Price v. Dixon

1

JENNIFER NICOLE PRICE, Petitioner, v. RICKY DIXON, Respondent.

No. 3:22-cv-5379-MCR-MJF

United States District Court, N.D. Florida, Pensacola Division

March 10, 2023

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Michael J. Frank, United States Magistrate Judge

Petitioner Jennifer Nicole Price, proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Doc. 1. Respondent (“the State”) answered providing relevant portions of the state court record. Doc 16. Price replied. Doc. 18. The undersigned concludes that no evidentiary hearing is required for the disposition of this matter, and that Price is not entitled to habeas relief.^[1]

I. Background Facts and Procedural History

On May 17, 2018, Price was charged in Escambia County Circuit Court Case No. 2018-CF-002338, with four crimes: (1) Trafficking in Amphetamine or Methamphetamine (28 Grams or More, Less than 200 Grams); (2) Possession of a Controlled Substance (Synthetic Cannabinoid); (3) Possession of Drug Paraphernalia; and (4) Driving While License Revoked as a Habitual Traffic Offender. Doc. 16, Ex. A at 7-9.^[2]Prior to trial, the State nolle prossed Count 2. Ex. A at 49.

Price went to trial on the remaining charges on December 10-11, 2018, and was found guilty as charged. Ex. A at 29 (Verdict); Id. at 49-58 (J. & Sentence). The trial court sentenced Price on Count 1 to 10 years of imprisonment with a 7-year mandatory minimum. Ex. A at 49-58. On Counts 3 and 4, the trial court sentenced Price to 1 year in the county jail and 60 days in the county jail, respectively, to run concurrent with Price's 10-year sentence. Id. at 49-58. On January 6, 2020, the First DCA affirmed the judgment without written opinion. Price v. State, 286 So.3d 252 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (per curiam) (Table) (copy at Ex. F).

Price filed two motions to modify or reduce sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(c). Ex. A at 78; Ex. H. Both motions were denied. Ex. A at 80; Ex. I. On May 19, 2020, Price filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, which she subsequently amended. Ex. J at 6-19 (Mot.); Id. at 23-36 (Am. Mot.). The state circuit court summarily denied relief. Ex. J at 37-59. The First DCA affirmed without written opinion. Price v. State, 319 So.3d 627 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (per curiam) (copy at Ex. M). The mandate issued July 19, 2021. (Ex. N).

Price filed her federal habeas petition on April 28, 2022. Doc. 1. The petition raises two claims: a trial-court error claim and an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. Id. at 3-5. The State asserts that Price is not entitled to habeas relief because she procedurally defaulted her first claim, and she fails to satisfy § 2254(d)'s demanding standard for the claim she properly exhausted. Doc. 16.

II. Relevant Legal Principles

A. Federal Habeas Exhaustion Requirement and Procedural Default

“To respect our system of dual sovereignty, the availability of habeas relief is narrowly circumscribed.” Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S.___, 142 S.Ct. 1718, 1730 (2022) (citations omitted). One such constraint is the exhaustion requirement and corollary principle of procedural default. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); Shinn, 142 S.Ct. at 1731-32.

Section 2254 “requires state prisoners to ‘exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State' before seeking federal habeas relief.” Shinn, 142 S.Ct. at 1732 (alteration adopted) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A)). “To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must have fairly presented the substance of h[er] federal claim” to the state's highest court, either on direct appeal or on collateral review. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989). In other words, “state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process.” O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999).

When a petitioner fails to exhaust her federal claim and the state court remedy no longer is available, that failure to exhaust is a procedural default. Boerckel, 526 U.S. at 839-40; see also Bailey v. Nagle, 172 F.3d 1299, 1303 (11th Cir. 1999) (when a petitioner fails to properly exhaust a federal claim in state court, and it is obvious that the unexhausted claim now would be procedurally barred under state law, the claim is procedurally defaulted).

Together, exhaustion and procedural default promote federal-state comity. Exhaustion affords States an initial opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of prisoners' federal rights, and procedural default protects against the significant harm to the States that results from the failure of federal courts to respect state procedural rules. Ultimately, it would be unseemly in our dual system of government for a federal district court to upset a state court conviction without giving an opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional violation, and to do so consistent with their own procedures.

Shinn, 142 S.Ct. at 1732 (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

A petitioner seeking to overcome a procedural default must “demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claim[ ] will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); Lucas v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 682 F.3d 1342, 1352-53 (11th Cir. 2012). A petitioner establishes “cause” by showing that an objective factor external to the defense impeded an effort to properly raise the claim in the state court. Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 892 (11th Cir. 2003). A petitioner establishes “prejudice” by showing at least a reasonable probability that the proceeding's result would have been different. Id. at 892.

To satisfy the miscarriage of justice exception, the petitioner must show that “a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). “To establish the requisite probability, the petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted h[er].” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. The Schlup standard is very difficult to meet:

a substantial claim that constitutional error has caused the conviction of an innocent person is extremely rare. To be credible, such a claim requires [a] petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence-whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence-that that was not presented at trial.

513 U.S. at 327.

B. Section 2254 Standard of Review

A federal court “shall not” grant a habeas corpus petition on any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The United States Supreme Court explained the framework for § 2254 review in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).^[3]Justice O'Connor described the appropriate test:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.

529 U.S. at 412-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

Under the Williams framework, the federal court first must determine the “clearly established Federal law,” namely, “the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court render[ed] its decision.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). After identifying the governing legal principle, the federal court determines whether the state court's adjudication is contrary to the clearly established Supreme Court case law. The adjudication is “contrary” only if either the reasoning or the result contradicts the relevant Supreme Court cases. See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (“Avoiding th[e] pitfalls [of § 2254(d)(1)] does not require citation to our cases - indeed, it does not even require awareness of our cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.”).

If the “contrary to” clause is not satisfied, the federal court determines whether the state court “unreasonably applied” the governing legal principle set forth in the Supreme Court's cases. The federal court defers to the state court's reasoning unless the state court's application of the legal principle was “objectively unreasonable” in light of the record before the state court. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 409; Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 652 (2004). “[E]ven a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011).

Section 2254(d) also allows habeas relief for a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court where that adjudication “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). As with the “unreasonable application” clause, the federal court applies...