Presnell v. Snap-On Securecorp, Inc.

583 F.Supp.3d 702

James PRESNELL, Plaintiff,

v.SNAP-ON SECURECORP, INC., Defendant.

1:20CV234

United States District Court, M.D. North Carolina.

Signed February 1, 2022

Timothy A. Sheriff, Crumley Roberts, LLP, Charlotte, NC, for Plaintiff.

Charles K. Seyfarth, Mary Grace Miller, O'Hagan Meyer, PLLC, Richmond, VA, Aretina K. Samuel-Priestley, O'Hagan Meyer, PLLC, Charlotte, NC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

OSTEEN, JR., District Judge This matter comes before the court on the Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. 24), filed by Defendant Snap-On Securecorp, Inc. For the reasons stated herein, this court will grant the Motion to Dismiss.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On a motion to dismiss, a court must "accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint ...." Ray v. Roane, 948 F.3d 222, 226 (4th Cir. 2020). The facts, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, are as follows.

Plaintiff James Presnell ("Plaintiff") is a resident of High Point, North Carolina. (Am. Compl. (Doc. 23) ¶ 1.)¹ Plaintiff has been a mechanic for over thirty years. (Id. ¶ 6.) Defendant Snap-On Securecorp, Inc. ("Defendant") sells hammers and similar products. (Id. ¶ 3.)

On November 9, 2018, Plaintiff purchased a Snap-On HBBD32 32oz. Ball Peen Soft Grip Dead Blow Hammer from Defendant at its store on Meadowview Road in Greensboro, North Carolina. (Id. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff regularly uses tools like ball peen hammers to work on vehicles as part of his job. (Id. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff used the ball peen hammer to knock a ball joint out of a pickup truck. (Id. ) Defendant's website describes the intended uses of the ball-peen hammer as for "[r]ear drums, ball joints, tie rods and rounded end U-joints, track bar and rivets ...." (Id. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff wielded the hammer in his right hand and hit the ball joint with the flat ball side of the ball peen hammer. (Id. ¶ 7.)

When Plaintiff used the ball peen hammer to knock out the ball joint on the pickup truck, a metal piece from the head of the hammer broke off, (id. ¶ 11), and lodged itself in Plaintiff's left forearm, (id. ¶ 14). Plaintiff went to the hospital as well as an orthopedist for treatment. (Id. ¶¶ 15-16.) Plaintiff developed inflammation and pain after the incident. (Id. ¶ 16.)

The ball peen hammer's handle contains the following warning: "WEAR SAFETY GOGGLES OPERATOR AND BYSTANDERS. Do not use chipped or mushroomed tools. This tool can be made to chip if stuck against another tool or hard object, possibly resulting in eye or other bodily injury." (Am. Compl. (Doc. 23) at Ex. A.) Additionally, Defendant's website contains the following warning:

(Am. Compl. (Doc. 23) at Ex. B.) Further explanation of these warnings is also provided on Defendant's website:

(Ex. 1 (Doc. 24-1) at 5.)

Additionally, Defendant's Terms and Conditions on its website contain the following disclaimer language:

THE FOREGOING WARRANTY IS IN LIEU OF AND EXCLUDES ALL OTHER WARRANTIES NOT EXPRESSLY SET FORTH HEREIN, WHETHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, BY OPERATION OF LAW OR OTHERWISE, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. Descriptions of Product contained in this website are for the sole purpose of identifying Product and shall not be construed as an express warranty.

(Ex. 2 (Doc. 24-2) at 2.)²

On January 31, 2020, Plaintiff filed his Complaint in Guilford County Superior Court. (Doc. 4.) Defendant removed to this court, (Doc. 1), and filed a Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. 7). This court granted that motion and gave Plaintiff leave to amend his Complaint. (Doc. 19.) Plaintiff moved to amend his Complaint, (Doc. 20), and this court granted that motion, (Doc. 22).

On May 13, 2021, Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint. (Am. Compl. (Doc. 23).) Defendant moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint, (Doc. 24), and filed a brief in support, (Def.’s Br. (Doc. 25)). Plaintiff responded, (Pl.’s Br. in Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 26)), and Defendant replied, (Reply in Supp. of Snap-On's Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 27)). This matter is ripe for adjudication.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). To be facially plausible, a claim must "plead[ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable" and must demonstrate "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). When ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court must accept the complaint's factual allegations as true. Id. Further, the complaint and facts alleged therein are viewed "in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Burgess v. Goldstein, 997 F.3d 541, 562-63 (4th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).

Nevertheless, the factual allegations must be sufficient to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level" so as to "nudge[ ] the[ ] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680, 129 S.Ct. 1937. A court cannot "ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege any facts which set forth a claim." Estate of Williams-Moore v. All. One Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 335 F. Supp. 2d 636, 646 (M.D.N.C. 2004). Consequently, even given the deferential standard allocated to the pleadings at the motion to dismiss stage, a court will not accept mere legal conclusions as true and "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, [will] not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff brings four claims against Defendant: (1) failure to warn; (2) breach of express warranty; (3) breach of implied warranty of merchantability; and (4) breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. (Am. Compl. (Doc. 23) ¶¶ 21-56.)

A. Failure to Warn

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's failure to warn claim because Plaintiff fails to plead facts plausibly alleging that a lack of warning caused Plaintiff's injuries, and because Plaintiff relies on Defendant's website which includes the warnings Plaintiff alleges he did not receive. (Def.’s Br. (Doc. 25) at 5-9.)

Under North Carolina law,

(a) No manufacturer or seller of a product shall be held liable in any product liability action for a claim based upon inadequate warning or instruction unless the claimant proves that the manufacturer or seller acted unreasonably in failing to provide such warning or instruction, that the failure to provide adequate warning or instruction was a proximate cause of the harm for which damages are sought, and also proves one of the following:

(1) At the time the product left the control of the manufacturer or seller, the product, without an adequate warning or instruction, created an unreasonably dangerous condition that the manufacturer or seller knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, posed a substantial risk of harm to a reasonably foreseeable claimant.

(2) After the product left the control of the manufacturer or seller, the manufacturer or seller became aware of or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known that the product posed a substantial risk of harm to a reasonably foreseeable user or consumer and failed to take reasonable steps to give adequate warning or instruction or to take other reasonable action under the circumstances.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99B-5(a) ; City of High Point v. Suez Treatment Sols. Inc., 485 F. Supp. 3d 608, 632 (M.D.N.C. 2020) (dismissing failure to warn claim). There is also a common law duty to warn: "a manufacturer is under an obligation to provide warnings of any dangers associated with the product's use ‘sufficiently intelligible and prominent to reach and protect all those who may reasonably be expected to come into contact with [the product].’ " Nicholson v. Am. Safety Util. Corp., 124 N.C. App. 59, 65, 476 S.E.2d 672, 676 (1996) (alteration in original) (quoting Ziglar v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 53 N.C. App. 147, 155, 280 S.E.2d 510, 516, disc. review denied, 304 N.C. 393, 285 S.E.2d 838 (1981) ); accord Lightfoot v. Georgia-Pacific Wood Prods., LLC, 441 F. Supp. 3d 159, 170 (E.D.N.C. 2020).

Liability arises for a supplier of a product, "if the supplier (a) knows, or from facts known to him should realize, that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied; (b) and has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous condition; and (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition or of the facts which make it likely to be so."

Lightfoot, 441 F. Supp. 3d at 170-71 (quoting Stegall v. Catawba Oil Co. of N.C., 260 N.C. 459, 464, 133 S.E.2d 138, 142 (1963) ). Proximate causation is also required. Stegall, 260 N.C. at 464, 133 S.E.2d at 142.

This court finds Plaintiff fails to allege any facts that would allow this court to draw the reasonable inference that Defendant's failure to warn of the risk of harm from striking an object with the ball peen hammer caused Plaintiff harm. Plaintiff only alleges that "[t]he aforesaid incident and injury was caused by the negligent warning instruction of the Defendant .... Accordingly, Defendant is liable under the product liability statute ... for all injuries and damages suffered by Plaintiff ...." (Am. Compl. (Doc. 23) ¶¶ 31-32.) Plaintiff's allegation that the warranty was deficient is not only conclusory but also contradicted by Plaintiff's factual allegations. Plaintiff alleges that the ball peen hammer contained a warning stating that the "tool can be made to chip ... possibly resulting in ... bodily injury." (Am....