injuries arising from or exacerbated by the stress of having to fight to keep his job and recover his firearms.” Id. ¶ 50; see Id. ¶ 43;^[1] id. ¶ 60 (“As a direct and proximate result of the Nov. 14, 2018 email sent by Defendant to Plaintiff's employer, Plaintiff has suffered personal injuries and bodily injuries arising from the additional stress caused by the prospect of losing his job, and the reality of having lost all future career advancement potential within the City of Binghamton Fire Department.”).

The SAC asserts three causes of action - tortious interference with contractual relations, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. See generally Id. Defendant moves pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) & (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the SAC. Dkt. No. 60. He argues, inter alia, that the action must be dismissed “because the intentional infliction of emotional distress and interference with contractual relations claims are entirely duplicative of Plaintiff's defamation claim and Plaintiff cannot possibly establish sufficient damages to invoke this Court's diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 USC § 1332 with respect to his remaining defamation claim.” Dkt. No. 60-6, at 1. Defendant maintains that the complained-of actions taken by the Fire Department were the exclusive results of Plaintiff's conduct on December 23, 2018 when he got into an argument with a subordinate firefighter and later made a statement that several firefighters interpreted as a threat to shoot the subordinate f irefighter. Id. at 2. Plaintiff opposes the motion, Dkt. No. 68, and Defendant files a reply. Dkt. No. 69.

II. DISCUSSION

“When presented with motions under both Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the first issue is whether the Court has the subject matter jurisdiction necessary to consider the merits of the action.” Morrell v. WW Int'l, Inc., No. 20-CV-9912 (JGK), 2021 WL 3185608, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2021)(citing Rhulen Agency, Inc. v. Ala. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 896 F.2d 674, 678 (2d Cir. 1990); Abrahams v. App. Div. of the Sup. Ct., 473 F.Supp.2d 550, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff'd on other grounds, 311 Fed.Appx. 474 (2d Cir. 2009); SEC v. Rorech, 673 F.Supp.2d 217, 220-21 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)).

a. Rule 12(b)(1) - Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Plaintiff invokes the Court's diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). SAC ¶ 3. This confers original jurisdiction on the federal district courts with respect to "all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75, 000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between ... citizens of different States." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Defendant argues that diversity jurisdiction is lacking because the damages of which Plaintiff complains were of his own making and not caused by Defendant's conduct. Thus, Defendant contends, Plaintiff fails to adequately allege that the amount in controversy exceeds $75, 000.

Standard of Review

“To prevail against a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the Court's jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” Morrell v. WW Int'l, Inc., No. 20-CV-9912 (JGK), 2021 WL 3185608, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2021)(citing Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000)). “In considering such a motion, the Court generally must accept the material factual allegations in the complaint as true.” Id. (citing J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. Attica Cent. Schs., 386 F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 2004)). The Court does not, however, draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Id. (citing J.S. ex rel. N.S., 386 F.3d at 110 and Graubart v. Jazz Images, Inc., No. 02-cv-4645, 2006 WL 1140724, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2006)).

“Although a plaintiff invoking federal jurisdiction must demonstrate a reasonable probability that the amount-in-controversy requirement is satisfied, [courts] recognize a rebuttable presumption that the face of the complaint is a good faith representation of the actual amount in controversy.” Pyskaty v. Wide World of Cars, LLC, 856 F.3d 216, 223 (2d Cir. 2017)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see Scherer v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of U.S., 347 F.3d 394, 397 (2d Cir. 2003)(Plaintiff's burden of demonstrating to a reasonable probability that the $75, 000 threshold has been satisfied “is hardly onerous," because courts "recognize ‘a rebuttable presumption that the face of the complaint is a good faith representation of the actual amount in controversy.'")(quoting Wolde-Meskel v. Vocational Instruction Project Cmty. Servs., Inc., 166 F.3d 59, 63 (2d Cir. 1999)). “A defendant may rebut that presumption by demonstrating ‘to a legal certainty that the plaintiff could not recover the amount alleged or that the damages alleged were feigned to satisfy jurisdictional minimums.'” Pyskaty, 856 F.3d at 223 (quoting Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 438 F.3d 214, 221 (2d Cir. 2006)(citation and brackets omitted) and citing St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289, 58 S.Ct. 586, 82 L.Ed. 845 (1938) (“It must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal.”); see I. Constr. Mgmt., LLC v. M. Melnick & Co. Inc., No. 20 CIV. 9188 (JPC), 2021 WL 1092354, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2021) (“To rebut this presumption, a defendant must demonstrate ‘that the complaint was so patently deficient as to reflect to a legal certainty that [the plaintiff] could not recover the amount alleged or that the damages alleged were feigned to satisfy jurisdictional minimums.'”)(quoting Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 438 F.3d 214, 221 (2d Cir. 2006)(interior quotation marks and citations omitted)). “The Second Circuit has set a high bar for overcoming the presumption: ‘the legal impossibility of recovery must be so certain as virtually to negate the plaintiff's good faith in asserting the claim.'” I. Constr. Mgmt., 2021 WL 1092354, at *2 (quoting Scherer, 347 F.3d at 397 (alteration omitted))(interior quotation marks and citations omitted).

“[W]here jurisdictional facts are disputed, the Court has the power and the obligation to consider matters outside the pleadings, such as affidavits, documents, and testimony, to determine whether jurisdiction exists.” Morrell, 2021 WL 3185608, at *2 (citing APWU v. Potter, 343 F.3d 619, 627 (2d Cir. 2003) and Kamen v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 791 F.2d 1006, 1011 (2d Cir. 1986)); see Jarvis v. Cuomo, No. 5:14-CV-1459 (LEK/TWD, 2016 WL 278934, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2016), aff'd, 660 Fed.Appx. 72 (2d Cir. 2016)(“When resolving a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), a district court may refer to evidence outside the pleadings without converting the motion into a motion for summary judgment.”)(citing Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000)); Gasery v. Kalakuta Sunrise, LLC, 422 F.Supp.3d 807, 818 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)("Defendants are not limited to the pleadings in overcoming this presumption, and a court ‘may look outside the pleadings to other evidence on the record.'")(quoting United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 919, AFL-CIO v. Centermark Props. Meriden Square Inc., 30 F.3d 298, 305 (2d Cir. 1994)). Although the court may "consider affidavits and other materials beyond the pleadings to resolve the jurisdictional issue," it "may not rely on conclusory or hearsay statements contained in the affidavits." J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. Attica Cent. Schs., 386 F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Where jurisdictional facts are placed in dispute, “the party asserting subject matter jurisdiction ‘has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it exists.'” Tandon v. Captain's Cove Marina of Bridgeport, Inc., 752 F.3d 239, 243 (2d Cir. 2014)(quoting Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113).

Allegations in the SAC

The SAC alleges that on November 14, 2018, Defendant sent an allegedly defamatory email (“November Email”) to the Chief of the Fire Department, Daniel Eggleston (“Chief Eggleston”), regarding Plaintiff in the hope that Pla...