Poullard v. Gateway Buick GMC LLC

MAKELIAH POULLARD, Plaintiff, v. GATEWAY BUICK GMC LLC, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:20-CV-2439-B

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division

September 17, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JANE J. BOYLE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court are Defendant Gateway Buick GMC, LLC (“Gateway”)'s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 45) and Defendant Randy Jones (“Jones”)'s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 46). For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS the motions and DISMISSES Plaintiff Makeliah Poullard (“Poullard”)'s claims. The Court, however GRANTS Poullard leave to amend her complaint to address the deficiencies identified in this Order.

I. BACKGROUND^[1]

This is a civil-rights case. Poullard, who alleges she is innocent was arrested by Defendant Jones for fraudulent use of another's identifying information and detained until the charge against her was eventually dropped. Poullard brings suit premised on this arrest.

In April 2018, Jane Doe, an unidentified black female, purchased a vehicle from Gateway using false credentials. Doc. 42, Am. Compl., ¶¶ 8-9. Eric Brown is the sales associate who sold the vehicle to Jane Doe. Id. ¶ 11. Later, a gentleman named Alvin Sanders was discovered in possession of the vehicle. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. According to Poullard, Sanders acted in concert with Jane Doe to purchase the vehicle. Id. ¶ 11. Sanders was arrested, and in order to determine Jane Doe's identity, police “focused [on] . . . those known to be relatives or associates of” Sanders. Id. ¶¶ 12, 14.

Poullard avers that Jones, a police detective, “settled on a decision early on to closely investigate” her. Id. ¶ 15. Poullard alleges that “[d]espite not having close contact or a close relationship with Sanders, [she] was subjected to increased scrutiny because she was a relative of Sanders and because she was a black female.” Id. Poullard contends that, “[a]t the time that the subject vehicle was purchased by Jane Doe and Sanders, [she] was working her usual shift as an associate at the Waffle House restaurant in the City of Fate, Texas” and therefore could not be Jane Doe. Id. ¶ 22.

It is undisputed that Brown, the sales associate who sold the vehicle to Jane Doe, positively identified Poullard as Jane Doe upon being presented with Poullard's photo by police. Id. ¶ 18; Doc. 46-1, Jones's Ex. 1. Following Brown's identification, Jones swore to an arrest warrant affidavit and obtained a warrant for Poullard's arrest for “[f]raudulent use or possession of [i]dentifying [i]nformation, ” a third-degree felony.^[2] Id. ¶ 20; Doc. 46-2, Jones's Ex. 2. In his arrest warrant affidavit, Jones swears that “Brown picked Poullard out of a photo lineup that . . . consisted of six black females of similar characteristics.” Doc. 46-2, Jones's Ex. 2. However, Poullard alleges that “the only image shown to Brown was the image of [Poullard]” and there was “no other person or suspect from which Brown could choose[.]”^[3] Doc. 42, Am. Compl., ¶ 17. Poullard claims that “Brown, upon seeing the image of [Poullard] and recognizing her as a black female, concluded that Plaintiff must have been Jane Doe and responsible for fraudulently purchasing the subject vehicle based on the information provided to him by detective, ” and therefore identified Poullard as Jane Doe. Id. ¶¶ 18-19. According to Poullard, “in a misguided effort to pin the crime on anyone associated with Sanders[, ]” Jones “misrepresented the process used to identify [her] as a target of his investigation” Id. ¶¶ 20, 24.

On August 22, 2018, pursuant to the warrant, Poullard was arrested while she “was working her usual shift” at Waffle House. Id. ¶ 23. Sometime after her arrest, Jones was indicted by a Rockwall County grand jury for the same offense. Doc. 46-3, Jones's Ex. 3. Ultimately, after spending nine months in jail awaiting trial-and maintaining her innocence throughout-“all charges against [Poullard] in Rockwall County were dismissed and [she] was freed from jail.” Doc. 42, Am. Compl., ¶ 34.

Poullard filed the pending lawsuit on August 21, 2020, bringing claims against Gateway, Jones, the City of Fate, and Lorne Megyesi (then-Mayor of Fate). See Doc. 1, Compl. Each defendant moved to dismiss Poullard's claims in their entirety, and on June 10, 2021, the Court granted Defendants' motions. Doc. 41, Mem. Op. & Order. The Court did, however, grant Poullard leave to amend her complaint as to her claims that were not dismissed with prejudice.^[4] Poullard filed her Amended Complaint (Doc. 42) on July 12, 2012.

Poullard's amended pleading makes just two claims. First, she brings a state claim for malicious prosecution against Gateway. Doc. 42, Am. Compl., ¶¶ 43-48. Second, she brings a constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Jones for false arrest. Id. ¶¶ 45-42. Gateway and Jones have each filed timely motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Each motion is fully briefed and ripe for consideration. The Court considers them below.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). If a plaintiff's complaint fails to state such a claim, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to file a motion to dismiss. In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “[t]he court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re Katrina, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)). The Court will “not look beyond the face of the pleadings to determine whether relief should be granted based on the alleged facts.” Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). However, the Court may “take judicial notice of matters of public record.” Norris v. Hearst, 500 F.3d 454, 461 n.9 (5th Cir. 2007).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff “must plead facts sufficient to show that her claim has substantive plausibility.” Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014). That means “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This standard “is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. When pleaded facts fail to meet this standard, “the complaint has alleged-but it has not shown-that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (quotation marks and alteration omitted).

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15

Courts “should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). But this “generous standard is tempered by the necessary power of a district court to manage a case.” Schiller v. Physicians Res. Grp. Inc., 342 F.3d 563, 566 (5th Cir. 2003). While Rule 15(a) indicates “‘a bias in favor of granting leave to amend,' it is not automatic.” In re Southmark Corp., 88 F.3d 311, 314 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 598 (5th Cir. 1981)). Although the decision to grant leave remains within the district court's discretion, the court must have a “substantial reason” to deny leave. Smith v. EMC Corp., 393 F.3d 590, 595 (5th Cir. 2004). In its discretion, the Court should consider several factors, including “undue delay, bath faith or dilatory motive on the party of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of the allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of the amendment.” Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 864 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)) (alteration in original). Absent one of these factors, the Court should grant leave. Id. (citing Foman, 371 U.S. at 182).

III. ANALYSIS

The Court first considers Gateway's motion and finds that Poullard's malicious prosecution claim should be dismissed. Then, the Court considers Jones's motion and finds that it should be dismissed. Finally, the Court considers Poullard's requests that she be granted leave to amend her complaint, see Doc. 47, Pl.'s Resp. (Gateway) and Doc. 49, Pl.'s Resp. (Jones), and determines that Poullard should be granted leave to amend her claims against Jones, but not Gateway.

A. Gateway's Motion

Poullard brings a state law claim against Gateway for malicious prosecution. See Doc. 42, Am. Compl., ¶¶ 43-48.

As a preliminary matter, Poullard imputes Brown's conduct in identifying Poullard as Jane Doe to Gateway and premises her claims against Gateway largely on this. See Id. ¶¶ 44-47. For the purposes of resolving these motions, the Court assumes without deciding that Brown's conduct may be properly imputed to Gateway.

Gateway challenges Poullard's amended complaint on two grounds. First, Gateway argues that Poullard's malicious prosecution claim is time-barred by the relevant Texas statute of limitations. Doc. 45, Gateway's Mot., 7-8. Second, Gateway argues that Poullard fails to plead facts establishing every element of malicious prosecution.^[5] Id. Though Poullard insists that she has properly pled the elements of malicious prosecution she does not respond to Gateway's contention that her claim is time-barred. See...