Pritchard v. Fla. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc.

371 F.Supp.3d 1081

Thomas PRITCHARD, Plaintiff,

v.FLORIDA HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, INC., Defendant.

Case No: 2:19-cv-94-FtM-29MRM

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Fort Myers Division.

Signed March 19, 2019

Michael Lamar Buckner, Michael L. Buckner Law Firm, P.A., Plantation, FL, for Plaintiff.

Leonard E. Ireland, Jr., Gainesville, FL, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

JOHN E. STEELE, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. # 5) filed on February 14, 2019. Defendant filed a Memorandum in Opposition (Doc. # 24) on March 14, 2019. The Court heard oral arguments on the motion on March 18, 2019. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.

I.

On February 13, 2019, plaintiff Thomas Pritchard filed a three-count Verified Complaint against defendant Florida High School Athletic Association, Inc., alleging violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, based on disability discrimination. (Doc. # 1, pp. 12-16.) Defendant is a non-profit corporation and the athletic administrative organization that regulates student participation in Florida high school athletic programs. (Id. p. 2.) As part of this regulation, defendant adopts and publishes bylaws relating to student-athlete eligibility. (Id. p. 3.) One such bylaw provides the following:

9.5.1 High School Student Has Four Years of Eligibility. A student is limited to four consecutive school years of eligibility beginning with school year he/she begins ninth grade for the first time. This does not imply that the student has four years of participation. After four consecutive school years, the student is permanently ineligible.

(Doc. # 1-3, p. 23.)

Per the Verified Complaint, plaintiff participated in high school athletics during his ninth and tenth grade years in Virginia before transferring to Florida and attending the Canterbury School. (Id. pp. 4-6.)

Based on a pre-enrollment assessment, Canterbury administrators recommended plaintiff repeat the tenth grade. (Id. p. 6.) Plaintiff did so, and competed in the school's basketball and lacrosse programs. (Id. ) The following year in the eleventh grade, plaintiff competed in the school's football, basketball, and lacrosse programs. (Id. ) Under defendant's Bylaw 9.5.1, this was the final year of plaintiff's eligibility because it was his fourth consecutive year in high school.

Plaintiff is now in the twelfth grade at Canterbury and on track to graduate at the end of the school year. (Id. p. 7.) In August 2018, Canterbury filed a request with defendant to waive Bylaw 9.5.1 and allow plaintiff to have an additional year of eligibility. (Doc. # 1-4, pp. 24-27.) During the 2017-18 school year, Canterbury staff recommended a psychologist test plaintiff. (Doc. # 1, pp. 6-7.) A full psychoeducational evaluation concluded plaintiff possessed a learning disorder with impairment in reading and comprehension. (Id. p. 7.) Canterbury administrators also identified a previous injury to plaintiff's hand, which caused him to have to write with his non-dominate hand, as a physical disability that adversely affected his math proficiency. (Id. p. 7.) As a supplement to the school's requested waiver, plaintiff's attorney argued that a waiver was appropriate because of, inter alia , plaintiff's learning disability and his hand injury. (Doc. # 1-4, p. 50.)

Defendant's Sectional Appeals Committee held a hearing on the matter on September 6, 2018 and ultimately denied the request for a waiver. (Doc. # 1-6, p. 109.) A second hearing was held on October 4, 2018 with the same result. (Doc. # 1-8, p. 150.) Plaintiff appealed the Committee's decision to defendant's Board of Directors, which conducted a hearing on October 28, 2018. (Doc. # 1-10, p. 195.) The Board upheld the Committee's ruling denying the waiver on November 1, 2018. (Id. )

On February 14, 2019, plaintiff filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order seeking, inter alia , a temporary restraining order and preliminary and permanent injunctions ordering defendant to accommodate him by allowing him to participate in boys' lacrosse during the 2018-19 school year. (Doc. # 5, p. 2.) On February 19, 2019, the Court denied the portion of the motion seeking a temporary restraining order. (Doc. # 6.) The Court found that by waiting to file the motion for nearly three and a half months until only two days before the lacrosse team's season began, the "emergency" nature of the plaintiff's situation was his own making. (Id. p. 5.)

On February 25, 2019, plaintiff filed a request for a hearing on his motion for preliminary injunction. (Doc. # 14.) The Court granted the motion, (Doc. # 21), and a hearing was conducted on March 18, 2019. Having considered the arguments made at the hearing and in the motion, as well as the applicable case law, the Court finds the request for a preliminary injunction should be denied.

II.

In determining whether preliminary injunctive relief is to be granted, the Court considers whether the movant has established (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) that irreparable injury will be suffered if the relief is not granted, (3) that the threatened injury outweighs the harm the relief would inflict on the non-movant, and (4) that entry of the relief would serve the public interest. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1225-26 (11th Cir. 2005). In this Circuit, a preliminary injunction is "an extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted unless the movant clearly established the ‘burden of persuasion’ " as to each of the four prerequisites. Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Because the movant "must meet all four prerequisites to obtain a preliminary injunction, failure to meet even one dooms" the motion. Wreal, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 840 F.3d 1244, 1248 (11th Cir. 2016).

A preliminary injunction is typically prohibitive in nature and seeks simply to maintain the status quo pending a resolution of the merits of the case. Haddad v. Arnold, 784 F.Supp.2d 1284, 1295 (M.D. Fla. 2010) ; see also Bloedorn v. Grube, 631 F.3d 1218, 1229 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting that the purpose of the "extraordinary remedy" of a preliminary injunction in advance of trial is "to preserve the positions of the parties as best [the court can] until a trial on the merits may be held"). Here, plaintiff does not seek to maintain the status quo, but rather seeks an injunction ordering defendant to accommodate him by allowing him to participate in the lacrosse season. (Doc. # 5, p. 2.) Such a request is considered a "mandatory or affirmative injunction." While defendant argues that such an injunction requires a heightened burden of demonstrating entitlement on plaintiff, it cites no binding authority. The Court therefore holds plaintiff to the usual requirements.

III.

A. Irreparable Injury

The Court begins its analysis by reexamining its prior conclusion that plaintiff's three and a half months delay in moving for ex parte relief was fatal to his request for a temporary restraining order. In examining the factors for a preliminary injunction, the Eleventh Circuit has noted that waiting such a period undercuts an argument that the movant faces "irreparable injury" without relief:

A delay in seeking a preliminary injunction of even only a few months—though not necessarily fatal—militates against a finding of irreparable harm. A preliminary injunction requires showing "imminent" irreparable harm. Indeed, the very idea of a preliminary injunction is premised on the need for speedy and urgent action to protect a plaintiff's right before a case can be resolved on its merits. For this reason, our sister circuits and district courts within this Circuit and elsewhere have found that a party's failure to act with speed or urgency in moving for a preliminary injunction necessarily undermines a finding of irreparable harm.

Wreal, 840 F.3d at 1248 (citations omitted).

Plaintiff argues his delay in pursuing injunctive relief does not negate a finding of irreparable harm as he possesses a reasonable explanation for the delay. (Doc. # 14, p. 6); see also Roberts v. Swearingen, 2018 WL 4620707, *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2018) (noting many courts typically decline to grant preliminary injunctions in the face of "unexplained delays of more than two months" (emphasis added and citation omitted) ). Plaintiff has submitted affidavit evidence that he suffered severe depression after defendant denied his eligibility request and became "paralyzed" for several months. (Doc. # 14-3, p. 233.) Due to this depression, plaintiff did not want to pursue any legal action regarding his eligibility for some time. (Id. pp. 233-34.)

For purposes of the motion, the Court will assume the validity of plaintiff's assertions and that they are sufficient to excuse his delay. See Advanced Commc'n Design, Inc. v. Premier Retail Networks, Inc., 46 Fed. App'x 964, 984 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("[W]e excuse delayed requests for Rule 65 relief when, as in this case, the movant has offered a ‘good explanation’ for that delay."); Kotori Designs, LLC v. Living Well Spending Less, Inc., 2016 WL 6833004, *2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 21, 2016) ("If Ms. Dalton's claims are true, then the Court agrees that Plaintiff did not unreasonably delay in pursuing injunctive relief.").

B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Nonetheless, the Court finds a preliminary injunction is inappropriate because plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. Plaintiff's claims are based upon Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, et. seq. (Doc. # 1, p. 3.) As such, the Court will analyze the "substantial likelihood of success" element as it relates to each of these statutes.

(1) Rehabilitation Act

The Rehabilitation Act provides, in pertinent part, "No otherwise qualified individual...