Price v. State

2019 Ark. 323

588 S.W.3d 1

Travis PRICE, Appellant

v.STATE of Arkansas, Appellee

No. CR-18-1029

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Opinion Delivered: November 14, 2019

Bill Luppen, for appellant.

Leslie Rutledge, Att'y Gen., by: Brooke Jackson Gasaway, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.

JOHN DAN KEMP, Chief Justice

Appellant Travis Price appeals an order of the Jefferson County Circuit Court convicting him of first-degree felony murder, two counts of aggravated robbery, and a firearm enhancement and sentencing him as a habitual offender to life imprisonment. For reversal, Price argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motions for directed verdict, sentencing him illegally, and denying his motion to suppress. We affirm.

I. Facts

Officer Christopher Sweeney of the Pine Bluff Police Department testified that, around midnight on May 14, 2016, he responded to a call involving a shooting at a Pine Bluff residence. When he arrived at the scene, the officer witnessed a man later identified as Jason Tyler carrying a red gaming table out of the home. Officer Sweeney entered the residence and found a man named Mason Foster sitting in a chair. He also found the victim, Andre Eason, unresponsive and lying in the floor. Dr. Adam Craig, a forensic pathologist at the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory, testified that Eason died from a gunshot wound that entered the left shoulder area, traveled through the body, and lodged in his pelvic bone.

Five eyewitnesses testified at trial. Foster testified that several friends gathered for a barbeque at his home and started shooting dice around 10:00 p.m. Foster stated that Price and "two younger guys" came to his home "ready to gamble." Foster stated that Price lost his money, and he and his two friends walked out the back door but returned five minutes later. According to Foster, Price reentered the room, pointed a gun at Foster's face, and said to "drop it, old school." Foster said that he dropped his money, which totaled approximately $1000, and Price lowered the gun. Foster slowly walked toward the bathroom, heard seven or eight shots, heard the backdoor slam, and emerged from the bathroom. Foster witnessed Price and the two men leave in a black Altima with a Texas license plate. Foster also testified that he saw Eason lying on the floor.

Tyler testified that he arrived at Foster's home around 11 p.m. on May 13, 2016. He testified that he and other individuals gambled and played dice that evening but that he lost his money. Tyler stated that he later heard shots, "balled up on the couch," and heard someone yell to get down. Tyler stated that he dropped his money and did not see who asked for it. Tyler further stated that he and Anthony Luckett ran out the front door and remained outside.

E.L. Surratt testified that he remembered drinking, shooting dice, and gambling at Mason's duplex until approximately 1 a.m. that evening. Surratt stated that he remembered gambling with a man by the street name of "Red" or "Red Nose." Surratt testified that "[t]he one I was gambling with" left, and "he wasn't out too long before he came back in." Surratt said that when the man returned, he shot his gun "in a seat or couch or something" but was not aiming at anyone. When he heard the shot, Surratt jumped up, got pushed, and fell to the floor. Surratt witnessed Foster pick up the table, and "they scuffled over" it. According to Surratt, more shots were fired in the house, and one of the men who "robbed the place" took his money.

Anthony Luckett testified that he went to Foster's home and recalled Price needing Foster to loan him $150. Luckett stated that Price asked him to intervene. Luckett testified that when he heard shots, he ran out the door and two blocks down the street. Luckett stated that he never saw Price with a gun, but he saw another man at the scene with a gun in his pocket.

Jesse Pridgeon, Foster's brother-in-law, testified that he saw Price "standing around and gambling" that evening. Pridgeon stated that Price "had two young guys with him." He testified that when he walked out of the bathroom, he saw Price "cock a gun," turn around, fire a couple of shots in the house, and say, "All you mother fuckers on the floor." Pridgeon testified that he ran into a back bedroom where Price could not see him. While he hid in the bedroom, Pridgeon heard five or six shots, heard someone say "someone got hit," and heard people "running everywhere and stuff."

Detective Keith Banks of the Pine Bluff Police Department testified that he received a call to investigate a possible homicide at approximately 1:00 a.m. When the detective arrived, he met the five eyewitnesses—Foster, Tyler, Surratt, Luckett, and Pridgeon—and interviewed them at the scene. Detective Banks testified that Price was subsequently arrested, taken into custody, and interviewed. During the detective's testimony, the State played for the jury Price's recorded interview during which he denied his involvement in the murder but admitted his presence at Foster's home that night.

On May 11, 2018, the State charged Price with one count of capital murder, six counts of aggravated robbery, felon in possession of a firearm, and two sentencing enhancements. A Jefferson County Circuit Court jury convicted Price of first-degree felony murder, two counts of aggravated robbery against Foster and Surratt, and a felon-in possession-of-a-firearm enhancement. The circuit court sentenced him as a habitual offender to a term of life imprisonment for the first-degree murder conviction and two terms of life imprisonment for the aggravated-robbery convictions. On May 24, 2018, the circuit court entered its sentencing order. From this order, Price timely appealed.

II. Motions for Directed Verdict

On appeal, Price argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict because substantial evidence does not support the first-degree murder conviction and one of the aggravated-robbery convictions.

We treat a motion for directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Gillard v. State , 372 Ark. 98, 270 S.W.3d 836 (2008). In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and consider only the evidence that supports the verdict. Id. , 270 S.W.3d 836. We affirm a conviction if substantial evidence exists to support it. Id. , 270 S.W.3d 836. Substantial evidence is that which is of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the other without resorting to speculation or conjecture. Navarro v. State , 371 Ark. 179, 264 S.W.3d 530 (2007).

Price's criminal liability is based on his status as an accomplice. Under accomplice liability, "[a] person may commit an offense either by his or her own conduct or that of another person." Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-401 (Repl. 2013). "A person is criminally liable for the conduct of another person if ... [t]he person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense[.]" Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-402(2) (Repl. 2013). A person is an accomplice of another person if, with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he or she solicits, advises, encourages, coerces, aids, agrees to aid, or attempts to aid in planning or committing the offense. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-403(a)(1)–(2) (Repl. 2013).

When a theory of accomplice liability is implicated, we affirm the circuit court's order in a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge if substantial evidence exists to show that the defendant acted as an accomplice in the commission of the alleged offense. Cook v. State , 350 Ark. 398, 86 S.W.3d 916 (2002). We have said that there is no distinction between principals on the one hand and accomplices on the other, insofar as criminal liability is concerned. Id. , 86 S.W.3d 916. When two people assist one another in the commission of a crime, each is an accomplice and criminally liable for the conduct of both. Id. , 86 S.W.3d 916. One cannot disclaim accomplice liability simply because he or she did not personally take part in every act that went to make up the crime as a whole. Id. , 86 S.W.3d 916.

A. First-Degree Murder

Price argues that the evidence was not sufficient to support his first-degree murder conviction and specifically contends that the eyewitnesses failed to provide any testimony about seeing the victim get shot or who shot him.

The felony-murder statute provides,

(a) A person commits murder in the first degree if:

(1) Acting alone or with one (1) or more other persons:

(A) The person commits or attempts to commit a felony; and

(B) In the course of and in furtherance of the felony or in immediate flight from the felony, the person or an accomplice causes the death of any person under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life[.]

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-102(a)(1) (Repl. 2013).

Circumstantial evidence may provide a basis to support a conviction, but it must be consistent with the defendant's guilt and inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion. Cluck v. State , 365 Ark. 166, 226 S.W.3d 780 (2006). Whether the evidence excludes every other hypothesis is left to the jury to decide. Id. , 226 S.W.3d 780. The weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are matters for the fact-finder, not for this court on appeal. Ridling v. State , 360 Ark. 424, 203 S.W.3d 63 (2005). The jury may believe all or part of any witness's testimony and is responsible for resolving questions of conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence. Id. , 203 S.W.3d 63. A criminal defendant's intent or state of mind is rarely capable of proof by direct evidence and most often is inferred from the circumstances of the crime. Steggall v. State , 340 Ark. 184, 8 S.W.3d 538 (2000). A jury is not required to believe all or any part of a defendant's or witness's statement and is entitled to draw upon common sense and experience in reaching its...