Pour v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.

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ROLAND POUR, SR., KMONTEE POUR, and ROLAND POUR, JR., Plaintiffs, v. LIBERTY MUTUAL PERSONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.

No. 22-CV-1502 (PJS/DJF)

United States District Court, D. Minnesota

March 22, 2024

Adam Hagedorn and Charles J. Lloyd, LIVGARD, LLOYD, & CHRISTEL PLLP, for plaintiffs.

Daniel W. Berglund, GROTEFELD HOFFMAN LLP, for defendant.

ORDER

PATRICK J. SCHILTZ, CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Plaintiff Roland Pour, Sr. (“Pour”) and his sons plaintiffs Kmontee Pour (“Kmontee”) and Roland Pour, Jr. (“Roland”), brought this coverage action against defendant Liberty Mutual Personal Insurance Company (“Liberty Mutual”) after the company declined to indemnify Pour for fire damage to his house and declined to indemnify Kmontee and Roland for fire damage to their personal property. This matter is before the Court on the Pours' motion for partial summary judgment and on Liberty Mutual's motion for full summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, the Court denies the Pours' motion and grants Liberty Mutual's.

I. BACKGROUND

The material facts are not in dispute. In 2010, Pour purchased a house in Champlin, Minnesota for use as his primary residence. Pour Exam. 9:6-16, ECF No. 331. Four years later, Pour obtained from Liberty Mutual a homeowner's policy covering the house (“the Policy”). Policy at 2, ECF No. 28-1; ECF No. 33-12 at 1. The Policy defines “named insured” as Pour and “insured” as both Pour and “relatives” of Pour who are “residents of [Pour's] household.” Policy at 8, ECF No. 28-1. The “insured location” is defined in the Policy as the “residence premises.” Policy at 8, ECF No. 28-1. “Residence premises” is, in turn, defined as follows:

8. “Residence premises” means:

a. The one family dwelling, other structures, and grounds; or

b. That part of any other building;

where you reside and which is shown as the “residence premises” in the Declarations. “Residence premises” also means a two family dwelling where you reside in at least one of the family units and which is shown as the “residence premises” in the Declarations.

Policy at 8, ECF No. 28-1 (emphasis added).

The Policy expressly provides coverage for the “dwelling on the ‘residence premises' shown in the Declarations, including structures attached to the dwelling.”

Policy at 8-9, ECF No. 28-1.^[1] The Policy also expressly covers the personal property of “insureds.” The coverage dispute in this case turns on the meaning of the phrase “where you reside”-and, specifically, on whether Pour “reside[d]” in the Champlin home at the time of the fire.

As noted, when Pour bought the Champlin home in 2010, it was his primary-indeed, his only-residence. In 2019, however, Pour moved to Georgia to live with his second wife, and from that point forward Pour lived and worked in Georgia. Pour Exam. 9:3-16, 13:19-23, ECF No. 33-1. Kmontee and Roland-both of whom are adult sons of Pour and his first wife-continued to live in the Champlin house, as they had before Pour moved to Georgia. Pour Depo. 25:4-10, ECF No. 28-2. After moving to Georgia, Pour continued to own the Champlin house and pay its mortgage, property taxes, and insurance premiums, although the utilities were transferred into Kmontee's name. Pour Depo. 30:13-16, 31:19-24, ECF No. 28-2. Pour traveled to Minnesota on a handful of occasions and, when he was in Minnesota, he visited the house, sometimes (but not always) staying overnight at the house. Pour Exam. 24:13-19, 25:2-15, ECF No. 33-1.

On September 5, 2021, a fire damaged the Champlin house, destroyed the attached garage, and damaged the personal property of Pour, Kmontee, and Roland. Pour Exam. 54:5-20, ECF No. 33-1. At the time of the fire, several people lived in the house, including Kmontee and his minor children, Roland, and Pour's ex-wife. Pour Exam. 5:10-15, ECF No. 28-4; Pour Exam. 13:1-12, 17:10-25, ECF No. 33-1. Pour reported the loss to Liberty Mutual, which, after investigation, denied coverage for everything but Pour's personal property. ECF No. 28-7. Liberty Mutual denied coverage for damage to the Champlin house because Pour did not “reside” at the house and therefore the house was not covered as the “residence premises.” ECF No. 28-7. Liberty Mutual also denied coverage for the personal property of Kmontee and Roland because they were not part of the same “household” as Pour and therefore were not “insureds” under the policy. ECF No. 28-7.

In this lawsuit, Pour and his sons challenge Liberty Mutual's determinations.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In ruling on a summary-judgment motion, the Court construes the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Wobig v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ill., 40 F.4th 843, 847 (8th Cir. 2022) (citing Johnson v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ill., 983 F.3d 323, 329 (8th Cir. 2020)). However, “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant].” Rohr v. Reliance Bank, 826 F.3d 1046, 1052 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).

This Court has diversity jurisdiction over this case, and thus Minnesota law controls determinations about the validity and meaning of the Policy. C.S. McCrossan Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 932 F.3d 1142, 1145 (8th Cir. 2019) (citing Jerry's Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Specialty Ins. Co., 845 F.3d 883, 887 (8th Cir. 2017)). This Court is, of course, bound by the Minnesota Supreme Court's decisions regarding Minnesota law. Id. (citing Integrity Floorcovering, Inc. v. Broan-Nutone, LLC, 521 F.3d 914, 917 (8th Cir. 2008)). But “[i]f the Minnesota Supreme Court has not spoken on a particular issue, this court must attempt to predict how the Minnesota Supreme Court would decide an issue and may consider relevant state precedent, analogous decisions, considered dicta and any other reliable data.” Id. (cleaned up).

B. “Residence Premises”

Under Minnesota law, the meaning of an insurance policy is a legal question that is generally determined using the same canons that apply to the interpretation of any contract. Midwest Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wolters, 831 N.W.2d 628, 636 (Minn. 2013). An insurance policy “must be construed as a whole, and unambiguous language must be given its plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. (quoting Henning Nelson Constr. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Am. Life Ins. Co., 383 N.W.2d 645, 652 (Minn. 1986)). Language in an insurance policy is ambiguous only if it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. Wesser v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 989 N.W.2d 294, 299 (Minn. 2023) (quoting King's Cove Marina, LLC v. Lambert Com. Constr. LLC, 958 N.W.2d 310, 316 (Minn. 2021)). Ambiguous terms are construed in favor of the insured. Id. But “[w]here the language is unambiguous, we will not render a construction which is more favorable to finding coverage but will apply the phrase to the facts of the case in order to give effect to the plain meaning of the language.” Firemen's Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J. v. Viktora, 318 N.W.2d 704, 706 (Minn. 1982) (citing Ostendorf v. Arrow Ins. Co., 182 N.W.2d 190, 192 (Minn. 1970)).

1. Residency Requirement

Liberty Mutual argues that the definition of “residence premises” is unambiguous and should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. According to Liberty Mutual, the Champlin house was covered by the Policy only if Pour “resided” at that house. Liberty Mutual concedes that a person can reside in more than one place, and also concedes that its policy covers a residence of the insured, even if the insured has more than one residence. Liberty Mutual argues, however, that the Champlin home was not a residence of Pour-mainly because, after Pour moved to Georgia to live with his new wife, he barely set foot in the Champlin home.

Pour, by contrast, argues that the Policy did not require Pour to “reside” at the Champlin house at the time of the fire. Pour relies on Farmers Ins. Co. of Or. v. Trutanich, a case in which similar-but not identical-language in a homeowner's policy was found to be ambiguous, because it was unclear whether the phrase “where you reside” modified only part of the definition of “residence premises” or the entire definition. 858 P.2d 1332, 1337 (Or.App. 1993). But no such ambiguity is presented in this case. In the Policy, the language and formatting of the clause defining “residence premises” make clear that the phrase “where you reside” modifies both “[t]he one family dwelling, other structures, and grounds” and “[t]hat part of any other building.” Policy at 8, ECF No. 28-1; see State v. Khalil, 956 N.W.2d 627, 635 (Minn. 2021) (a last antecedent separated from a qualifier by a comma is evidence that the qualifier is supposed to apply to all the antecedents).

The Pours next argue that the “where you reside” provision did not impose a continuing condition of coverage, but instead was merely intended to identify the dwelling that was being insured by referring to the dwelling in which the named insured resided on the day the Policy was issued. In other words, as the Pours would have it, the provision was merely providing: “This policy covers the dwelling in which the named insured resided on the day the policy was issued, and that coverage continues even if the named insured moves away and no longer resides in the dwelling.”

In support of their argument, the Pours rely on Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Howard, 679 F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1982). In Howard, the...