Powell v. Mich. Dep't of Corr.

MICHAEL LEON POWELL, Plaintiff, v. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al., Defendants.

Case No. 2:18-cv-221

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN NORTHERN DIVISION

March 5, 2019

Honorable Paul L. Maloney

OPINION

This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's complaint against Defendants Thomas Osier, Unknown Isard, Unknown LaLounde, Unknown Chapman, Unknown Dunton, Thomas Mackie, Timothy Ball, Robert Sharp, Brian Majerczyk, Carol Kenison, Unknown Mucha, Jason Thomas, and Larry Weaver, as legally frivolous. The Court will dismiss Plaintiff's complaint against the Michigan Department of Corrections on grounds of immunity and for failure to state a claim. The Court will dismiss Plaintiff's complaint against Melissa Davenport for failure to state a claim. Finally, the Court will dismiss, for failure to state a claim, Plaintiff's claims against Defendants John Doe #1, John Doe #2, Jane Doe #1, Jane Doe #2, Unknown Mason, Unknown Holden, and Unknown Curtis, EXCEPT: (1) Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to serious mental health needs based on the actions of John Doe #1, Jane Doe #1, Jane Doe #2, Unknown Mason, Unknown Curtis, Unknown Holden, and John Doe #2 in response to Plaintiff's suicide attempts as described in ¶¶ 20-25 of the complaint; and (2) Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims against Jane Doe #1, Jane Doe #2, Unknown Mason, Unknown Curtis, Unknown Holden, and John Doe #2 for hogtieing Plaintiff as described in ¶¶ 21, 24, and 25 of the complaint.

Discussion

I. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Kinross Correctional Facility (KCF) in Kincheloe, Michigan. The events about which he complains, however, occurred at the Oaks Correctional Facility (ECF) in Manistee, Michigan, and the Chippewa Correctional Facility (URF) in Kincheloe, Michigan. Plaintiff bounced back and forth between those facilities during the relevant time period: August of 2016 through April of 2017.

Plaintiff sues the MDOC and MDOC Mental Health Director Thomas Osier. Plaintiff sues several employees of the MDOC at URF: Deputy Warden Unknown Isard; Resident Unit Manager Unknown LaLounde; Assistant Resident Unit Supervisor Unknown Dunton; Psychologist Unknown Chapman; Mental Health Unit Chief John Doe #1; and Nurses Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2. Plaintiff sues several employees of the MDOC at ECF: Warden Thomas Mackie; Deputy Wardens Timothy Ball and Robert Sharp; Mental Health Unit Chief Brian Majerczyk; Psychologist Carol Kenison; Psychologist Case Manager UnknownMucha; Resident Unit Manager Jason Thomas; Assistant Resident Unit Supervisor Larry Weaver; Nurses Unknown Mason and Unknown Curtis; Captain Unknown Holden; Third Shift Lieutenant John Doe #2; and Dr. Melissa Davenport.

Plaintiff alleges that during August, 2016, he was placed in administrative segregation following a misconduct conviction. Plaintiff contends that he suffers from serious mental health issues and that the Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious mental health needs as they kept him in the unbearable, isolating conditions of administrative segregation. Plaintiff claims that Defendants' actions in subjecting him to atypical and significant hardships in administrative segregation violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Plaintiff claims that Defendants deliberate indifference to his serious mental health needs violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel or unusual punishment.

During March of 2017, Plaintiff used a razor to cut into his arm. Defendant John Doe #1, the URF Mental Health Chief, asked Plaintiff why. Plaintiff responded that he was tired of dealing with the pain and that he no longer wanted to live. Despite those statements, John Doe #1 put Plaintiff back in to the segregation cell and provided no treatment.

On March 27, 2017, Plaintiff bit and chewed into a vein in his left arm, trying to kill himself. Defendants Nurses Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 bandaged Plaintiff's wound. With the assistance of corrections officers the nurses stripped and hogtied Plaintiff and left him in his cell.

Hours later, on March 28, 2017, at 12:30 a.m. he removed the bandage. He was taken to the hospital and the wound was sutured. Later that day he was transferred to ECF.

At 5:30 p.m., Plaintiff chewed through the sutures in his arm. Defendant Nurses Mason and Curtis and Captain Holden bandaged the wound, stripped Plaintiff naked, and hogtiedhim. Defendant Third Shift Lieutenant John Doe #2 told Plaintiff that despite the pain of being hogtied, he would not untie Plaintiff. Plaintiff remained hogtied until the early morning hours of March 29, 2017.

Plaintiff alleges that he spent 305 days in segregation before he was released.

In addition to the Eighth Amendment and due process claims referenced above, Plaintiff contends that Defendants discriminated against him because of his mental health disability in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.

II. Res Judicata

This is not Plaintiff's first action alleging these facts. In Powell v. Washington et al., 1:17-cv-82 (W.D. Mich.) (Powell I), Plaintiff alleged virtually identical facts—and some additional facts regarding the unbearable conditions in administrative segregation—in support of Fourteenth Amendment due process, Eighth Amendment, and First Amendment retaliation claims. Plaintiff's allegations in his first complaint included events through January of 2017.

By opinion and judgment entered February 28, 2017, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint on grounds of immunity and failure to state a claim. Powell I (Op. & J., ECF Nos. 5, 6.) Plaintiff appealed that judgment. By order entered December 18, 2017, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in all respects, except one. The Court concluded that Plaintiff had stated a claim under the Eighth Amendment because Plaintiff's segregation cell was inadequately lit for a 35-day period during November and December of 2016. Powell v. Washington et al., No. 17-1262 (6th Cir. Dec. 18, 2017) (Powell I Appeal). The appellate courtremanded the case to this Court for further proceedings with respect to that Eighth Amendment claim. Id. Pretrial proceedings continue in Powell I.

Even though Powell I continues to proceed forward toward a new final judgment, the judgment initially entered is, in part, final. See FCA US, LLC v. Spitzer Autoworld Akron, LLC, 887 F.3d 278, 289-290 (6th Cir. 2018). The portion of the judgment that was affirmed by the Sixth Circuit is final; "only that . . . part of the prior judgment that has been reversed cannot support collateral estoppel." Id. at 289.

The doctrine of claim preclusion, sometimes referred to as res judicata, provides that if an action results in a judgment on the merits, that judgment operates as an absolute bar to any subsequent action on the same cause between the same parties or their privies, with respect to every matter that was actually litigated in the first case, as well as every ground of recovery that might have been presented. Black v. Ryder/P.I.E. Nationwide, Inc., 15 F.3d 573, 582 (6th Cir. 1994); see Kremer v. Chemical Const. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 467 n.6 (1982); see also Bowen v. Gundy, No. 96-2327, 1997 WL 778505, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 8, 1997). Claim preclusion operates to relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 ( 1980). In order to apply the doctrine of claim preclusion, the court must find that (1) the previous lawsuit ended in a final judgment on the merits; (2) the previous lawsuit was between the same parties or their privies; and (3) the previous lawsuit involved the same claim or cause of action as the present case. Allen, 449 U.S. at 94; accord Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981).

With respect to all claims other than the inadequate lighting claim, Powell I ended in a final judgment on the merits. Thirteen of the Defendants in this action—the names listed inbold above—were named in Powell I. Powell I involved Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment due process claims premised on Defendants placing Plaintiff in administrative segregation, and keeping him there, while deliberately depriving him of necessary mental health care from August of 2016 through January of 2017. Accordingly, the Powell I judgment operates as an absolute bar with respect to every claim litigated in that case, as well as every ground of recovery that might have been presented. Therefore, the Court must determine which claims were litigated in Powell I and, of the grounds of recovery presented here, which could have been presented in Powell I.

Plaintiff presents the same Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment due process claims in this action that he presented in Powell I, at least to the extent those claims relate to the Defendants' actions from August of 2016 through January of 2017. The...