Price v. Labor Comm'n

504 P.3d 723

Zola Mae PRICE, Petitioner,

v.LABOR COMMISSION, Douglas Knell Enterprises Inc., and WCF Insurance, Respondents.

No. 20210026-CA

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Filed December 16, 2021

Virginius Dabney, St. George, UT, and Stony Olsen, Attorneys for Petitioner

Eugene C. Miller Jr., Attorney, Salt Lake City, UT, for Respondents

Douglas Knell Enterprises Inc. and WCF Insurance

Judge Ryan M. Harris authored this Opinion, in which

Judges Gregory K. Orme and David N. Mortensen concurred.

Opinion

HARRIS, Judge

¶1 In this case, we are asked to determine whether an injured worker who settled her contested claim for permanent total disability benefits can later seek additional compensation that was not contemplated in the settlement agreement. The Labor Commission rejected Zola Mae Price's efforts to do so, determining that she should be held to the benefits of her bargain. We decline to disturb the Commission's determination.

BACKGROUND¹

¶2 In 1995, Price worked for Douglas Knell Enterprises Inc. (DKE), a company that owned a motel. One day, while carrying heavy motel linens to launder, Price's "spine gave out." The resultant injuries necessitated surgery, and DKE paid temporary total disability benefits. Later, however, Price filed a claim for permanent total disability (PTD) benefits. While DKE did not contest Price's claim that she had been injured on the job, and did not contest its obligation to pay temporary total disability benefits, it did contest Price's claim that she was permanently and totally disabled, and denied any obligation to pay PTD benefits.

¶3 Rather than proceed to an evidentiary hearing on the merits of Price's PTD claim, the parties entered into a stipulated settlement agreement resolving that claim. The agreement was titled "Agreement for Permanent Total Disability and Order of Approval Based upon Claim of Disputed Validity," and it purported to represent a "full and final settlement of any and all claims for workers' compensation benefits which [Price] has against [DKE] arising out of [Price's] industrial accident."

¶4 In the agreement, the parties acknowledged that Price had "sustained personal injuries as a result of an industrial accident arising out of and in the course of her employment," but the agreement specifically recited that "the parties disagree as to whether or not [Price] is permanently and totally disabled." The agreement also recited that Price had undergone a vocational assessment in which the evaluator had noted Price's "lack of interest in a number of jobs" and that "motivation and attitude are both important factors to success" in employment. Indeed, Price "expressly acknowledge[d]" in the agreement that DKE was "not admitting any liability whatsoever," and the agreement further recited that DKE was agreeing to make certain payments only "to avoid further litigation between the parties."

¶5 Finally, in the concluding paragraph, the agreement recited that Price had "carefully read and [understood]" the agreement and that she had "been advised by her own legal counsel" in the matter. Price acknowledged that, by entering into the agreement, she was "giving up the right to a hearing" in which "an administrative law judge could give her more money, the same amount, or less money than" she was to receive pursuant to the agreement. And Price also acknowledged that she could "never contest" or "re-open the terms" of the settlement, and that it was "a final and binding agreement." Simply put, "except for ... amounts to be paid pursuant" to the settlement, the agreement provided that DKE would "have no additional liability to [Price] as a result of the accident." Price and her attorney both executed the agreement in December 1997.

¶6 Under the settlement, Price was to receive weekly monetary payments "for so long as [she should] live." After acknowledging that—if the matter proceeded to a hearing and she were found to be permanently and totally disabled—Price "could be" entitled to $167 per week in benefits, the parties outlined the agreed-upon terms. Beginning in November 1997, Price was to receive $95 per week for 312 weeks, then $80 per week thereafter, subject to one condition: once Price began receiving Social Security retirement benefits, the amount of her weekly settlement payments would be "off-set in the amount of 50% of her Social Security retirement benefits."

¶7 After entering into the settlement agreement, the parties asked a Labor Commission administrative law judge to approve it, as they were required to do under then-applicable Labor Commission regulations. See Utah Admin. Code R568-1-16 (1995) ("Settlement agreements involving claims of doubtful compensability shall be subject to approval by the Commission."). The judge approved the settlement in a two-page order in January 1998. The record before us does not reveal whether the judge held a hearing to consider the matter, and does not reveal what materials the judge considered before signing the order. At the outset of his order, the judge "recogniz[ed] the disputed nature of [Price's] claim," and "ordered and acknowledged that this is a settlement of a disputed claim." The judge approved all the specific terms agreed upon by the parties, including the weekly payment amount and the condition reducing Price's weekly payments upon receiving Social Security retirement benefits.

¶8 The parties operated under the terms of the settlement agreement, without apparent complaint or complication, for the next twenty-two years: Price received settlement payments of $95 per week for the first 312 weeks, then $80 per week until 2012, when Price became eligible to receive Social Security retirement benefits; after that point, the payments were reduced to $8 per week due to the agreed-upon offset.

¶9 In July 2020, however, Price filed a new claim with the Commission requesting increased payments related to the 1995 accident. Price argued that her payments under the settlement agreement were too low and should be adjusted accordingly. Among other things, she asserted that the payments failed to account for the statutory minimum weekly compensation rates afforded for permanent total disability awards, and thus claimed that her monthly payments should be "adjusted in accordance with the" statutory guidelines. In addition, she asserted that the Social Security offset was improper, in light of the Utah Supreme Court's 2009 decisions declaring such offsets unconstitutional. See Merrill v. Utah Labor Comm'n (Merrill I ), 2009 UT 26, 223 P.3d 1089 ; Merrill v. Utah Labor Comm'n (Merrill II ), 2009 UT 74, 223 P.3d 1099. Price claimed she was entitled to recoup the portion reduced from past payments due to the offset, and receive increased future payments by eliminating the offset.

¶10 DKE filed a motion to dismiss Price's claim for increased payments, asserting that Price agreed to settle her disputed PTD claim for a specific amount and that she should be held to the benefit of her bargain. An administrative law judge (the ALJ) agreed with DKE and dismissed the claim with prejudice. Price then asked the Commission to review the ALJ's decision, asserting that re-opening the terms of the settlement agreement was proper because there had not been any bona fide dispute about whether she was permanently and totally disabled. The Commission rejected this argument and affirmed the ALJ's determination. Relying on a statutory subsection enacted in 2014, the Commission concluded that the parties' settlement agreement "extinguish[ed] ... Price's present claim for additional benefits." See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-420(5) (LexisNexis 2019) ("A full and final settlement approved under [the Workers' Compensation Act] shall extinguish the employer's liability to the employee ... except for an issue that is expressly preserved."). The Commission concluded that "disregard[ing] the terms of the agreement and revisit[ing] Price's entitlement would be contrary to the parties' intentions at the time of the settlement and the purposes behind allowing settlement agreements in the workers' compensation context."

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶11 Price now seeks judicial review of the Commission's dismissal of her 2020 claim. An agency's decision to grant a motion to dismiss presents a question of law, which we review for correctness, affording no deference to the agency. Hobbs v. Labor Comm'n , 1999 UT App 308, ¶ 6, 991 P.2d 590 ; see also Baker v. Labor Comm'n , 2015 UT App 127, ¶ 6, 351 P.3d 111.

ANALYSIS

¶12 We begin our analysis with an overview of the legal principles governing settlement of claims in the workers' compensation context, including a discussion of how those principles operated in 1997 and 1998 when the settlement agreement at issue here was entered into and approved. We then turn to the three specific arguments Price raises in support of her challenge to the Commission's ruling.

I

¶13 Utah's Workers' Compensation Act (the Act) provides "the exclusive remedy" for employees to gain redress from their employers for "any accident, injury, or death" sustained or incurred during employment. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105(1) (LexisNexis 2019); see also Stamper v. Johnson , 2010 UT 26, ¶ 12, 232 P.3d 514. Our workers' compensation system "is a mutual arrangement of reciprocal rights between an employer and an employee whereby both parties give up and gain certain advantages." Bingham v. Lagoon Corp. , 707 P.2d 678, 679 (Utah 1985). "The Act's remedial scheme [is] a ‘quid pro quo’ in which employees are able to recover for job-related injuries without showing fault and employers are protected from tort suits by virtue of the Act's exclusive remedy provision." Helf v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. , 2009 UT 11, ¶ 16, 203 P.3d 962 (quotation simplified). The "primary objective" of workers' compensation statutes is to remove industrial accidents "from the concept of the law of tort," Bryan v. Utah Int'l , 533 P.2d 892, 893 (Utah 1975), and thereby provide employees "a measure...