Powell v. State

258 Md.App. 436

298 A.3d 966

Lewin Carlton POWELL, III

v.STATE of Maryland

No. 0721, Sept. Term, 2022

Appellate Court of Maryland. *

July 26, 2023

Argued by: Rachel Marblestone Kamins (Natasha Dartigue, Public Defender of Maryland, on the brief), Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant

Argued by: Conor McCarthy (Brian E. Frosh, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, on the brief), Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee

Panel: Arthur, Ripken, Alan M. Wilner (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

Arthur, J.

Under section 7-103(b) of the Criminal Procedure Article ("CP") of the Maryland Code (2001, 2018 Repl. Vol.), a petition for post-conviction relief "may not be filed more than 10 years after the sentence was imposed" "[u]nless extraordinary cause is shown[.]"

In this case, the petitioner's post-conviction counsel attempted to file a petition for post-conviction relief on the eve of the statutory deadline, but negligently failed to ensure that the petition had been accepted for filing in the new MDEC system. When she discovered her error, two days after the deadline had run, she belatedly filed the petition.

The Circuit Court for Baltimore County dismissed the petition, finding no "extraordinary cause" to excuse the late filing. We vacate and remand.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 26, 2009, at the age of 17, appellant Lewin Carlton Powell III entered a guilty plea to one count of first-degree murder. On April 3, 2009, he was sentenced to life imprisonment.

In August 2018, approximately six months before the 10-year deadline for filing a post-conviction petition, Powell obtained post-conviction counsel. Counsel met with Powell on multiple occasions and told him that she would represent him in filing and litigating his post-conviction petition. Counsel knew that the 10-year deadline would run on April 3, 2019, and she intended to file a timely post-conviction petition on Powell's behalf. According to counsel, Powell "had no reason to think he would need to file a petition on his own behalf."

On April 2, 2019, the last day before the 10-year deadline would run, post-conviction counsel attempted to file Powell's post-conviction petition, using MDEC, the court's new electronic filing system.¹ On April 5, 2019, counsel checked MDEC, because she realized that she had not received confirmation of the filing. She discovered that she had not succeeded in filing the petition. She explained that she "must have failed to hit submit—or failed to do something else MDEC requires—because it did not get filed that day." She immediately filed the petition without any substantive changes. The petition was late by two days.

Counsel continued to work on Powell's case in the hope that the State would consent to an adjudication on the merits despite the late filing. On September 20, 2019, however, an Assistant State's Attorney informed counsel that "he would not be able to waive" the State's objection.

On July 12, 2021, Powell, through new counsel, filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief. In that petition, Powell argued he could demonstrate extraordinary cause, which would excuse the late filing of his original petition.

On September 10, 2021, the circuit court held a hearing on Powell's amended petition. In brief, Powell argued that he had a statutory right to the effective assistance of counsel in filing his post-conviction petition, that counsel's error had deprived him of that right, and that the deprivation amounted to extraordinary cause. The State countered that "failing to me[et] the deadline through ordinary course" did not qualify as extraordinary cause under CP section 7-103(b).

The court agreed with Powell that the late filing occurred because of the attorney's error, but disagreed that the error rose to the level of extraordinary cause to excuse the late filing.

Powell filed an application for leave to appeal, which we granted.

QUESTION PRESENTED

On appeal, Powell presents one question, which we have rephrased: Did the court err in ruling that post-conviction counsel's negligent failure to file a timely postconviction petition did not qualify as "extraordinary cause" under CP section 7-103(b) ?²

For the reasons set forth below, we hold the court erred in dismissing Powell's post-conviction petition as untimely, because the ineffective assistance of his postconviction counsel qualified as extraordinary cause.

DISCUSSION

Under the Maryland Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act ("UPPA"), CP §§ 7-101 to -301, a person who has been convicted of a crime and is either confined or on parole or probation may commence a post-conviction proceeding to challenge the validity of a conviction.

Before 1995, the UPPA permitted the filing of a post-conviction proceeding "at any time." Since October 1, 1995, however, the UPPA has stated that, "[u]nless extraordinary cause is shown," a petition for post-conviction relief "may not be filed more than 10 years after the sentence was imposed." CP § 7-103(b).

This case turns on the meaning of "extraordinary cause," a term that is not defined in the UPPA. " ‘When we are called upon to interpret any statute, we first examine the ordinary meaning of the enacted language, reading the statute as a whole to avoid an interpretation that might nullify another part of the statute.’ " Martinez v. Ross , 245 Md. App. 581, 590, 227 A.3d 667 (2020) (quoting Richard Beavers Constr., Inc. v. Wagstaff , 236 Md. App. 1, 14, 180 A.3d 211 (2018) ); accord Gateway Terry, LLC v. Prince George's County , 253 Md. App. 457, 467, 268 A.3d 908 (2022). "[T]o understand the meaning of statutory language, we must look beyond individual words and clauses to the larger context, including other surrounding provisions and the apparent purpose of the enactment." Trim v. YMCA of Cent. Maryland, Inc. , 233 Md. App. 326, 334-35, 165 A.3d 534 (2017) ; accord Martinez v. Ross , 245 Md. App. at 591, 227 A.3d 667.

The UPPA, in which the term "extraordinary cause" appears, was designed "to streamline ‘into one simple statute all the remedies, beyond those that are incident to the usual procedures of trial and review, which are ... present[ly] available for challenging the validity of a sentence.’ " Douglas v. State , 423 Md. 156, 175, 31 A.3d 250 (2011) (quoting State v. Zimmerman, 261 Md. 11, 24, 273 A.2d 156 (1971) ) (further citation omitted). Thus, the UPPA has the attributes of a remedial statute, which should be construed liberally in favor of claimants. See Kranz v. State , 459 Md. 456, 470, 187 A.3d 66 (2018) (citing Haas v. Lockheed Martin Corp. , 396 Md. 469, 495, 914 A.2d 735 (2007) ).

The parties agree that the meaning of "extraordinary cause" is a question of law for a court to decide. So do we. See , e.g ., Baltimore County v. Ulrich , 244 Md. App. 410, 425, 223 A.3d 1111 (2020) ; Richard Beavers Constr., Inc. v. Wagstaff , 236 Md. App. at 13, 180 A.3d 211. Consequently, we review the circuit court's interpretation of the term without deference.

A number of reported decisions have interpreted the term "extraordinary cause" in other contexts. We begin with a review of those decisions to see what light, if any, they shed on the meaning of "extraordinary cause" in CP section 7-103.

In State v. Hicks , 285 Md. 310, 403 A.2d 356 (1979), the Court considered the meaning of "extraordinary cause" in former Rule 746, which required a criminal trial to begin within 120 days of the appearance or waiver of counsel or the appearance of defendant, but permitted the administrative judge or a designee to change the trial date "for extraordinary cause shown."³ The rule implemented a statutory directive, which required that a criminal trial begin "not later than six months" from the arraignment or the appearance or the appointment of counsel for the accused, "whichever occurs first," and prohibited postponements "except for extraordinary cause shown." Md. Code (1971), art. 27, § 591.⁴ The Court viewed the statute as "a declaration of legislative policy designed to obtain prompt disposition of criminal charges" and as a manifestation of the "legislature's recognition of the detrimental effects to our criminal justice system which result from excessive delay in scheduling criminal cases for trial and in postponing scheduled trials for inadequate reasons." State v. Hicks , 285 Md. at 316, 403 A.2d 356.

On the merits, the Court explained that "[d]etermining what constitutes ‘extraordinary cause’ under Rule 746" depended upon "the facts and circumstances of each case." State v. Hicks , 285 Md. at 319, 403 A.2d 356. In the Court's view, however, "extraordinary cause" "[c]learly" meant "cause beyond what is ordinary, usual or commonplace" or cause that "exceeds the common order or rule and is not regular or of the customary kind." Id.

In Hicks , the defendant was incarcerated in Delaware on the scheduled date of the trial, which was shortly before the end of the 120-day period. Id. at 313, 403 A.2d 356. The defendant had not consented to return to Maryland for his trial, but he would be released and could be taken into custody in a month. Id. at 314, 403 A.2d 356. Because the defendant could not be tried in absentia , the circuit court postponed his case. Id. As soon as the 120 days had passed, however, the defendant moved to dismiss the charges. Id. The circuit court granted the motion, finding that the State had not demonstrated "extraordinary cause" to postpone the trial date beyond the 120-day deadline. Id. at 315, 403 A.2d 356.

On appeal, the Court reversed. It reasoned that, under the common law (as preserved by Article 5 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights), a criminal defendant has the right to be present at every stage of the trial. Id. at 319, 403 A.2d 356 (citing Bunch v. State , 281 Md. 680, 683-84, 381 A.2d 1142 (1978) ). "Thus," the Court held, "where the defendant does not appear for trial, through no fault of his own or of the State, ‘extraordinary cause’ for a postponement would plainly appear to exist." Id. The Court was undisturbed that ...