Pramuk v. Purdue Calumet Univ.

SUSAN E. PRAMUK, Plaintiff, v. PURDUE CALUMET UNIVERSITY, Defendant.

NO. 2:12-CV-77

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA HAMMOND DIVISION

DATED: December 13, 2012

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, filed by Purdue Calumet University on May 11, 2012, and Plaintiff's Motion for Damages filed on December 6, 2012. For the reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiff's claim pursuant to the Age Discrimination Act is DISMISSED without prejudice due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. All other claims are DISMISSED with prejudice. Plaintiff's Motion for Damages filed December 6, 2012, is DENIED AS MOOT.

BACKGROUND

On February 22, 2012, pro se Plaintiff, Susan E. Pramuk ("Pramuk"), filed a complaint against Defendant, Purdue Calumet University ("Purdue"). Pramuk filed an amended complaint onApril 11, 2012, utilizing a form provided by the Clerk's Office designed for pro se litigants to use when bringing an employment discrimination lawsuit. She indicates, by initialing the lines to the left of various entries, that she is bringing her lawsuit pursuant to the following statutes: (1) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5) ("Title VII"); (2) The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (29 U.S.C. § 621) ("ADEA"); (3) The Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. § 12101) ("ADA"); (4) The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 701, et seq.) ("Rehabilitation Act"); and (5) 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Under "other" Pramuk specifies that her Rehabilitation Act claim is brought under Section 504, and her ADA claim is brought under Title II. The amended complaint itself contains almost no facts. In the section that is designed for a pro se plaintiff to present facts, Pramuk has instead provided citations to statutes and statutory language.

What can be gleaned from the amended complaint is that Pramuk, who was once a student at Purdue, believes Purdue discriminated against her due to her age and disability. She filed two complaints with the U.S. Department of Education. The following summary of her claims is taken from the July 19, 2010, letter from the United States Department of Education Office forCivil Rights ("OCR"), which is attached to her complaint:

1. In fall 2009, the University denied [Pramuk] the necessary academic adjustments of alternate arrangements for submitting papers and a waiver of attendance rules and the necessary auxiliary aid of books on tape.

2. In fall 2009, instructors in a Social Psychology course and an Organizational Behavior course did not provide [Pramuk] with study guides or test answers and also gave [Pramuk] lower grades than [she] deserved;

3. In fall 2009, instructors in Social Psychology course and an Organizational Behavior course created tests that they knew would be more difficult for [Pramuk] than for other students;

4. In spring 2010, the University's Financial Aid Office inappropriately billed [Pramuk] $1600;

5. In spring 2010, the University did not provide [Pramuk] the necessary auxiliary aid of books on tape in [Pramuk's] Introduction to Criminal Justice, Essentials of Nutrition, Juvenile Delinquency, and Spanish Level I courses; and

6. In spring 2010, [Pramuk] did not receive lecture notes provided to all other students in a Nutrition course.

(DE 4 at 4). The OCR determined that the evidence gathered was insufficient to establish that Purdue violated Section 504 ofthe Rehabilitation Act, Title II of the ADA, or the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6102-6103 ("Age Discrimination Act"). There is no evidence that Pramuk filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or the Indiana Civil Rights Commission.

In the instant motion, Purdue moves to dismiss each of Pramuk's claims. Pramuk did not file a response to the instant motion, even after this Court sua sponte extended the deadline to file a response and notified Pramuk of her obligation to respond. Accordingly, the motion is fully briefed and ripe for adjudication.

On December 6, 2012, Pramuk filed a Motion for Damages in which she makes reference to the statutes that serve as the basis for this lawsuit without any further argument or legal support. Defendant responded to the motion noting that Pramuk failed to provide any facts or authority in support of her motion. This motion is also fully briefed and ripe for adjudication.

DISCUSSION

In determining the propriety of dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept allfacts alleged in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Johnson v. Rivera, 272 F.3d 519, 520 (7th Cir. 2001). A complaint is not required to contain detailed factual allegations, but it is not enough merely that there might be some conceivable set of facts that entitles the plaintiff to relief. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007), abrogating in part Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). A plaintiff has an obligation under Rule 8(a)(2) to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief, which requires more than labels and conclusions. Id. at 1965. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss should be granted if the complaint fails to include sufficient facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Factual allegations, taken as true, must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Id. Moreover, a plaintiff may plead himself out of court if the complaint includes allegations that show he cannot possibly be entitled to the relief sought. Jefferson v. Ambroz, 90 F.3d 1291, 1296-97 (7th Cir. 1996).

Pramuk's Title VII Claim

Title VII provides that "it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to . . . discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Moreover, the existence of an employment relationship at the time of the discrimination complained of is a necessary prerequisite to bringing a claim under Title VII. Id.

In her Amended Complaint, Pramuk failed to allege an employment relationship between herself and Purdue. She also failed to allege that she is a member of a protected class under Title VII. In her Amended Complaint, Pramuk alleged that she was discriminated against based on her age and physical disability; not her race, color, religion, sex, or national origin as required by the statute. As such, she has failed to state a valid claim against Purdue under Title VII.

Pramuk's ADEA Claim

The ADEA provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for an employer to. . . discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). Pramuk has failed to state a valid claim under the ADEA for the same reason that her Title VII claim failed; she did not allege an employment relationship between herself and Purdue in her Amended Complaint.

Pramuk's Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981

42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) provides that "[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right[s] in every state and territory . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens." The United States Supreme Court has interpreted this statutory language as requiring intentional discrimination based on race or ethnicity for a claim brought under Section 1981 to be viable. See Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987) ("Congress intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics. Such discrimination is racialdiscrimination that Congress intended § 1981 to forbid."). See also Abdullahi v. Prada USA Corp. , 520 F.3d 710, 712 (7th Cir. 2008). Because Pramuk has failed to allege that she is a member of a class protected under Section 1981, she fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Pramuk's Claim Under Section 504 of The Rehabilitation Act

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794, which provides that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of his or her disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). A Claim brought in federal court under 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) is governed by the statute of limitations for personal injury claims of the state in which the federal court is sitting. Conley v. Village of Bedford Park, 215 F.3d 703, 710, n.5 (7th Cir. 2000). Under Indiana law, a personal injury claim must be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4.

In her Amended Complaint, Pramuk alleged that the discriminatory conduct occurred in the fall of 2009. (Am.Compl., p. 3). Thus, Pramuk had until sometime in the fall of 2011 to bring her claim. Pramuk did not file her complaint with this Court until February 22, 2012. As a result, Pramuk's claim is untimely unless there is some basis for tolling the statute of limitations so as to cure the untimely filing.

The statute of limitations can be tolled when a plaintiff is required to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing a claim in federal court. Johnson v. Ry. Exp. Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 465-66 (1975). However, when a plaintiff elects to exhaust administrative remedies, but is not required to do so, the statute of limitations will not be tolled. Id. at 461. Furthermore, claims brought under 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), are subject to "[t]he remedies, procedures, and rights...